Terrorism, Corporate Performance and Business Strategies: Presence, Impact, and Future by Malik, Faisal Saeed
Terrorism, Corporate Performance and Business Strategies: 




for obtaining the academic degree of  
Doctor rerum oeconomicarum (Dr. rer. oec.) 
 
Faculty of Management and Economics 
Schumpeter School of Business and Economics 




Faisal Saeed MALIK 




Prof. Dr. Werner Bönte 
Chair of Industrial Organization and Innovation 
Schumpeter School of Business and Economics 
Bergische Universität Wuppertal 
 
1. Supervisor 
Prof. Dr. Vivien Procher 
Chair of Entrepreneurship and Innovative Business Models 
Philipps-Universität Marburg 


















                                                           
1 I am highly indebted to Higher Education Commission (HEC), Pakistan for funding my doctoral studies. Chair of 
Industrial Organization and Innovation (Prof. Dr. Werner Bönte), Jackstädt Center of Entrepreneurship and 
Innovation Research, Center for Graduate Studies (CGS), and Schumpeter School of Business and Economics at 
Bergische Universität Wuppertal has graciously supported my doctoral research, conferences, and research travels,  
2 Doctoral dissertation is printed with the support of the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD). 
DEDICATION 
By the Grace of Allah, I dedicate this dissertation to my father, Muhammad Saeed Malik; my 
mother, Zamurd Saeed Malik; sisters, Hina & Sadia; and my elder brother, Adil Saeed Malik.  





I am greatly thankful to my supervisor Werner Bönte for accepting me as a doctoral student 
on a phone call. Since my first interaction with Prof. Bönte, he always amazed me with his 
generosity, patience and kindness. He is bighearted from day one and still providing me all 
opportunities to establish myself in the field. During my doctoral journey, his guidance and 
invaluable suggestions enlightened me to understand “the significant scientific contribution”. I 
am also grateful to Prof. Procher for her trust and a strong believe in my abilities. Her clarity of 
thoughts and inspirational statement “Faisal... you can do it…” always motivated me to go extra 
mile. She discovered a hidden talent in me i.e., my networking skills. I still remember the way 
she appreciated me for my first conference. Without her care and vision, it would have been 
difficult to achieve excellence. No matter how much I achieve, I always dedicate my success to 
my professors. Thanks for always showing me hope when I was lost and distracted.  
Moreover, I am intellectually indebted to Christian Rupietta for always sharing honest 
thoughts on my research and introducing me to innovative quantitative methodological technique 
fsQCA. His suggestions have always added value to my research. I highly regard him for my 
career development (for Swiss Chocolates too). I would like to show my greatest appreciation to 
Prof. Dr. Rocki-Lee DeWitt (my co-author). Since my presentation at AOM (2019) in Boston, 
she has always broadened my understanding to strategy and core of the business. Her meticulous 
comments on my research expanded the scope of my research. She made an incredible impact by 
sharing her vast knowledge. I must thank Diemo Urbig for his dynamic personality. His presence 
at JZ was a blessing for me, his networking skills and the art of asking questions was matchless. I 
remembered his precious words to stay focused on research methods skills and life in general.   
v 
 
I thank Prof. Dr. Uzair Ahson for supervising my Master-Thesis and always sharing 
inspirational thoughts. I truly respect and honor my teachers Qais Aslam, Almas Hyder, Rafiq 
Jaffar, Imtiaz Khalid, and Bashir Naeem for discovering my potential and transforming me as a 
person. I must appreciate Naseer Almas for stirring up my big dreams. Thanks Dr. Ghulam 
Hussain for always coaching me about life. I must mention my dear friend Dr. Sajid Ali for 
absolute support. Thanks to Mrs. Timmermann for taking great care of my health. Thanks for 
being part of this journey: Abdullah, Ahmad, Ali, Anna, Anton, Anwar, Asad, Asif, Atif, Axel, 
Bilal, Birim, Behailu, Christian, Claudia, Desiree, Dmitry, Franziska, Hamid, Iiris, Imad, Irmak, 
Jan, Jana, Jens, Julia, Khurram, Klaudia, Katherina, Leo, Lu, Marco, Markus, Nader, Nana, 
Nasir, Nazia, Niyaz, Oliver, Omer, Osama, Philip, Rudy, Saad, Sabeeh, Sandro, Sarah, Shamas, 
Shahbaz, Shahzad, Shazaib, Sofia, Susan, Tobias, Vannesa, Victoria, Waleed, and Waseem.  
My intellectual debt is to the faculty of the Schumpeter School of Business and Economics 
for the development of dissertation. Thanks Prof. Christine Volkmann Director Jackstädt Center 
for encouragement in the beginning of my doctoral journey. I must thank Prof. Pigorsh for 
teaching econometrics and application of methods in Master-course and doctoral seminar. I 
heartily acknowledge Prof. Betzer, Prof. Crasellt,  Prof. Jürges, Prof. Jüßen, Prof. Rupietta, Prof. 
Schneider, Prof. Temme, and Prof. Witt for valuable feedback on my research. Thanks Matthias 
Schulz and Philip Steinberg for sharing great memories. I must acknowledge Mrs. Haselhof for 
administrative support and great conversations. Thanks Mrs. Wüster, for always considering me 
the part of the family. Unfortunately, she is no more, but her thoughts will stay. I am thankful to 
Mrs. Bieck, Mr. Bartsch, Prof. Dr. Braukmann, Mr. Hanebeck, Mrs. Heide, Mrs. Jansen, Mr. 
Kluge, Mrs. Leclaire, Mrs. Lindhorst, and Mrs. Stenzel for always extending their help in 
administrative matters at Bergische Universität Wuppertal.  
vi 
 
Outside the Schumpeter School, my dissertation is presented at various flagship conferences 
in the field. I want to thank David Audretch for encouraging my research idea at various 
conferences. My special thanks for Simon Parker for offering a course on STATA using a Panel 
Data in Siegen, his teaching philosophy inspired me. I am extremely thankful to Michael Hitt for 
offering a detailed discussion on my research. I also thank Mike Peng, Yadong Luo, Sheila 
Puffer, David Ahlstrom, Seung-Hyun Lee, and John Meiz for their valuable feedback at Global 
Strategy and Emerging Market Conference (GSEM) 2019 at University of Texas, Dallas, USA. 
This dissertation has also benefitted from the valuable and insightful discussion about my 
research projects with Jeane Boddewyn, Alvaro Cuervo-Cazurra, Michael Czinkota, Li Dai, 
Lorraine Eden, Walid Hejazi, Gary Knight, Dan Li, Shige Makino, Ram Mudambi, and Saeed 
Samiee at the Academy of International Business 2019, Copenhagen, Denmark.  
A special thanks to Prof. Dr. Robert Greenbaum and Prof. Dr. Gary Lafree for sharing 
thoughts on my research. Later on, Prof. LaFree invited for a presentation at START (Global 
Terrorism Database) University of Maryland, USA. Terrorism research experts helped me to 
refine my research. I felt honored when Prof. Czinkota offered to visit McDonough School of 
Business at Georgetown University, Washington, USA. His persona is larger than life, he has 
always been a great support to introduce me to other leading scholars and encouraging me to 
carry on research on the topic of terrorism and international business. His scientific work is a 
great source of an inspiration for my future research prospect. Special thanks to Mr. & Mrs. 
Boddewyn for inviting me to New York for a diner and sharing great thoughts on my research. I 
must thank International Management (IM) Division, Academy of Management for accepting my 
research for Doctoral Student Consortium and Professional Development Workshop. It provided 
me an opportunity to spend a day with the leading scholars in the field of IM and Strategy.  
vii 
 
I am highly thankful to Prof. Jay Barney for discussing my project and hinting future 
research possibilities. Academy of Management 2019 in Boston provided me a presentation 
opportunity to talk about my research with the leading scholars Ilya Cuypers, Rocki-Lee DeWitt, 
Jesper Edman, Kendall Roth, William Newburry, and Srilata (Sri) Zaheer. I am deeply grateful 
to Peter Liesch for offering support for future research project. I must thank Sarianna Lundan, 
Rebecca (Becky) Reuber, Elizabeth Rose, Paul Vaaler, and Alan Verbeke for the feedback on 
my research at European International Business Academy 2019, Leeds, UK. I am thankful to 
Rebecca Piekkari, Emmanuella Playkoyianaki, and Catherine Welch for offering a workshop on 
Qualitative Case Study Research in International Business. I must acknowledge your valuable 
comments on my research. I want to thank Ajai Gaur, Walid Hejazi, Gary Knight, Martina 
Musteen, and Carol Reade for valuable feedback and honoring my research with the Student 
Paper Award at Academy of International Business 2020, US-West Chapter, San Diego, USA.   
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Higher Education Commission (HEC), 
Pakistan, the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD), Jackstädt Center for 
Entrepreneurship (JCE), Center for Graduate Studies (CGS), and Zentralen 
Forschungfördertopfes (ZEFFT) for funding my doctoral studies in Germany. Research 
competitiveness can only be achieved by knowledge sharing among the scientific community. 
Capacity buildings and scientific research networks are contingent to sufficient financial 
resources. Fortunately, I could get hold of flagship conferences because of Prof. Bönte’s 
generous funds for my research. Also, I am obliged to the Center for Graduate Studies, 
University of Wuppertal, and the “Eberhard Robke-Stiftung” for providing additional funds to 
establish international research connections through showcasing of research at international 
conferences. Hence, it yields me great research collaboration with Prof. Rocki-Lee DeWitt.   
viii 
 
This dissertation was not possible without the emotional support from my family. I thank my 
parents for their continuous support, also within single projects of this dissertation, and for 
outlining the beauty of learning to me. I thank my father, Muhammad Saeed Malik who has 
shown me the meaning of honesty, integrity and unbending principles. Thanks for always 
teaching me the path of uprightness. I must mention my mother, Zamurd Saeed Malik who 
taught me the meaning of life. Because of her, I never needed a friend. Her love and care has 
always captivated me. I always felt amazing to discuss everything about everything. Without her 
love and patience, I would have not have been able to follow my passion: “Without you, 
everything is nothing, and with you, nothing can be everything.”  
I am deeply thankful to my brother Adil Saeed Malik who always stood by me in every thick 
and thin. I missed you throughout these years. I may not be able to pay back all the efforts and 
responsibilities you did to ensure my absence. You support has ensured my doctoral journey. I 
am thankful to you for every single day. Thanks to my sisters Hina and Sadia for always being a 
reason of happiness in my life. Thanks for being strength in my life. They are the real happiness 
for me. A special thanks to Momina and Maria for always bringing smile on my face. Because of 
their innocence, I always remained energetic and fresh to look at the bright side of life. I must 
thank my grandparents Mr. & Mrs. Malik Dost Muhammad and Mr. & Mrs. Malik Atta 
Muhammad for endless love. Last but not the least, I want to thank to all my well wishers who 
have an impressive impact on who I am, but I am not going to mention all here. Thanks to my 
secret lovers and admirers for encouraging me and believing in me.  
Faisal Saeed Malik, 




This dissertation consists of five chapters which investigate different facets of terrorism on 
firms. I have extensively benefitted from the insightful discussions with my professors. In 
Chapter 2, I have built on a data from survey conducted at international trade fairs. Chapter 2 of 
this dissertation is completed as a single authored. Research reported in Chapter 3 is a joint work 
with my supervisors, Prof. Dr. Werner Bönte and Prof. Dr. Vivien Procher. Chapter 4 is a 
collaborative research project with Prof. Dr. Rocki-Lee DeWitt from Grossman School of 
Business, University of Vermont, USA. In all Chapters of the dissertation, I have major 
contributions in all aspects of the research process, including theory development, design of the 
empirical approach, analyses, discussion, and the writing process. 
An earlier version of Chapter 2 has received a student paper award at the Academy of 
International Business (AIB) 2020 US-West Chapter 2020 in San Diego, USA. Moreover, 
Chapter 2 has been accepted and presented at the following scientific conferences and seminars: 
Global Strategy and Emerging Market (GSEM) 2019 in Dallas, USA; AIB 2019 in Copenhagen, 
Denmark; the Academy of Management (AOM) 2019 in Boston, USA; European International 
Business Academy (EIBA) 2019 in Leeds, UK; AIB 2020 Annual Conference (Online). Chapter 
3 has been presented at Annual Entrepreneurship Workshop (2015) in Indiana, USA; Brown Bag 
Seminar of Schumpeter School of Business and Economics (2017); Kiel International Workshop 
(2017); and Schumpeter Society Workshop (2019). Chapter 3 also received critical insights from 
Martina Musteen and Carol Reade. Chapter 4 is presented and received well at National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Research on Terrorism (START) 2019, Maryland, 
USA. Chapter 4 is presented to Robert Greenbaum, Walid Hejazi, and Gary LaFree for feedback.    
x 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Acknowledgements ...................................................................................................................... iv 
Preface ........................................................................................................................................... ix 
Table of Contents  ..........................................................................................................................x 
List of Tables  ............................................................................................................................. xiii 
List of Figures  ..............................................................................................................................xv 
 
1. Introduction  ...............................................................................................................................1 
1.1. Motivation .............................................................................................................................1 
1.2. Major research gaps and organization of the dissertation .....................................................8 
1.3. Contributions and overview of the dissertation ..................................................................13 
 
2. Exploring the Effects of Terrorism on Business Operations and Firms’ Responses  ........21 
2.1. Introduction .........................................................................................................................21 
2.2. Conceptual background  ......................................................................................................23 
2.2.1. Potential effects of terrorism on business dimensions .................................................26 
2.2.2. Management practices to deal with terrorism ..............................................................29 
2.3. Method ................................................................................................................................33 
2.3.1. Research setting and design..........................................................................................33 
2.3.2. Questionnaire development ..........................................................................................33 
2.3.3. Data collection ..............................................................................................................38 
2.3.4. Sample ..........................................................................................................................39 
2.4. Results .................................................................................................................................41 
2.5. Discussion ...........................................................................................................................50 





3. Terror in the City: Effects of Terrorism on Firms Exports   ...............................................61 
3.1. Introduction .........................................................................................................................61 
3.2. Terrorism, Firms Exports, and Interregional Spillovers  ....................................................64 
3.3. Data .....................................................................................................................................71 
3.3.1. Data sources and sample ..............................................................................................71 
3.3.2. Measurement of variables.............................................................................................73 
3.3.3. Variation of terrorism in Pakistan across cities and time .............................................77 
3.4. Econometric specification and results .................................................................................82 
3.4.1. Econometric speciation  ...............................................................................................82 
3.4.2. Regression results .........................................................................................................83 
3.5. Discussion and conclusion ..................................................................................................90 
 
4. Terrorism, Competitive Positioning and Liability of Location: Exit of Publicly-Traded 
Pakistani Firms ............................................................................................................................94 
4.1. Introduction .........................................................................................................................94 
4.2. Theory and hypothesis  .......................................................................................................99 
4.3. Methods .............................................................................................................................108 
4.3.1. Data.............................................................................................................................109 
4.3.2. Variables .....................................................................................................................109 
4.4. Data analysis .....................................................................................................................120 
4.5. Results ...............................................................................................................................121 
4.6. Discussion and conclusions ...............................................................................................130 
4.6.1. Theoretical contributions ............................................................................................130 
4.6.2. Empirical contributions ..............................................................................................132 
4.6.3. Practical contributions ................................................................................................134 
 
5. Overall Summary and Conclusion .......................................................................................136 
5.1. Overview ...........................................................................................................................136 
5.2. Summary ...........................................................................................................................137 
5.2.1. Chapter 2 ....................................................................................................................141 
xii 
 
5.2.2. Chapter 3 ....................................................................................................................146 
5.2.3. Chapter 4 ....................................................................................................................148 
5.3. Implications .......................................................................................................................150 
5.3.1. Limitations and implications for research ..................................................................150 
5.3.2. Implications for policy ...............................................................................................153 
5.3.3. Implications for managers ..........................................................................................157 





Appendix A. Survey for Trade Fairs in Germany and Pakistan (Chapter 2) ...........................177 












LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1.1: Overview of chapters and contributions of the dissertation           14 
Table 2.1: Effects and threats of terrorism               34 
Table 2.2: Effects of terrorism on business operations             35 
Table 2.3: Management practices items               37 
Table 2.4a: Profile of firms                 40 
Table 2.4b: Firms profiling based on location, size, and export-intensity           40 
Table 2.5: Export and non-export firms and effects or threats of terrorism           41 
Table 2.6: Different size of firms and effects or threats of terrorism               42 
Table 2.7: Firms located in different cities and effects or threats of terrorism          42 
Table 2.8: Effect of terrorism on business operations of Export and non-exporting firms         43 
Table 2.9: Different size of firms and effect of terrorism on business operations          44 
Table 2.10: Firms located in different cities and effect of terrorism on business operations       45 
Table 2.11: Export and non-export firms’ management practices to deal with terrorism         46 
Table 2.12: Different size of firms and management practices to deal with terrorism         47 
Table 2.13: Export Firms location and management practices to deal with terrorism         49 
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics                76 
Table 3.2: Correlation matrix                76 
Table 3.3: The Relationship between Export Ratio and Terrorism                       85 
Table 3.4: The Relationship between Export Ratio and Terrorism            86 
Table 4.1: Firms by City and Industry                           110 
xiv 
 
Table 4.2: Exit of Publically Listed Firms, Pakistan Stock Exchange, 2002-2015                    111 
Table 4.3: Geographically distribution of Bankruptcy (All Sectors)                    111 
Table 4.4: Bankruptcy by City and Industry                           117 
Table 4.5: City, Industry, Size, Export and Age of Bankruptcy Firms                    118 
Table 4.6: Location and Severity of Terrorism and Exit from Stock Market                   122 
Table 4.7: Location and Severity of Terrorism and Exit by Share Buyback                    123 
Table 4.8: Location and Severity of Terrorism and Exit by M&A                     124 
Table 4.9: Location and Severity of Terrorism and Exit by Bankruptcy                    125 
Table 4.10a: Textiles Firms in Exports                           126 
Table 4.10b: Textiles Firms in Sizes                            126 
Table 4.10c: Textiles Firms by Size and Exports                          126 
Table 4.10d: Textiles Firms Bankruptcy                           127 
Table 4.10e: Textiles Firms Bankruptcy by High Terrorism Cities                     127 
Table 4.10f: Textiles Firms Bankruptcy by Exports                         128 
Table 4.10g: Textiles Firms Bankruptcy by Size                          128 
Table 4.11: Bankruptcy in Textiles as Function of “Location” -- Geography, Size,  
Export and Terrorism                           129 
Table 5.1: Summary of dissertation                         138 





LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1.1a: Global terrorism rank of Pakistan 2002-2015              4 
Figure 1.1b: Terrorism deaths in Pakistan 2002-2015              5 
Figure 1.2: Terrorism in various cities of Pakistan (City Terrorism Index)                    7 
Figure 1.3: Organization of dissertation                8 
Figure 2.1: Relation of terrorism and business dimensions of the firm           28 
Figure 2.2: Relationship between firms’ business dimensions, management practices, 
and terrorism                         30 
Figure 2.3: Firms management practices to safeguard business dimensions                       31 
Figure 3.1: Terrorism in cities across Pakistan (CTI index)             78 
Figure 3.2: City Terrorism Index (CTI) in Pakistani cities for the 2000 to 2007 period              80 
Figure 3.2: City Terrorism Index (CTI) in Pakistani cities for the 2008 to 2015 period              81 
Figure 4.1: Model of Exit Due to Liabilities of Location                         103 
Figure 4.2: SATP Terrorism in Selected Cities, 2001-2015                       114 










“Private-sector preparedness is not a luxury; it is a cost of doing business in the post-9/11 
world. It is ignored at a tremendous potential cost in lives, money and national security.” 
(The 9 11 Commission Report, 2004, Page 398) 
Terrorism has become increasingly prevalent. Data evidences variation in its occurrence by 
geography and time. Guidance provided to firms to address terrorism, both its threat and direct 
experience, offers a comprehensive set of activities. Yet to date, the variety of ways in which 
firms might address terrorism and the extent to which the potential impact of terrorism varies as 
a function of contextual and/or firm attributes is underexplored. The overarching objective of this 
dissertation is to examine the relationship between terrorism, firms’ characteristics, and firms’ 
behaviors. I analyze the implications of terrorism on businesses and strategic response of firms to 
safeguard business activities.  
Terrorism can be understood both as an event and the repeated occurrence of these particular 
types of events. As an event, it is noteworthy for its unpredictable and sudden nature; it is a 
“shock”. Terrorism shock has a potential to "cause fatalities, injuries, property damage, 
infrastructure damage, and agricultural loss, damage to the environment, interruption of business, 
or other types of harm or loss” (IMF, 2018). Businesses are the soft targets of terrorist groups 
(Frey, 2009) and, in certain instance, terrorist events are purposely designed to seriously damage 
business activities. As a repeated occurrence, while the sudden nature of terrorism does not 
change, the expectation of terrorism events increases, giving greater impetus to institutional and 
business modifications to reduce its impact.  
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Terrorism has been a global problem since the beginning of the 21st century (Institute for 
Economics and Peace, 2019). Quite a number of countries and regions have experienced 
terrorism. For some, terrorism is a significant threat to peace but, for others, it is a negligible 
issue. Terrorism as a threat to peace has important economic consequences for countries and 
businesses within those countries. According to the report of Business and Peace (2018), foreign 
direct investment inflows are more than two times higher in countries with higher levels of peace 
than in less peaceful countries. However, within countries affected by terrorism, foreign direct 
investment may persist, albeit at lower levels. Within a country, not all locations experience 
terrorism in the same way. Business leaders encounter different level of uncertainty in various 
regions and devise different anti-terrorism strategies based on their experience of terrorist 
incidents. Policies adopted by businesses to respond to terrorist attacks effect market resilience 
(Brück & Wickström, 2004). The density of uncertainty in different regions asks for a 
customized policy to mitigate the damage of terrorism.   
Since the beginning of the 21st century, terrorism has received global attention among the 
business community (Institute of Economics and Peace, 2018). Terrorism presents an external 
challenge to regional economic activities and the business environment (Suder & Czinkota, 
2005). Emerging economies like Pakistan faced a dramatic increase in terrorist attacks over the 
past years (Czinkota, 2002; Knight & Czinkota, 2008). Terrorism has negative effects especially 
when emerging economies seek to engage in the global economy (Tingbani et al., 2019). Thus, 
terrorism is an important context to study the impact on capital markets, and other private firms 
from different sectors. The pattern of terrorism and economic and business effects validate 
Pakistan as a suitable single-country context for the study of terrorism’s effects on business 
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activity (Knight and Czinkota, 2008). The high-level literature review offers insight into the field 
of research and the potential contributions of the dissertation. 
Previous literature has mostly focused on macroeconomic analysis of terrorism on economy 
at a cross-country (Abadie & Gardezeabel, 2008; Eggers & Gassebener, 2015; Sandler & Enders, 
2008; Tingbani et al., 2019), but a very little research has focused on firm-specific terrorism 
impact on business activities in a single-country (Greenbaum, LaFree, & Dugan, 2007). 
Therefore, this dissertation focuses on how terrorism affects firms’ operations in Pakistan, one of 
the top 5 ranked terrorism-afflicted countries since the beginning of 21st century. Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Syria, and Nigeria are amongst the other countries of note (Institute of Economics 
and Peace, 2019, see Figure 1.1a & Figure 1.1b). More specifically, since 9/11, the instability in 
Afghanistan and the influx of Afghan refugees resulted in a sudden spike in the frequency and 
scale of terrorist attacks in Pakistan (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017). According to the Global 
Terrorism Report (2019), an increase in terrorism in Pakistan resulted in a reduction in per capita 
GDP (Gross Domestic Product) growth in Pakistan. Moreover, the results of this dissertation 
research can bid policy implications for ensuring a safe business environment in other terrorism-
ridden countries.  
Spatial and temporal coincidence of established firms and terrorist attacks and their mutual 
interaction within Pakistan makes it a more interesting and relevant test case to study the 
relationship of terrorism and firms’ behavior. It takes into account the reliable publicly traded 
and internationally active firms. Manufacturing sector firms’ international outreach enhanced 
industrial sector’s contribution to the GDP of Pakistan by 20.88% (Ministry of Finance, 2017). 
Exports of Pakistan are 8.97% of GDP (World Bank, 2019). Economic development of the 
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country is ensured through a healthy volume of exports activities of the firms. Pakistan exports 
are reaching far-off international markers and generating revenue of $23.631 B, the United States 
($3.802B), China ($1.818B), the United Kingdom ($1.729B), Afghanistan ($1.348B), and 
Germany ($1.310B) share the major portion (World Integrated Trade Solution, 2018). Different 
industrial sectors are contributing to the total exports of Pakistan: textiles and clothing $13.569B, 
vegetable $3.456B, food products $1.223B, hides and skins $957M, animal $743M, minerals 
$532M, metals $483M, chemicals $367, and other sectors $2.301B (World Integrated Trade 
Solution, 2018). Additionally, there is substantial within-Pakistan variation in terrorism (Institute 
of Economics and Peace, 2018), and the location of particular industrial sectors (Pakistan Bureau 
of Statistics, 2013). These three attributes – incidence of terrorism, established business 
infrastructure, and within country variation in terrorism and business hotspots – offer a rich 
context for the study of firm behavior in the context of the experience of terrorism. 
Figure 1.1a: Global terrorism rank of Pakistan 2002-2015  
 
Source: START GTD, IEP Calculations (2019) 
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Figure 1.1b: Terrorism deaths in Pakistan 2002-2015 
 
Source: Global Terrorism Database (2019) 
It is prudent for business leaders to be concerned with the effects of terrorism. Previous 
studies show that terrorism negatively affects business performance and survival (Alexander & 
Alexander, 2002; Larobina & Pate, 2009). There is a wide array of ways in which terrorism can 
affect business performance. Oh and Oetzel (2017) argue that violent conflicts not only cause 
social unrest but also add to the cost of doing business, suggesting that demand and supply alike 
are affected. External environment threat may create difficult situations for the firms. Moreover, 
terrorism can destroy infrastructure and consequently disrupt the businesses (Enders & Sandler, 
2006). Internal capability of the firms and external challenges constitute the business 
environment in a specific location. For example, Suder and Czinkota (2005) point to decision-
making challenges as terrorism increases the level of uncertainty regarding decline in consumer 
demand, disruption in supplies of goods, government policies and law modifications, 
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macroeconomic phenomena, and shift in foreign relations of the countries. Terrorism shock is 
sudden and complicated to be assessed beforehand in a region. As a result, terrorism potentially 
increases the cost of supply chain (Gupta et al., 2004; Jain & Grosse, 2009; Spich & Grosse, 
2005). All firms might not receive unanticipated risk of terrorism in a similar way. Some firms 
may experience difficulty in managing the business operations. For example, firms may incur 
additional expenses on employees’ wages, insurance, and timely supply of goods to the 
customers due to terrorism (Wernick, 2006). Terrorism potentially affects various business 
dimensions; evaluating and addressing those dimensions may be a tough call for the firms. 
Awareness of the numerous ways in which terrorism could affect a business is essential. 
General conclusions about what businesses in Pakistan should do given the incidence of 
terrorism could be problematic as geopolitical terrorism data shows that there is a variation of 
terrorist incidents in Pakistan over time and space (SATP, 2018, see Figure 1.2). Within 
Pakistan, terrorism in one city may or may not affect the routine activities of another city the 
same way (see Figure 1.2). From Figure 1.2, it can be observed that there are different levels of 
terrorist incidents. Lahore and Karachi have relatively lower numbers of terrorist incidents than 
Peshawar and Quetta, but more business activities of firms. Sialkot and Faisalabad have rarely 
suffered from terrorism, whereas firms in these cities are relatively fewer than Lahore and 
Karachi but have a stronger focus on export market. In a global economy, just as it is important 
to consider country-level differences in incidence of terrorism, it may be as, if not more 
important to consider city-level differences in incidence of terrorism. Similarly, Knight and 
Czinkota (2008) highlighted the relevance of Pakistan in the context of explaining the 
significance of international trade for a terrorism-ridden country that employs over half of its 
industrial workforce in textiles and apparel manufacturing sector. 
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Figure 1.2: Terrorism in various cities of Pakistan (City Terrorism Index3)  
                                                           
3 City Terrorism Index (CTI) for each city is based on the number of terrorist incidents, the number of fatalities, and 
the number of injuries constructed in style of the Global Terrorism Index that computed each country’s terrorism 








1.2. Major Research gaps and organization of the dissertation 
Study of the manner in which a variety of firms adopt resilience strategies to address 
terrorism could offer more precision regarding the alignment between terrorism management 
practices, business context and business attributes. As shown in Figure 1.3, this dissertation 
addresses three particular aspects of the relationship between incidence of terrorism, business 
context and business management practices. A brief presentation of the research questions 
related to each aspect supported by the most relevant literature is presented here. More in-depth 
treatment of the relevant literature and research methods are found in the chapters that follow. 












Business Operations of Textile Firms’ in 
Pakistan and Management Practices 
used to Deal with Terrorism [RQ1] 
Chapter 2 
Exit Strategy of 
Listed-Firms [RQ3] 
Chapter 4 






Research Question 1 [RQ1] 
What is the impact of terrorism on business operations of textile firms in Pakistan and what 
management practices do they use to deal with terrorism? 
Terrorism can be a more significant threat to firms that have a high contribution to 
employment and trade volume of the country (Knight & Czinkota, 2008). Not only are 
internationally engaged firms a more attractive target to those who would seek to disrupt the 
economy (Czinkota & Ronkanen, 2009), their preparedness contributes to the resilience of the 
economy. These firms are more likely to incorporate management practices in line with their 
exposure to terrorist attacks and the availability of resources to safeguard their business 
activities. 
Generally, firms in emerging markets are prone to find complexities in their business 
environment. Specifically, internationally engaged firms of the emerging market face more 
challenges due to terrorism (Tingbani et al., 2019). Earlier, Suder & Czinkota (2005) 
conceptually framed vulnerabilities in value chain activities of the firms that ask for strategic 
responses. There are very few conceptual and empirical studies that explain the effect of 
terrorism on firms’ business operations (Czinkota, Knight, & Liesch, 2004; Czinkota et al., 2005, 
2010; Suder & Czinkota, 2005; Zeneli et al., 2018). Furthermore, previous research has provided 
conceptual explanations to cope with the issue of terrorism (Czinkota et al., 2010; Frey, 2009).  
Existing literature does not provide empirical evidence to establish the relation of terrorism 
and internationally engaged firms’ business activities. Thus, there is need to conduct an 
empirical study on textile sector of Pakistan due to its iconic economic role in employment and 
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contributions to the international trade (Czinkota, 2002; Knight & Czinkota, 2008). Historically, 
textiles have contributed almost 60% of Pakistan’s total country exports (Textile Industry 
Division, 2018). This study has a potential to unleash the impact of terrorism on the business 
dimensions of the firms such as: supply, supply chain, production, human resource, cost factor, 
and demand. Consequently, firms create a protective layer of management practices to enhance 
the resilience of the firms’ business operations under uncertain business environment.   
 
Research Question 2 [RQ2] 
How does terrorism affect the export behaviors of the firms? 
Firms are very sensitive to external environment uncertainty. Terrorism-driven uncertainty 
may create a challenging environment for trade between countries. For example, an increase in 
the number and intensity of terrorist attacks can adversely affect international trade. In a global 
perspective, Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) investigated bilateral trade flows between more than 
200 countries and found that, as the number of terrorist attacks doubles, bilateral trade decreases 
by about four percent. Furthermore, they explained that the reduction in trade volume is caused 
by raise in transaction cost due to anti-terrorism security measures. Egger and Gassebner (2015) 
employed a structural model of trade and provided evidence that international terrorism displays 
effects on bilateral and multilateral trade only in the medium run (after 1.5 years of the terrorist 
attack), while the pure short-run effect appears very small, if not negligible. Moreover, Mirza 
and Verdier (2014) conducted quantitative research and found that the counterterrorism security 
measures (cross-border scrutiny) resulted in negative impact on US imports. Hence, terrorism 
has short and long-run negative impact on global trade. 
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International business literature suggests that there is dearth of study that establishes an 
empirical relation of terrorism and export performance of firms at city-level. Frequent terrorist 
incidents in a particular country can seriously damage the ability of firms for the cross-border 
trade due to additional cost, furthermore, change in border security regulations hitch the mobility 
of international travelers and international trade (Frey, 2009). Previous literature accounts for the 
macroeconomic explanations that shed light on the negative impact of terrorism on international 
trade (Egger & Gassebner, 2015; Nitsch & Schumacher, 2004), while our knowledge about 
microeconomic link of firms’ exports activities in the context of terrorism-ridden country is still 
limited. This study builds upon earlier studies of terrorism and trade (Mirza & Verdier, 2014; 
Nitsch & Schumacher, 2004) but seeks to offer greater precision regarding influence of local 
terrorism incidences on export behavior of the firms. This is the first study – to the best 
knowledge of authors - that focuses on disaggregated data of terrorism at a city-level and listed 
firms' export behavior by analyzing firm-specific micro data. 
 
Research Question 3 [RQ3] 
What is the relationship between terrorism, competitive positioning, liability of location, and the 
exit of publicly-traded Pakistani firms? 
Terrorism amplifies the risk for business stability and, as a result, reduces the revenue and 
profitability of the firms (Hendrick & Singhal, 2005a, 2005b). Some firms manage to absorb the 
pressure of terrorism, while others demonstrate deterioration over time and, consequently, 
businesses fail. From a global standpoint, Tingbani et al. (2019) conducted a quantitative study 
with a sample of 174 countries and found that terrorism has a significant positive impact on 
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business failure in developing and fragile countries but not in developed countries. In a particular 
country, Greenbaum et al. (2007) conducted a study using a panel data of Italian provinces 
between 1985 and 1997. Their findings suggest that terrorist incidents in provinces significantly 
reduce the growth of employment, the number of existing businesses, the birth of new 
businesses, and attraction for investment. Hence, terrorism is an external jolt that potentially 
dislodges well-established businesses. 
This current study is an effort to provide empirical evidence to disentangle the strategic 
relevance of each exit route from the stock market. The literature of exit strategy is explained in 
various routes (Balcaen et al., 2012). The most prominent exit strategies are business death 
(bankruptcy) (Balcaen et al., 2011; Coad, 2014); mergers and acquisitions (Cefis & Marsili, 
2011); and buyback of shares (Lei & Zhang, 2016). The exit strategies are also explained in the 
context of firms' survival (Coad et al., 2013; Coad & Guenther, 2013; Yang & Aldrich, 2012) 
and as a part of the overall strategy (Cefis & Marsili, 2012) of the firms. Lei and Zhang (2016) 
proposed that firms conduct leveraged buybacks to optimize their capital structures. Previous 
studies explain mergers and acquisitions in two contexts as friendly mergers between two firms 
(Hackbarth & Morellec, 2008) and hostile takeovers (Lukas & Welling, 2012). The court-driven 
exit is the most unfavorable exit when firms go bankrupt due to insufficient resources to repay all 
creditors (Schary, 1991). This chapter drills down into specific city firms, comparison of sectors, 
export orientation, and size of the firms’ combinations to segregate which type of exit appears to 
have been most negatively affected in the context of terrorism. 
Chapter 4 of this dissertation seeks to offer greater measurement precision regarding the 
incidence of terrorism. There is a considerable research gap to address the city-level and firm-
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level explanation of relationship between terrorist attacks and business failure. Using city-level 
measure of terrorist incidents would allow capturing the immense variation across cities and 
overtime in a single country (Öcal & Yildirim, 2010). Chapter 4 theoretically develop the 
concept “liabilities of location” to align theory applicable to the study of a population of 
publicly-traded firms and to link classic population ecology arguments (McKelvey & Aldrich, 
1983; Stinchcombe, 1965) with classic competitive positioning (Hambrick & Fredrickson, 2005) 
and economic cluster arguments found in the strategy literature (Porter, 1980, 1985, 1990). Thus, 
the context of Pakistan fulfills the purpose of single country analysis by empirically investigating 
the relationship of terrorism in the city and exit routes of the firms from the stock market in 
Pakistan. This study addresses the calls of Greenbaum et al. (2007) and Tingbani et al. (2019) by 
considering the city-level, firm-level, and sector-level analyses to augment our knowledge on 
terrorism effect on firms exit within a country context.   
This dissertation uses a mix of primary and secondary data analyses such as panel data, 
survey, and interviews. This comprehensive, multi-source data approaches allow us to dig deeper 
to unleash the underlying mechanisms through which terrorism affects businesses. This 
dissertation focuses on terrorism and firms' behavior and addresses three independent studies 
based on research questions identified above from research and knowledge gaps. The more 
thorough and complete literature review can be found in each chapter of the dissertation.  
 
1.3. Contribution and Overview of the Dissertation 
This dissertation contributes to the existing literature in several important aspects in three 
major chapters. These self-containing chapters deal with different topics of terrorism and firms in 
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the context of Pakistan's business environment (see Table 1.1). Chapter 2 highlights the impact 
of terrorism on business operations, and management practices of firms to deal with terrorism. 
Chapter 3 analyzes the relationship between city-level terrorism and the export behavior of firms 
in Pakistan. Chapter 4 aims to explain how terrorism affects the exit strategy of listed-firms at 
the stock market. Chapter 5 is a summary of all chapters, highlights implications and provides 
future research directions. 
Table 1.1: Overview of chapters and contributions of the dissertation 
 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 
Title  Exploring the effects of 
terrorism on business 
operations of firms and 
firms’ responses 
Terror in the city: effects of 
terrorism on firm exports  
Terrorism, competitive 
positioning and liability of 
location: exit of publicly-
traded Pakistani f firms 
Co-author(s) N/A Prof. Dr. Werner Bönte,  
Prof. Dr. Vivien Procher 
Prof. Dr. Rocki-Lee DeWitt 
Data source  Primary data Secondary data Secondary data 
Data period  2018 2005-2015 2000-2015 
Types of firms Publicly listed and non-listed Publicly listed Publicly listed 
Methodology  Primary data collection 
through firm survey, 
quantitative empirical analyses 
(comparison of means using t-
statistics) 
Quantitative empirical 
analyses (Fixed-effects panel 
models) 
Quantitative empirical 




using Chi-square analysis 
Contributions 
 
Extends studies of Czinkota et 
al. (2010); and Zeneli et al. 
(2018) by taking into account 
the firm sizes and market 
orientation (local and foreign), 
and location of the firms to 
explain the relationship 
between terrorism and 
business activities and 
management practices of firms 
to protect businesses.  
Extends studies of Egger and 
Gassebner (2015); and Nitch 
and Schumacher (2004) that 
focus on terrorism and trade 
at a country-level, but our 
study goes one step further 
and contributes to the 
literature through a city-
specific and firm-specific 
relationship of terrorism and 
export behaviors.  
Extends studies of  
Greenbaum et al. (2007); 
and Tingbani et al (2019) 
through answering the call 
of incorporating firm-
specific variables 
(Greenbaum et al., 2007); 
and conducting a single 
country sector-specific 
analysis of terrorism and 




Chapter 2: Exploring the Effect of Terrorism on Business Operations and Firms Responses  
Chapter 2 is based on an empirical paper titled “Exploring the Effects of Terrorism on 
Business Operations of Firms and Firms’ Responses”, a single-authored paper and was given a 
student paper award at the Academy of International Business, 2020 Conference West-Chapter 
in San Diego, California, USA.4 
Business leaders and policymakers alike attend to how terrorism may affect businesses. This 
is especially the case when businesses are geographically clustered, require physical facilities, 
are interdependent, play an important economic role in a region and country, and rely upon face 
to face interaction to initiate and consummate transactions. The extent to which businesses 
represent different combinations of these attributes is likely to inform differences in how they 
perceive terrorism might affect their business and the management practices they undertake to 
address the anticipated situations. This study is in response to the call of Knight and Czinkota 
(2008) to address the unpredictability of timing but the disruptive nature of a terroristic act that 
directly affects businesses. 
This first empirical study is based on a survey using both closed- and open-end questions to 
explore the effect of the threat of terrorism on business operation; and firms’ management 
practices to safeguard the business activities against terrorism in Pakistan. This study goes 
beyond prior research of Czinkota et al. (2010), Frey (2009), and Knight and Czinkota (2008) 
                                                           
4 An earlier version of this chapter was presented at Global Strategy and Emerging Markets (2019) in Dallas, USA; 
Academy of International Business (2019) in the Paper Development Workshop of Journal of International Business 
Policy and Global Strategy Journal in Copenhagen, Denmark; Academy of Management (2019) in Boston, USA; 
European International Business Academy (2019) in Leeds, UK; Academy of International Business US-West 
Chapter (2020) in San Diego, USA; and Academy of International Business (2020) in Miami, USA (Online 




that propose the ways in which terrorism might affect firms to obtain managers perception. 
Unique primary data is collected through a firms-level survey that captures how terrorism affects 
business dimensions such as supply, production, business costs, supply-chain, demand, 
employees, local and foreign customers of firms of different sizes (small, medium, and large), 
market orientation (local and/or foreign), and geographic regions. Furthermore, it disentangles 
the viewpoint of various firms about the effect or threats of terrorism on business operations and 
preparation against terrorism through management practices.  
The results of Chapter 2 provide an overview of the effect of terrorism on business 
operations and firms’ management practices to deal with terrorism from the standpoint of various 
types of firms based on export intensity, firm size, and location. Non-exporting firms suffer 
delays in supplies. Thus, they deal with terrorism by adopting management practices to identify 
vulnerabilities in their value chain and critical operations movement less terrorism-prone regions. 
On the other hand, exporting firms’ customers decline demand and avoid visiting Pakistan. In 
order to deal with the issue of terrorism, exporting firms apply management practices of safety 
arrangements to foreign customers. They rely on multi-location suppliers rather than a single 
location, and prepare for rapid repair and replacement in case of terrorism. They provide 
payment of extra insurance and wages and rules of succession for every leading position.  
This chapter offers implications to address how other difficult situations, outside terrorism, 
may impact the businesses. For example, the current situation of COVID-195 has also disrupted 
                                                           
5 Terrorism and COVID-19 are both unpredictable in nature, but high risk threats for the firms. The hidden 
characteristic of both risks distinguish them from other types of risks. Terrorism and COVID-19 have provoked fear 
and mistrust among people. COVID-19 outbreak is affecting supply chains and disrupting manufacturing business 
worldwide, it is a big threat for the survival of the firms that depend on supplies from the foreign market (see Haren 




the business environment globally. These management practices can be generalized to other 
difficult business situations to address the problems of the firms operating in the face of such 
difficulties. This chapter helps in identifying relevant managerial, and policy implications 
through providing a blueprint of firms' business activities in the context of terrorism. Future 
research can use panel data to validate the mechanism explained in this chapter. The arguments 
of this chapter can be strengthened by using panel data to empirically analyze the effect of 
terrorism on the firms at a city-level in a specific country context. 
 
Chapter 3: Terror in the City: Regional Effects of Terrorism on Firms Exports 
The impact of terrorism on the behavior of the export of the firms' Chapter 3 is based on a 
paper titled “Terror in the City: Effects of Terrorism on Firm Exports” co-authored with Prof. 
Dr. Werner Bönte, and Prof. Dr. Vivien Procher. This paper is ready to be submitted for 
publication in Oxford Economic Papers.6 
This empirical study is based on secondary data obtained from different data sources, like the 
South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) and reports of firms listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange. 
Chapter 3 explores the relationship between firms’ exports and terrorist activities in Pakistan. 
Going beyond the nation-wide influence of terrorism, in our empirical investigation, we take the 
geographical distribution of firms and terrorist attacks into account to analyze the regional 
impact of terrorism on the firm’s export performance. This is the first study that takes into 
consideration the disaggregated city-level data of terrorism and export behavior of the firms. 
                                                           
6 An earlier version of this paper is presented in various doctoral seminars, Indiana University-Wuppertal University 
Workshop, Schumpeter Society Workshop, and Brown Bag Seminar at the Schumpeter School of Business and 
Economics. The authors are grateful for valuable feedback and helpful suggestions.  Thanks to Prof. Dr. Gary 
Knight, Prof. Dr. Martina Musteen, and Prof. Dr. Carol Reade for their feedback on this study.   
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While previous empirical research investigating the impact of terrorism on international trade 
(Nitsch & Schumacher, 2004; Egger & Gassebner, 2015) focused on macroeconomic 
relationships, our knowledge about the microeconomic link between terrorism and firms’ export 
behavior is limited. 
This empirical approach allows us to identify the potential effects of regional terrorism on 
firm exports. In doing so, we make use of a unique dataset that combines panel data of 482 firms 
listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange with data on terrorist attacks in Pakistani cities in the 
period from 1999 to 2014. Computing a City Terrorism Index (CTI), we find considerable 
variation in the level of terrorist attacks between cities as well as within cities over time.  
The results of the panel regressions point to a negative and statistically significant 
relationship between firm exports and the level of terrorist attacks in cities where firms are 
located. Moreover, terrorist attacks in other cities have a distinct and separable effect on firm 
exports pointing to interregional spillovers of terrorism. This type of spillover, however, 
diminishes with geographical distance. Future research might use a combination of qualitative 
and quantitative responses from the firms to explain the firm-specific insights for a closer 
analysis of terrorism on export performance of the firms.  
 
Chapter 4: Terrorism, Competitive Positioning and Liability of Location: Exit of Publicly-
Traded Pakistani Firms 
Chapter 4 is based on a paper titled “Terrorism, Competitive Positioning and Liability of 
Location: Exit of Publicly-Traded Pakistani Firms,” co-authored with Prof. Dr. Rocki-Lee 
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DeWitt, Grossman School of Management, University of Vermont, USA. This paper is currently 
under process for submission to the Academy of Management Journal.7  
Chapter 4 examines the impact of terrorist activities on the survival of firms. Using the Cox 
regression model and the open-source database on terrorism from the South Asian Terrorism 
Portal and Global Terrorism Database, we contribute to the literature on terrorism’s economic 
effects by examining the relationship between geographic-based patterns of terrorism and the 
exit of firms from the Pakistan stock market between 2004 and 2015. This chapter is in response 
to the call of Tingbani et al. (2019) to conduct a research study based on sectors to analyze the 
effect of terrorism on business failures. We extend the logic of liabilities of age and size to 
liabilities of location derived from the choice of geography, industry, and buyer markets and 
used this concept in the fine-grained study of the stock market exit of firms.  
We begin with survival analyses of the relationship between the geographic effects, 
measured as proximity and severity of terrorism events at a country and city-level, and three exit 
pathways from the stock market of 499 publicly-traded firms. As hypothesized, bankruptcy is 
more likely when terrorism is proximate and more severe. Acquisitions and buyback of shares 
occur more during periods of low terrorism but the relationship is statistically insignificant. The 
inclusion of geographic spillover effects does not enhance the explanation of bankruptcy. We 
then examine disproportionate occurrence related to our broader notion of locational liability and 
find that industry and age matters. Our findings suggest that terrorism operates both as a natural 
hazard as firms from multiple industries are affected and as a technological discontinuity because 
                                                           
7 An earlier version of this paper is presented at the Study of Terrorism and Research on Terrorism (START), 
University of Maryland, USA (2019). The authors are thankful to Prof. Dr. Jeane J. Boddewyn, Prof. Dr. Michael 
Czinkota, Prof. Dr. Robert Greenbaum, Prof. Dr. Walid Hejazi, Prof. Dr. Gary Knight, Prof. Dr. Gary LaFree, and 
Prof. Dr. Peter Liesch, for their valuable comments and advice to improve the quality of this scientific work. 
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textile firms are disproportionately affected. Future research might employ a mixed-method 
analysis to explain the mechanisms of business failure. 
 
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
Finally, Chapter 5 concludes this dissertation with an overall summary of the dissertations’ 
theoretical and empirical findings. The final chapter of this dissertation highlights the three major 
aspects: firm-specific characteristics, location-specific terrorism effect on firms (operations, 
exports, and exit), and the significance of firms’ rigorous terrorism management practices. 
Chapter 5 provides an integrative model for the firms to explain the relationship of terrorism and 
firms’ behavior in a particular country context. The implications are highlighted based on the 
empirical findings of the Chapter 2, Chapter 3, and Chapter 4 for scholars and managers.  The 
limitations and implications for future research are also presented. 
Overall, this dissertation is an attempt to fill the research gap to understand the underlying 
mechanisms through which terrorism affect the business operations, and how firms cope with the 
issue of terrorism (Czinkota et al., 2005, 2010; Frey, 2009; Harvey, 1993; Zeneli et al., 2018). A 
more detailed study in the context of Pakistan might provide interesting insights because 
terrorism is constantly occurring in Pakistan. Firms may change their management practices to 
address the potentially more enduring nature of terrorism. There is variation among different 
cities within a country in the occurrence of terrorist incidents. Addressing selected aspects within 
the outlined research gaps might not only contribute to academics but also help managers to 
understand underlying processes and help them to manage those better. 
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2. EXPLORING THE EFFECTS OF TERRORISM ON BUSINESS 
OPERATIONS AND FIRMS’ RESPONSES 
 
2.1. Introduction 
This chapter examines how terrorism in a country influences the business operations of firms 
and the preparation of firms to avoid or at least to alleviate the effects of terrorism. Business 
activities are on the radar of terrorist attacks that negatively influence global businesses in 
emerging markets (Tingbani et al., 2019). Similarly, Knight and Czinkota (2008) highlighted the 
relevance of Pakistan in the context of explaining the significance of international trade for a 
terrorism-ridden country that employs over half of its industrial workforce in textiles and apparel 
manufacturing sector. 
Firms are differently affected by terrorism and may respond differently. Developing a better 
understanding of how terrorism affects firms’ business operations might provide managers and 
policymakers with relevant management practices in response to terrorism. In this study, we 
surveyed textile firms from Pakistan with respect to the threat of terrorism and management 
practices they use to deal with terrorism. We use close-ended questions as well as open-ended 
questions that allow firms to talk about their experiences in relation to international business and 
terrorism.  
Pakistan is an emerging country that is among the five most terrorism-affected countries in 
the world (National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, 2017). 
The textile sector is an iconic manufacturing sector that contributes more than 50 percent to the 
export in Pakistan (Trade Development Authority of Pakistan, 2018). The experience of textile 
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firms dealing in the international market may help to better understand the dynamics of terrorism 
and firms’ responses. 
This study is an effort to address Zeneli et al. (2018) call to conduct a study on how terrorism 
affects firms and the responses of firms to safeguard against terrorism. We have designed a 
comprehensive questionnaire that includes relevant questions to analyze the relation of terrorism 
and business operations in a terrorism-affected country to contribute significantly to the ongoing 
discussion. The issue of terrorism is discussed in the firm-specific studies to explain a negative 
impact on the business dimensions: supply chain, supply, demand, customers, employees, and 
cost factors. In our study, we have combined all the business dimensions in relation to terrorism. 
A literature review of Czinkota, Knight, and Liesch (2004); Czinkota et al. (2005, 2010); Frey 
(2009); Harvey (1993); Knight and Czinkota (2008); Sheffi (2001, 2005); Suder (2004, 2006); 
Wernick (2006); and Wernick and von Glinow (2012) guided to draft a comprehensive survey 
and interviews to explore terrorism and business activities of firms; and the role of management 
practices to deal with terrorism. 
The effect of terrorism on firms depends on the firms’ sizes, geographic locations, and local 
or foreign orientations as well as the management practices they employ to avoid damage of 
terrorism on business operations. Most of the previous research dealing with terrorism and firms’ 
relationship explained the effect conceptually. Therefore, this study responds to Zeneli et al. 
(2018) call for a study based on more internationally engaged and large-scale firms. Similarly, 
the study of Czinkota et al. (2005, 2010) conceptually provides insights into the impact of 
terrorism on firms’ business operations and anti-terrorism measures to safeguard firms.  This 
study aims to contribute to the literature by addressing these noted gaps. First, this survey study 
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is a combination of unique data extracted from the firms operating in a terrorism-ridden country 
through a self-administered questionnaire based on open- and close-ended questions. Our 
research study is investigating about terrorism and firms anti-terrorism strategies to protect their 
businesses. Thus, we employ surveys as an appropriate method to probe issues and understand 
their strategic solutions (Slater & Atuahene-Gima, 2004). Second, this study measures the effect 
of terrorism on Pakistan textile sector firms that are dealing at export and non-export markets. It 
also provides insights of firms’ anti-terrorism management practices to stay competitive in 
domestic and export market. There is a possibility that an export and non-export market may 
perceive and behave differently to the problem of terrorism. To the best of our knowledge, this is 
the first study that disentangles the effect of terrorism on firms dealing with domestic and export 
markets. Third, we have accounted for the firms of small, medium and large sizes to understand 
the mechanism through which firms are affected by terrorism and what are their responses to 
terrorism. This study contributes to the literature by distinguishing between sizes of the firms to 
explain the relationship of terrorism and business activities. Fourth, the heterogeneity among 
geographic regions in terms of terrorism intensity allows an empirical examination of whether 
firms in different regions are differently affected by terrorism. We contribute to the 
understanding of how firms respond to this heterogeneity. 
 
2.2. Conceptual background 
Terrorism creates unique problems for managers. On the one hand, managers know that 
terrorism will occur and affects the business. Conversely, they do not have prior knowledge of 
when and where exactly terrorist attacks will occur. This decision-making context is 
simultaneously uncertain and risky. Prior literature provides detail about uncertainty but not with 
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respect to terrorism. Terrorism is a type of discontinuous risk that is episodic in nature and 
difficult to predict (Oetzel & Oh, 2013). 
According to a PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) survey, 41 percent of 1293 CEOs of global 
firms are “extremely concerned” about terrorism (PwC, 2018). Terrorism has changed the 
priorities of spending of the firms. Firms are spending more money on their security and 
alternative supply solutions in the face of terrorism. Furthermore, Oetzel and Breslauer (2015) 
elaborate the causes how violence affects businesses through disruption in supply chain, increase 
in security costs, risk of human life loss, higher insurance costs, decline in productivity, and their 
employees on a day-to-day basis. 
Terrorism may affect the business operations of firms in different regions within a country.  
Some of the firms are comparatively more affected by terrorism than others. Some firms’ 
managers’ devise strategies to counter the uncertainty factor of terrorism. Cuervo-Cazurra, 
Ciravegna, Melgarejo, and Lopez (2018) call for future studies trying to understand the 
relationship between internationalization and performance needs to go deeper and beyond a 
focus on company conditions and incorporate the effects of the country context where the firms 
are based on the relationships analyzed, using empirical evidence from new geographies and 
different variables to measure context uncertainty. Holburn and Zelner (2010) empirically argue 
that managers learn useful skills for dealing with the risks and uncertainty to operate in other 
politically risky countries. Similarly, firms based in terrorism-prone regions may learn how to 
manage terrorism uncertainty. Some firms might not manage to react in anticipation of future 
terrorist events, while others employ different management practices to deal with terrorism. For 
example, Oh and Oetzel (2017) argue that when firm survival and profitability are threatened, 
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some firms will develop innovative management strategies to surmount the challenge they face 
while others will die out. 
The adaptability of firms to a risky and challenging environment helps in overcoming the 
problem and gaining a competitive advantage (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 2018; Jiménez et al., 2014; 
Oh & Oetzel, 2017). Dai, Eden, and Beamish (2017) provide empirical evidence that those firms 
which are exposed to adversity, they devise certain strategies to effectively cope with sudden 
environmental changes. From a standpoint of resilience against uncertain environment, Sirmon, 
Hitt, Arregle, and Campbell (2010) suggest that capability strengths and capability weaknesses 
affect competitive advantage, exploring how the environment and firm-specific factors influence 
their change over time increases their knowledge related to the durability of competitive 
advantage. 
In their qualitative study, Gao, Zuzul, Jones, and Khanna (2017) argue that environmental 
uncertainty is a type of transaction uncertainty that is different from behavioral uncertainty when 
both parties to a transaction acted according to their agreements. They note that frequent 
environmental shocks (including regulatory and political shocks, expropriation, coup, chaos, and 
wars) still posed a threat. Gao et al. (2017) further explain that because of these shocks, firms 
faced the risk that their operations - or the operation of their partners, suppliers, and buyers - 
would cease to exist or become severely disrupted. 
Terrorism may affect the business operations of firms directly and indirectly. For instance, a 
direct effect of terrorism may be a bomb blast on firms to target employees, firms’ building, 
machinery, and transport vehicles. The indirect effect of terrorism on firms can be a decline in 
demand by local and foreign customers; increase in transaction cost; interruption in supply chain; 
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and reputation of the firms (Czinkota et al., 2004; Knight & Czinkota, 2008; Gao et al., 2017; 
Jain & Grosse, 2009; Suder, Chailan, & Suder, 2008). The impact of terrorism varies from one 
part of the country to another, where the firms are located and terrorist incidents occur. Similarly, 
this asks for a different level of preparedness from the firms to dilute the impact of terrorism on 
overall business performance. 
 
2.2.1. Potential effects of terrorism on business dimensions  
Firms’ business operations are consisting of various dimensions. These various business 
dimensions are demand, supply, supply chain, human resources, cost of business, and 
production. Terrorism may affect business dimensions differently (see Figure 2.1). Generally, 
businesses are sensitive to costs (Hitt, 2011). Specifically, firms dealing in international business 
are more susceptible to transaction costs. Supply chain interruption leads to an increase in the 
cost of doing business (Spich & Grosse, 2005; Jain & Grosse, 2009). The risk reduces the 
revenue and profitability of the firms (Hendrick & Singhal, 2005a, 2005b). Also, Suder and 
Czinkota (2005) have identified vulnerabilities in value chain activities that ask for firms' 
strategic responses. Firms spend additional money on employees’ wages, insurance, and timely 
supply of goods to the customers (Wernick, 2006). Similarly, Oh and Oetzel (2017) argue that 
violent conflicts also impose added costs of doing business in a country, e.g. higher insurance 
premiums, security costs, and finding alternative suppliers, etc. 
Firms in terrorism-ridden regions are fragile. Harvey (1993) conducted a study of corporate 
programs for managing terrorist threats and spending of firms beyond normal security. The basic 
objective of Harvey’s study was to determine to what degree firms were prepared for terrorist 
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attacks. Similarly, Knight and Czinkota (2008) asked firms in a survey-based study about the 
effects or threats of terrorism on firms. They focused on the responses of the international firms 
to the effect and threats of terrorism, the background on the relationship of terrorism and 
international business. They empirically explained about the relationship of resources of firms 
and reaction against terrorism.   
Terrorist attacks affect firms’ business operations directly and indirectly. Overall terrorism 
induces a shortage of supplies to customers by disturbing important business operations (Council 
on Foreign Relations, 2002). Moreover, the supply of goods is interrupted by detailed security 
checks on every entry and exit point of the cities (Knight & Czinkota, 2008). Consequently, 
firms may incur additional expenses to counter unpredictable supply chain shifts (Knight & 
Czinkota, 2008). Sometimes strikes and agitations may prolong the delivery time of 
transportation of goods (Knight & Czinkota, 2008).   
Terrorist attacks in a geographic region can cause physical damages to buildings and plants 
of the firm. Also, uncertainty driven by terrorism can lower the demand of customers from local 
and foreign markets (Czinkota et al., 2005). Customers may avoid visiting firms in problematic 
regions. Additionally, firms situated in a frequent terrorist attacks region demand a strong 
security plan.  
Likewise, uncertain events may also cost the life of employees or permanent injuries when 
terrorist attacks happen in the immediate vicinity of firms. It can also reduce the availability of 
skilled workers. Eventually, terrorism may increase the labor and insurance cost for businesses 
(Knight & Czinkota, 2008).  
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Figure 2.1: Relation of terrorism and business dimensions of the firms 
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2.2.2. Management practices to deal with terrorism 
The thick layer of management practices reduces the effect of terrorism on the business 
dimensions of the firms (see Figure 2.2). Terrorist attacks are beyond the control of firms, they 
are unpredictable and exogenous, but management practices are internal mechanisms that help 
firms to survive in the adverse external environment. Managerial perception and responses 
regarding terrorism appear to differ within and across firms (Gillingham, 2006). They depend on 
factors such as the accuracy and completeness of information, previous experience of terrorist 
events, and whether or not these threats were prioritized over other uncertainties (Sullivan-
Taylor & Wilson, 2009).  
Figure 2.3 details the management practices of firms to safeguard the business dimensions of 
the firms. Czinkota et al. (2010) conceptually explain that terrorism affects the different 
dimensions of business. We have identified key management practices in relation to terrorism 
which are used by the firms to minimize the negative effect of terrorism. There is a need for 
management to counter the effect of terrorism. That is why appropriate management practices to 
deal with the threat of terrorism are vital for firms, enabling the firm to react appropriately in an 
uncertain situation. These management practices are applied at a different point in time for 
different firms to reduce the impact of terrorism on the business dimensions. Firms are 
concerned about terrorism, particularly those dealing in international businesses that are 
vulnerable to terrorist attacks. In the international market, firms have a high pressure of 
curtailing the cost of doing business in a cut-throat competitive environment. Management 
practices help firms to deploy the flexibility mechanisms to protect business dimensions against 
the negative effect of terrorism (see Figure 2.2). 
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Figure 2.3: Firms management practices to safeguard business dimensions8 
 
 
                                                           








-Increase in the safety stock of the 
inventory (12) 
-Terrorism contingency plan (1) 
-Decentralized operations and buildings 
(2) 
-Critical operations movement to less 
terrorism-prone areas (3) 
-Identifying vulnerabilities in internal 
value chain (4) 
-Rely on government measures to 
counter terrorism (5) 
-Increase in the number of security staff 
(6) 
-Decentralized decision-making (7) 
-An escape and security plan in place (8) 
-Preparedness for the rapid repair and 
replacement of physical capital (9) 
-Employees’ extra insurance and higher 
wages (17) 
-Rely on suppliers from multi-
locations rather than single 
location (13) 
-More material supply from less 
terrorism-prone areas (14) 
-Contingency transportation 
arrangements (15) 
-Employees training in case of 
terrorism (16) 
-Preparedness for financial, 
medical and psychological help 
(18) 
-Rules of succession for every 
key position (19) 
-Sharing terrorism risk with 
customers (10) 





Figure 2.3 explains the layers of management practices to protect business dimensions 
against terrorism. Management practices focused on “demand” protections consider sharing 
terrorism risk and anti-terrorism measures with customers, and safety arrangement of 
customers (Knight & Czinkota, 2008; Suder, 2006). Literature has discussed the “cost factor” 
in the context of offering employees extra insurance and higher wages (Frey, 2009; Wernick, 
2006). Firms integral business dimension, “human resource”, is protected by employing 
management practices such as employee training in case of terrorism (Harvey, 1993), 
preparedness for financial, medical and psychological help for employees (Frey, 2009), and 
rules of succession for every leading position (Czinkota et al., 2010; Frey, 2009).  
The ‘production” business dimension is safeguarded by the management practices that 
include: terrorism contingency plan (Harvey, 1993; Knight & Czinkota, 2008; Wernick & von 
Glinow, 2012); decentralized operations and buildings (Frey, 2009; Sheffi, 2001, 2005; Suder, 
2004, 2006); critical operations movement to less terrorism prone areas; identification of 
vulnerabilities in internal value chain (Frey, 2009; Suder, 2006); reliance on government 
measures to counter terrorism (Czinkota et al., 2010); decentralized decision making (Knight 
& Czinkota, 2008); an escape and security plan in place, and preparedness for the rapid repair 
and replacement of physical capital (Frey, 2009). The “supply chain” dimension is managed 
by devising strategies of relying on suppliers from multi-locations rather than a single location 
(Knight & Czinkota, 2008; Suder, 2006); more material supply from less terrorism-prone 
areas (Suder, 2006); and contingency transportation arrangement of supplies (Suder, 2006). 
Last but not the least business dimension “supply” is protected through increase in the safety 






2.3.1. Research setting and design 
Three criteria were set for the sample of this study. First, we focused on textile sector 
firms that were dealing in the international market as an importer and/or exporter. Second, 
interviews were conducted with those firms that manufacture products in Pakistan. Third, data 
were collected from firms that were exhibiting at international trade fairs to ensure the 
engagement of firms in the foreign market.  The textile sector in Pakistan is a significant 
contributor to employment and exports (Knight & Czinkota, 2008). Privately owned, 
Pakistan’s textile sector contributes 46 percent to the manufacturing sector of Pakistan that 
adds 8.8 percent to GDP (Asian Development Bank, 2008). The textile sector stands first with 
a considerable share of 61 percent of total exports of Pakistan in the fiscal year 2016-17 
(Ministry of Finance, 2018). So, the significance of the textile sector to the export business 
and heterogeneity of terrorism in different cities of Pakistan makes this survey relevant to 
study the impact of terrorism on the business operations of firms engaged in international 
business (Czinkota, 2002). 
2.3.2. Questionnaire development 
We build on previous studies that have analyzed management practices. Most of the 
studies have proposed conceptual and theoratical arguments for management practices but 
they have not measured them empirically. Similarly, firms devise a sound internal strategy to 
cope with the challenge of terrorism. Previous studies from Czinkota et al. (2004); Czinkota, 
Knight, Liesch, and Steen (2005; 2010); Frey (2009), Harvey (1993); Knight and Czinkota 
(2008); Sheffi (2001, 2005); Suder (2004; 2006); Wernick (2006); and Wervick and Von 
Glinow (2012) have guided to include relevant questions in our survey to empirically explore 
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the the relationship between firms' business operations and terrorism and the business 
strategies of firms to deal with the the threat of terrorism.  
During the survey design, the researcher visited Pakistan in both September-October 2015 
and March-April 2016 to incorporate insights from experts, engaging with businessmen, 
government officials, and key officials of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. In the 
light of feedback from the business community and government officials, the survey was 
customized suitable for the business environment of Pakistan. The following sections present 
the different parts for the survey, starting with how firms evaluate the threat of terrorism, then 
the effects of terrorism on business operations, and last but not the least the management 
practices of the firms to deal with terrorism. 
Threats of terrorism 
Firms’ preparedness for terrorism (see table 2.1) is inquired with their experience in the 
past, present, and future (Knight & Czinkota, 2008). The study of Knight and Czinkota (2008) 
has used similar questions with a five-point Likert scale. For this study, a seven-point Likert 
scale is employed throughout. 
Table 2.1: Effects and threats of terrorism 
Item Effects and threats of terrorism in Pakistan Source of items 
1. My firm was affected by terrorism in the past. Adapted from Knight and 
Czinkota (2008) 
2. My firm is concerned about the effects or threats of terrorism. Knight and Czinkota (2008) 
3. I expect that my firm will be negatively affected by terrorism 
within the next 5 years. 







The effects of terrorism on business operations 
The effects of terrorism on the firm's business operations are explained through 10 items 
(Table 2.2). Table 2.2 captures the following business dimensions: item 1 is related to 
“production”; items 2 to 4 are related to “demand”; items 5 and 6 are related to “supply 
chain”; item 7 is related to “supply”; item 8 is related to “human resource”; and items 9 and 
10 are related to “cost factor” business dimensions of the firms. The items of the 
questionnaire capture the following effects of terrorism on business dimensions of the firms 
(see Table 2.2). Items 1 to 4 were developed for this study because there were conceptual 
arguments in the literature but no clear study that was capturing those items. Items 5 to 10 
were taken from the study of Knight and Czinkota (2008), which used similar items in their 
study. 
Table 2.2: Effects of terrorism on business operations 
Item Effects of terrorism on your business operations in Pakistan Source of items 
1. Physical damages (e.g. firm buildings) (Production) Developed for this study 
2. Lower demand by customers from Pakistan (Demand) Developed for this study 
3. Lower demand by customers from abroad (Demand) Developed for this study 
4. Customers are reluctant to come to Pakistan to visit my firm 
(Demand) 
Developed for this study 
5. Unpredictable supply chain shifts and interruptions (Supply chain) Knight and Czinkota 
(2008) 
6. Supply chain direct costs have gone up (Supply chain) Knight and Czinkota 
(2008) 
7. Longer delivery times (Supply) Knight and Czinkota 
(2008) 
8. Injured or killed employees (Human Resource) Developed for this study 
9. Higher labor costs (Cost factor) Developed for this study 






Management practices to deal with terrorism 
Firms adopt management practices to protect business dimensions to deal with the issue of 
terrorism. We have constructed management practices digging deeper into the literature to 
unleash the mechanisms that firms use to safeguard their business operations. Management 
practices are discussed with their relevance to the business dimensions of the firms using 19 
items (see Table 2.3). Items 2, 3, 4, 7, 9, 17, 18, and 19 originate from the conceptual study of 
Frey (2009) that focused on how businesses cope with terrorism. Similarly, items 1, 6, 8, and 
12 are taken from the study of Knight and Czinkota (2008) to capture the management 
practices of the firms to protect business dimensions namely “human resource”, “production” 
and “supply chain”. Items 10 and 11 are developed for this study to capture the management 
practices of firms to safeguards “demand”. 
Items 2, 4, 12, 13, 14, and 15 originate from the theoretical arguments of Suder (2004, 
2006) to capture management practices to deal with terrorism for smooth “production”, and 
“supply chain” of the firms. Items 1 and 16 are taken from the empirical study of Harvey 
(1993) for a corporate program for managing terrorist threats. Items 5 and 19 are derived from 
the conceptual study of Czinkota et al. (2010). These 19 items capture the following 
management practices to protect business dimensions of the firms: items 1 to 9 are included 
for “production”; items 10 and 11 are included for “demand”; item 12 is included for 
“supply”; items 13 to 15 are included for “supply chain”; items 16, 18 and 19 are included for 
“human resource”; and item 17 is included for “cost factor”. These 19 items of management 






Table 2.3: Management practices items 
Item Management practices to deal with terrorism Source of items 
1. 
My firm has a formalized program designed to reduce the 
probability of terrorist attacks and to deal with the terrorist if an 
attack occurs (i.e. terrorism contingency plan).  
Harvey (1993); Knight and 
Czinkota (2008); Wernick and 
von Glinow (2012) 
2. 
My firm has decentralized business operations and buildings to 
ensure business continuity in the event of a terrorist attack.  
Frey (2009); Sheffi (2001, 
2005); Suder (2004, 2006) 
3. 
My firm moves critical operations or branching out into less 
terrorism-prone areas.  
Frey (2009) 
4. 
My firm identifies vulnerabilities across the firm’s internal value 
chain 
Frey (2009); Suder (2006) 
5. My firm relies on government measures to counter-terrorism.  Czinkota et al. (2010) 
6. My firm increased the number of security staff.  Knight and Czinkota (2008) 
7. 
My firm’s decision-making is decentralized rather than 
centralized.  
Frey (2009) 
8. My firm has an escape and security plan in place.  Knight and Czinkota (2008) 
9. 
My firm is prepared for the rapid repair and replacement of 
damaged physical assets after a terrorist attack.  
Frey (2009) 
10. 
My firm discusses the risk of terrorism and anti-terrorism 
measures with customers. 
Developed for this study 
11. 
My firm offers to provide safe travel arrangements for visiting 
customers. 
Developed for this study 
12. My firm has increased safety stocks of inventory. 
Knight and Czinkota (2008); 
Suder (2006) 
13. 
My firm relies on alternative suppliers in different locations 
rather than on a single source supplier 
Suder (2006 ) 
14. 
My firm has increased the amount of material sourced from less 
terrorism-prone areas. 
Suder (2006 ) 
15. 
My firm has broadened its shipping arrangements with 
alternative modes of transportation (contingency transportation 
arrangements). 
Suder (2006 ) 
16. 
My firm provides training to employees on how to behave in 
case of a terrorist event. 
Harvey (1993) 
17. My firm offers extra insurance and higher wages for employees. Frey (2009) 
18. 
My firm is prepared to provide financial, medical and 
psychological help in case of terrorist attacks. 
Frey (2009) 
19. My firm has rules of succession for every leading position. 






Background Characteristics  
This survey allows for the classification of firms on the basis of size, market orientation, 
export share, and location. A section of the questionnaire includes a range of questions about 
characteristics of the firm, such as business experience, firm group9, main industry, main 
products, subsidiaries inside and outside the country, number of employees and sales10, export 
sales and percentage of export sales to total sales, number of years exporting abroad11, exports 
and import markets, the most important export and export markets, customers in Germany, 
obstacles to doing business.  
 
2.3.3. Data collection 
Data were collected at trade fairs in Pakistan and Germany to contact firms dealing in 
international business. These surveys were conducted at Heimtextil (Frankfurt), Textile Asia 
(Karachi) and FIBO (Cologne). The first trade fair was Heimtextil 2018 which is the biggest 
textile trade fair in Germany (Messe Frankfurt, 2020). Pakistan is among the top ten 
exhibitors (almost 200 firms) in this trade fair. Senior managers of 76 firms that deal in the 
international market as an exporter and/ or importer were interviewed. There was a majority 
of firms that were active exporters (80 percent export-oriented firms). Heimtextil includes a 
majority of exporters and potential exporters that are seeking customers for future cross-
border business transactions at an international trade fair. In the second trade fair, data were 
collected from 96 firms exhibited at the Textile Asia 2018. The inclusion of Textile Asia 2018 
helped in controlling the bias of international trade fair outside Pakistan which has high 
percentage of export-oriented firms. Consequently, 86 firms were interviewed at Textile Asia 
                                                          
9 CIS, 2012 
10 CIS, 2012, number of years adapted 
11 Ernst and Young Survey of Jackstädt Centre for Entrepreneurship and Innovation Processes, 2016, adapted 
(asking here for how many years instead of export experience) 
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and 80 percent of the interviewed firms were non-exporting importers. Besides trade fairs, 
interviews were conducted with 10 firms that promised to share information outside Textile 
Asia due to time constraints.  
In the third trade fair, FIBO 2018 in Cologne, Germany, data were collected from 32 firms 
dealing in textile and sports goods industries. At FIBO 2018, only Sialkot firms were 
exhibiting because this city is famous for sports textiles manufacturers and exporter in 
Pakistan. In total, data were collected from 204 firms operating in geographic regions of 
Pakistan: Faisalabad, Karachi, Lahore, Multan, Rawalpindi, and Sialkot; different firms’ 
sizes: small, medium, and large; and firms’ exports intensity: exporting, and non/exporting. 
Most of the respondents were senior managers (C.E.O., Directors, General and Senior 
Managers) and they were well aware of firms’ current business situation and equipped with 
responses to capacity-related questions. Firms usually prefer to send very knowledgeable and 
capable managers to international trade fairs. Survey items and interviews were asked face-to-
face in the English language. In some situations, respondents switched to Urdu while 
explaining the mechanism of terrorism and international business relationship. Due to firms' 
presence at the international trade fair, English language was not a barrier to extract 
information. Before the interview, compliance with the confidentiality of respondents was 
ensured. It helped in maximizing the numbers of respondents. 
 
2.3.4. Sample 
The survey covered 204 manufacturing firms employed between 5 and 15000 employees 
situated in 6 different cities in Pakistan (see Table 2.4a & 2.4b). Faisalabad, Karachi, Lahore, 
Multan, Rawalpindi and Sialkot are the main industrial hotspots in Pakistan and contribute 
almost 90 percent of total economic activities in Pakistan. The sample size of 204 firms is in 
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line with the average number of firms 175 observations used in survey-based studies 
according to the publication in Strategic Management Journal (Phelan et al., 2002) .  
Table 2.4a: Profile of firms 
Location Heimtextil Textile Asia FIBO Non-Trade Fair Overall 
Karachi 41 70 0 1 112 
Faisalabad 27 3 0 2 32 
Sialkot 0 0 32 0 32 
Lahore 5 13 0 7 25 
Multan 2 0 0 0 2 
Rawalpindi 1 0 0 0 1 
Grand Total 76 86 32 10 204 
 
Table 2.4b: Firms profiling based on location, size, and export-intensity 
Location Size Export Non-export Others Overall 
Karachi Small 2 29 4 35 
Medium 8 22 9 39 
Large 16 7 15 38 
Faisalabad Small 1 0 2 3 
Medium 6 1 5 12 
Large 14 1 2 17 
Sialkot Small 15 0 0 15 
Medium 15 0 0 15 
Large 2 0 0 2 
Lahore Small 0 7 2 9 
Medium 1 5 1 7 
Large 2 1 6 9 
Multan Small 0 0 0 0 
Medium 2 0 0 2 
Large 0 0 0 0 
Rawalpindi Small 0 0 0 0 
Medium 0 0 0 0 
Large 0 0 1 1 
Grand Total   84 73 47 204 
 
Firms are categorized on the basis of size, export orientation, and location (see Table 
2.4b). In this chapter, we have used the same definition of firms’ size in the context of 
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Pakistan as mentioned in the prudential regulation of the State Bank of Pakistan (2017). 
Almost 33 percent of firms have annual sales turnover above Pakistani Rs 800 million 
(classified as being large firms), around 37 percent of firms have annual sales turnover 
between Rs 150 million and Rs 800 million (medium-sized firms), and nearly 30 percent of 
firms have annual sales turnover upper limit up to Rs 150 million (small firms). Firms export 
intensity is defined as exporting if export sales are 100 percent of total sales, non-exporting if 
export sales are 0 percent of total sales, and others if export sales are more than 0 percent and 
less than 100 percent of total sales (see Table 2.4b). 
 
2.4. Results 
Terrorism is a threat for the business environment. Firms working in a hostile 
environment have challenges to execute their business activities. Firms belonging to different 
export-intensity have responded with regard to their own experience with terrorism in the 
past, their concerns and their expectations are reported in Table 2.5. Descriptive statistics and 
comparison of means are analyzed using STATA version 14. 
Table 2.5: Export and non-export firms and effects or threats of terrorism 
Comparison of means 
Effects or threat of terrorism on firms Overall Exporting DIFFENE 
Non-
Exporting 
Concerned about the effects or threats of 
terrorism 
2.64 3.18 0.96*** 2.22 
Terrorism affected firms in the past 4.06 4.87 1.4*** 3.47 
Terrorism will affect the firm in the future 4.09 4.37 0.49* 3.88 
Notes: Overall firms = 204, Exporting firms = 84, Non-Exporting firms = 73 
*p-value <0.1, ** p-value <0.05, *** p-value <0.01 
Mean value closes to 1 means strongly agree and close to 7 strongly disagree to the statement 
DIFFENE means the difference of means between exporting firms and non-exporting firms 
As can be seen from Table 2.5, non-exporting firms are more concerned about the effects 
or threats of the terrorism in comparison to exporting firms. In Table 2.5, we can observe that 
there is a statistically significant difference between export and non-export firms in concerns 
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about terrorism effects or threats. Similarly, non-exporting firms are significantly different 
from exporting firms while responding to the question about terrorism affecting the firm in 
the past. Moreover, non-exporting firms are statistically different than exporting firms and 
expressed that terrorism will affect them in the future.  
Table 2.6: Different size of firms and effects or threats of terrorism 
  Comparison of means 
Effects or threat of terrorism on 
firms 
Overall Small DIFFSM Medium DIFFML Large DIFFLS 
Concerned about the effects or threats 
of terrorism 
2.64 2.69 0.21 2.48 -0.3 2.78 0.09 
Terrorism affected firms in the past 4.06 4.08 0.49 3.59 -0.98*** 4.57 0.49 
Terrorism will affect the firm in the 
future 
4.09 3.98 -0.02 4 -0.3 4.3 0.32 
Notes: Overall firms = 204, Small firms = 62, Medium firms = 75, Large firms = 67 
*p-value <0.1, ** p-value <0.05, *** p-value <0.01 
Mean value closes to 1 means strongly agree and close to 7 strongly disagree to the statement 
DIFFSM means the difference of means between small firms and medium firms 
DIFFML means the difference of means between medium firms and small firms  
DIFFSM means the difference of means between large firms and small firms 
The size of the firms also reflects the ability and resources of firms to counter the effect of 
terrorism. Medium and large firms were differently affected by terrorism in the past. In Table 
2.6 column 5, large firms are least affected by terrorism in comparison to medium firms. 
Terrorism has a statistically different impact on both firms, medium and large.   
Table 2.7: Firms located in different cities and effects or threats of terrorism 
Comparison of means 
Threat of terrorism Overall Khi Fsd DIFFFS Skt DIFFLS Lhr DIFFFL Mtn Rwp 
Concerned about the 
effects or threats of 
terrorism 
2.64 2.26 2.59 -1.69*** 4.28 -1.76*** 2.52 0.07 1.00 1.00 
Terrorism affected firms 
in the past 
4.06 3.68 4.22 -1.09* 5.31 -1.27** 4.04 0.18 2.50 5.00 
Terrorism will affect the 
firm in the future 
4.09 3.88 3.75 -1.16** 4.91 -0.39 4.52 -0.77 3.00 4.00 
Notes: Khi = Karachi, Fsd = Faisalabad, Skt = Sialkot, Lhr = Lahore, Mtn = Multan, Rwp = Rawalpindi 
Overall firms = 204, Khi = 112, Fsd = 32, Skt = 32, Lhr = 25, Mtn = 2, Rwp = 1  
*p-value <0.1, ** p-value <0.05, *** p-value <0.0 
DIFFFS means the difference of means between firms in Faisalabad and Sialkot 
DIFFLS means the difference of means between firms in Lahore and Sialkot 
DIFFFL means the difference of means between firms in Faisalabad and Lahore 
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Firms located in terrorism-ridden regions are likely to be more affected by terrorism than 
firms located in other regions. This comparison gives a true picture of the intensity of 
terrorism in Pakistan. Karachi is the most terror-ridden region among other cities in this 
sample. Firms in Karachi are more concerned about the issue of terrorism. Sialkot is a 
peaceful city in Pakistan and firms in Sialkot are not that much concerned about the threat of 
terrorism (see Table 2.7). On the other hand, Faisalabad is also a peaceful region in Pakistan 
but firms in this city are more concerned about the effects and threats of terrorism. Firms in 
Faisalabad have to send their goods to dry port in Lahore and for exporting in Karachi 
seaport. In Table 2.7, firms in Faisalabad are more concerned about terrorism in comparison 
to firms in Sialkot. The difference between two cities is statistically significant. Similarly, 
there is a significant difference between Sialkot and Faisalabad firms about terrorism effects 
in the past and their concern about future terrorism effects on their business. Firms in Lahore 
and Sialkot are also significantly different from each other because firms in Lahore are more 
concerned about the effects and threats of terrorism and they were more strongly affected in 
the past in comparison to Sialkot firms.  
Table 2.8: Effect of terrorism on business operations of Export and non-exporting firms 
Comparison of means 
Terrorism impact on business operations Overall Exporting DIFFENE 
Non-
Exporting 
Reluctance of foreign customers to visit Pakistan 2.73 2.35 -1.16*** 3.51 
Higher insurance costs 2.75 2.88 0.03 2.85 
Supply chain direct costs have gone up 2.99 2.87 -0.34 3.21 
Longer delivery times 3.13 3.42 0.58** 2.84 
Unpredictable supply chain interruptions 3.37 3.49 0.01 3.48 
Lower demand by customers from abroad 3.43 3.26 -0.67** 3.93 
Lower demand by customers in Pakistan 3.86 4.27 0.83*** 3.44 
Higher labor costs 4.19 4.37 0.1 4.27 
Physical damages (e.g., firm buildings) 5.66 6.31 1.06*** 5.25 
Injured or killed employees 6.15 6.57 0.75*** 5.82 
Notes: Overall firms = 204, Exporting firms = 84, Non-Exporting firms = 73 
*p-value <0.1, ** p-value <0.05, *** p-value <0.01 
DIFFENE means the difference of means between exporting firms and non-exporting firms 
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In order to gain additional insights into the effects of terrorism on business activities, 
firms reported in more detail how their business dimensions were affected. In the total 
sample, the average score is lowest for the “demand” dimension suggesting that the refusal of 
foreign customers to visit firms in Pakistan is the most relevant threat, whereas the highest 
score is for injured people suggesting that firms do not tend to be directly affected in this way. 
This is a big challenge for export-oriented firms. Results in Table 2.8 suggest that export-
oriented firms are statistically different from non-exporting firms and that they face lower 
demand from foreign customers. It limits the opportunity for firms to showcase their capacity 
to produce quality products. Ultimately, this additional cost is settled in the price of the 
products. It makes export-oriented firms less elastic about the price in the international 
market. Non-export firms are statistically different from exporting firms and they have other 
issues, for example, in the presence of terrorism non-export firms face longer delivery times; 
lower demand from the local market; physical damages; and injured or killed employees.  
Table 2.9: Different size of firms and effect of terrorism on business operations 
  Comparison of means 
Terrorism impact on business 
operations 
Overall Small DIFFSM Medium DIFFML Large DIFFLS 
Reluctance of foreign customers to 
visit Pakistan 
2.73 3.16 0.76** 2.4 -0.3 2.7 -0.46 
Higher insurance costs 2.75 2.87 0.32 2.55 -0.33 2.88 0.01 
Supply chain direct costs have gone up 2.99 3.31 0.62** 2.69 -0.32 3.01 -0.3 
Longer delivery times 3.13 3.16 0.4 2.76 -0.76** 3.52 0.36 
Unpredictable supply chain 
interruptions 
3.37 3.68 0.81*** 2.87 -0.79*** 3.66 -0.02 
Lower demand by customers from 
abroad 
3.43 3.68 0.61* 3.07 -0.53 3.6 -0.08 
Lower demand by customers in 
Pakistan 
3.86 3.9 0.45 3.45 -0.82** 4.27 0.37 
Higher labor costs 4.19 4.23 0.24 3.99 -0.4 4.39 0.16 
Physical damages (e.g., firm buildings) 5.66 5.5 -0.3 5.8 0.16 5.64 0.14 
Injured or killed employees 6.15 6.06 -0.18 6.24 0.12 6.12 0.06 
Notes: Overall firms = 204, Small firms = 62, Medium firms = 75, Large firms = 67 
*p-value <0.1, ** p-value <0.05, *** p-value <0.01 
DIFFSM means the difference of means between small firms and medium firms 
DIFFML means the difference of means between medium firms and small firms  
DIFFSM means the difference of means between large firms and small firms 
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There is a statistically significant difference between small and medium firms. As we can 
infer from Table 2.9, medium firms are suffering more from terrorism in comparison to small 
firms because foreign customers are reluctant to visit Pakistan. Supply chain direct costs have 
increased due to unpredictable supply chain interruption and because of lower demand from 
abroad. Terrorism has a stronger impact on medium firms in comparison to large firms 
because they suffer longer delivery time, unpredictable supply chain and lower demand of 
customers in Pakistan.   
Table 2.10: Firms located in different cities and effect of terrorism on business 
operations 
Comparison of means 
Terrorism impact on 
business operations 
Overall Khi Fsd DIFFFS Skt DIFFLS Lhr DIFFFL Mtn Rwp 
Reluctance of foreign 
customers to visit Pakistan 
2.73 2.87 2.28 -0.31 2.59 0.49 3.08 -0.80 1.00 1.00 
Higher insurance costs 2.75 2.59 3.19 0.47 2.72 0.36 3.08 0.11 2.00 2.00 
Supply chain direct costs have 
gone up 
2.99 3.04 2.91 0.22 2.69 0.67 3.36 -0.45 2.00 2.00 
Longer delivery times 3.13 3.02 3.28 0.16 3.13 0.40 3.52 -0.24 2.50 3.00 
Unpredictable supply chain 
shifts and interruptions 
3.37 3.21 3.81 0.38 3.44 0.16 3.60 0.21 2.00 2.00 
Lower demand by customers 
from abroad 
3.43 3.64 2.84 0.03 2.81 1.15** 3.96 -1.12** 3.50 4.00 
Lower demand by customers 
in Pakistan 
3.86 3.63 3.53 -0.69 4.22 0.58 4.80 -1.27** 5.00 3.00 
Higher labor costs 4.19 4.19 4.50 0.78* 3.72 0.68 4.40 0.10 4.50 4.00 
Physical damages (e.g., firm 
buildings) 
5.66 5.35 6.00 -0.38 6.38 -0.78** 5.60 0.40 6.50 6.00 
Injured or killed employees 6.15 5.96 6.19 -0.44 6.63 -0.35 6.28 -0.09 7.00 6.00 
Notes: Khi = Karachi, Fsd = Faisalabad, Skt = Sialkot, Lhr = Lahore, Mtn = Multan, Rwp = Rawalpindi 
Overall firms = 204, Kar = 112, Fsd = 32, Skt = 32, Lhr = 25, Mtn = 2, Rwp = 1  
*p-value <0.1, ** p-value <0.05, *** p-value <0.0 
DIFFFS means the difference of means between firms in Faisalabad and Sialkot 
DIFFLS means the difference of means between firms in Lahore and Sialkot 
DIFFFL means the difference of means between firms in Faisalabad and Lahore 
There is a statistically significant difference between firms in Sialkot and Faisalabad, as 
firms in Sialkot pay more to the labor in comparison to firms in Faisalabad (see Table 2.10). 
Due to terrorism threats, firms in Sialkot are facing a decline in demand from abroad in 
comparison to firms in Lahore. There is a statistically significant difference in the impact of 
terrorism on the physical damages between Lahore and Sialkot firms. In Table 2.10, there is a 
46 
 
significant difference between firms in Lahore and Faisalabad as firms in Faisalabad are 
facing lower demand from customers abroad and in Pakistan.  
 Table 2.11: Export and non-export firms’ management practices to deal with terrorism 
Comparison of means 
Management practices to deal with terrorism Overall Exporting DIFFENE 
Non-
Exporting 
Safety arrangement for visiting customers 2.36 1.96 -1.04*** 3.00 
Preparedness for financial, medical, and psychological help 2.72 2.49 -0.63*** 3.12 
Increase in safety stocks of inventory 2.73 2.77 -0.05 2.82 
Rely on suppliers from multi-locations rather than a single 
location 
2.74 2.3 -0.99*** 3.29 
Rules of succession for every leading position 2.79 2.49 -0.83*** 3.32 
An escape and security plan in place 2.8 2.69 -0.34 3.03 
Preparedness for the rapid repair and replacement of physical 
capital 
2.8 2.55 -0.67*** 3.22 
Increase in the number of security staff 2.86 3.01 0.15 2.86 
Contingency transportation arrangements 3.02 3.12 0.15 2.97 
Identifying vulnerabilities in internal value chain 3.14 3.52 0.96*** 2.56 
More material supply from less terrorism-prone areas 3.16 3.12 -0.04 3.16 
Rely on government measure to counter-terrorism 3.38 3.36 -0.17 3.53 
Terrorism contingency plan 3.39 3.48 -0.11 3.59 
Critical operations movement to less terrorism-prone areas 3.64 3.99 0.67** 3.32 
Decentralized operations and buildings 3.68 3.82 -0.03 3.85 
Decentralized decision-making 3.88 4.23 0.53 3.7 
Employees training in case of terrorism 3.88 3.77 -0.30 4.07 
Sharing terrorism risk and anti-terrorism measures with 
customers 
4.3 4.44 0.43 4.01 
Employees extra insurance and higher wages 4.42 3.96 -1.09*** 5.05 
Notes: Overall firms = 204, Exporting firms = 84, Non-Exporting firms = 73 
*p-value <0.1, ** p-value <0.05, *** p-value <0.01 
DIFFENE means the difference of means between exporting firms and non-exporting firms 
There is a statistically significant difference between export and non-export firms on the 
basis of management practices adopted by them. Export-oriented firms are more concerned 
with the safety arrangement of the visiting customers (see Table 2.11), spend money on 
financial, medical and psychological help of employees in case of terrorist attacks, and get 
supplies from multiple source suppliers to deal with the terrorism-driven interruption. In order 
to avoid skilled staff shortage, export-oriented firms follow the rule of succession for every 
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leading position. They readily prepared for the rapid repair and replacement of physical 
capital and pay higher wages and extra insurance to retain their employees and customers. 
Non-exporting firms identify vulnerabilities in their value chain activity and move critical 
business operations to less terrorism-prone regions to avoid disruption in their business 
activities due to terrorism.  
Table 2.12: Different size of firms and management practices to deal with terrorism 
  Comparison of means 
Management practices to deal with terrorism Overall Small DIFFSM Medium DIFFML Large DIFFLS 
Safety arrangement for visiting customers 2.36 3.21 1.16*** 2.05 0.12 1.93 -1.28*** 
Preparedness for financial, medical, and 
psychological help 
2.72 3.11 0.47* 2.64 0.21 2.43 -0.68*** 
Increase in safety stocks of inventory 2.73 3.19 0.56** 2.63 0.21 2.42 -0.77*** 
Rely on suppliers from multi-locations rather 
than single location  
2.74 3.44 0.64** 2.8 0.79*** 2.01 -1.43*** 
Rules of succession for every leading position 2.79 4 1.68*** 2.32 0.13 2.19 -1.81*** 
An escape and security plan in place 2.8 3.76 1.32*** 2.44 0.11 2.33 -1.43*** 
Preparedness for the rapid repair and 
replacement of physical capital 
2.8 3.69 1.06*** 2.63 0.45* 2.18 -1.51*** 
Increase in the number of security staff 2.86 3.35 0.59** 2.76 0.24 2.52 -0.83*** 
Contingency transportation arrangements 3.02 3.27 0.6** 2.67 -0.51* 3.18 -0.09 
Identifying vulnerabilities in internal value 
chain 
3.14 3.16 0.17 2.99 -0.31 3.3 0.14 
More material supply from less terrorism-prone 
areas 
3.16 3.34 0.14 3.2 0.26 2.94 -0.4 
Rely on government measure to counter 
terrorism 
3.38 2.73 -0.74** 3.47 -0.43 3.9 1.17*** 
Terrorism contingency plan 3.39 4.34 1.27*** 3.07 0.19 2.88 -1.46*** 
Critical operations movement to less terrorism-
prone areas 
3.64 3.89 0.37 3.52 -0.02 3.54 -0.35 
Decentralized operations and buildings 3.68 4.32 0.84** 3.48 0.18 3.3 -1.02*** 
Decentralized decision-making 3.88 4.47 1.03*** 3.44 -0.38 3.82 -0.65* 
Employees training in case of terrorism 3.88 4.55 0.9** 3.65 0.13 3.52 -1.03*** 
Sharing terrorism risk and anti-terrorism 
measures with customers 
4.3 4.61 0.53 4.08 -0.17 4.25 -0.36 
Employees extra insurance and higher wages 4.42 5.15 1.08*** 4.07 -0.06 4.13 -1.02*** 
Notes: Overall firms = 204, Small firms = 62, Medium firms = 75, Large firms = 67 
*p-value <0.1, ** p-value <0.05, *** p-value <0.01 
DIFFSM means the difference of means between small firms and medium firms 
DIFFML means the difference of means between medium firms and small firms  
DIFFSM means the difference of means between large firms and small firms 
Medium firms and large firms are statistically significantly different from small firms 
because they develop a protection core for their business dimensions against terrorism (see 
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Table 2.12, column 4 & 8). Medium firms and large firms employ different management 
practices from small firms to enhance the resilience amid terrorism, such as: 1) Arranging safe 
traveling of customers to visit Pakistan, 2) Preparing for financial, medical, and psychological 
help, 3) Increasing safety stocks of inventory, 4) Relying on suppliers from multi-locations 
rather than single location, 5) Adopting rules of succession for every leading position, 6) 
Providing an escape and security plan in place in case of terrorist incidents, 7) Preparing for 
the rapid repair and replacement of physical capital, 8) Increase in the number of security 
staff, 9) Contingency transportation arrangements (only medium firms), 10) Terrorism 
contingency plan, 11) Decentralized operations and buildings, 12) Decentralized decision-
making, 13) Employees training in case of terrorism and 14) Offering employees with extra 
wages and insurance.  
Due to the scarcity of resources, small firms rely on government anti-terrorism policies 
and regulations to safeguard their business operations. Small firms are statistically different 
from medium firms and large firms because of their dependency on the measures of the 
government to create a safe business environment. Large firms have more resources to 
enhance their resilience against terrorism through employing management practices against 
terrorism. Large firms are significantly different from medium firms because large firms rely 
on suppliers from multi-locations rather than single location; they are better prepared for the 
rapid repair and replacement of physical capital (see Table 2.12, column 6).  
Medium firms are statistically different and better in using contingency transportations 
plan to mitigate the risk of terrorist incidents while transporting supplies to the customers in 




Table 2.13: Firms location and management practices to deal with terrorism 
Comparison of means 
Management practices to deal 
with terrorism 
Overall Khi Fsd DIFFFS Skt DIFFLS Lhr DIFFFL Mtn Rwp 
Safety arrangement for visiting 
customers 
2.36 2.47 2.09 0.13 1.97 0.75* 2.72 -0.63 3.00 1.00 
Preparedness for financial, 
medical, and psychological help 
2.72 2.67 2.66 0.19 2.47 0.85** 3.32 -0.66 3.00 2.00 
Increase in safety stocks of 
inventory 
2.73 2.71 3.22 0.97** 2.25 0.51 2.76 0.46 3.50 2.00 
Rely on suppliers from multi-
locations rather than single 
location 
2.74 2.78 2.41 -0.03 2.44 0.96** 3.40 -0.99** 3.00 1.00 
Rules of succession for every 
leading position 
2.79 2.82 2.41 -0.28 2.69 0.55 3.24 -0.83* 3.50 2.00 
An escape and security plan in 
place 
2.80 2.78 2.38 -0.50 2.88 0.61 3.48 -1.11** 2.50 1.00 
Preparedness for the rapid repair 
and replacement of physical 
capital 
2.80 2.95 2.34 -0.41 2.75 0.21 2.96 -0.62 2.00 1.00 
Increase in the number of security 
staff 
2.86 2.76 2.75 -0.19 2.94 0.46 3.40 -0.65 3.50 1.00 
Contingency transportation 
arrangements 
3.02 3.20 3.66 1.91*** 1.75 1.29*** 3.04 0.62 2.50 4.00 
Identifying vulnerabilities in 
internal value chain 
3.14 3.08 3.41 0.56 2.84 0.52 3.36 0.05 5.00 2.00 
More material supply from less 
terrorism-prone areas 
3.16 3.00 3.34 0.66 2.69 1.51*** 4.20 -0.86* 3.50 3.00 
Rely on government measure to 
counter terrorism 
3.38 3.48 2.69 -1.19** 3.88 -0.52 3.36 -0.67 1.00 4.00 
Terrorism contingency plan 3.39 3.30 3.13 -0.84* 3.97 -0.33 3.64 -0.52 1.50 1.00 
Critical operations movement to 
less terrorism-prone areas 
3.64 3.55 3.84 0.34 3.50 0.38 3.88 -0.04 5.00 2.00 
Decentralized operations and 
buildings 
3.68 3.64 3.56 -0.25 3.81 0.15 3.96 -0.40 2.50 2.00 
Decentralized decision-making 3.88 3.75 4.22 0.28 3.94 -0.02 3.92 0.30 3.00 6.00 
Employees training in case of 
terrorism 
3.88 3.91 3.50 -0.25 3.75 0.65 4.40 -0.90* 4.00 4.00 
Sharing terrorism risk and anti-
terrorism measures with customers 
4.30 4.20 4.25 0.16 4.09 0.91 5.00 -0.75 5.50 4.00 
Employees extra insurance and 
higher wages 
4.42 4.65 4.31 0.59 3.72 0.72 4.44 -0.13 4.00 4.00 
Notes: Khi = Karachi, Fsd = Faisalabad, Skt = Sialkot, Lhr = Lahore, Mtn = Multan, Rwp = Rawalpindi 
Overall firms = 204, Khi = 112, Fsd = 32, Skt = 32, Lhr = 25, Mtn = 2, Rwp = 1 
*p-value <0.1, ** p-value <0.05, *** p-value <0.01 
DIFFFS means the difference of means between firms in Faisalabad and Sialkot 
DIFFLS means the difference of means between firms in Lahore and Sialkot 
DIFFFL means the difference of means between firms in Faisalabad and Lahore 
Sialkot is an exporting and a relatively peaceful city of Pakistan. Firms in Sialkot are 
innovative in comparison to firms in Lahore as they provide safety arrangements for foreign 
visitors, preparedness for financial, medical and psychological help, rely on supplier from 
multi-locations rather than single location, adopt a contingency transportation plan, and garner 
more material supply from less terrorism-prone areas (see Table 2.13, column 7).  
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Business community in Sialkot has a different approach to look at the issue of terrorism. 
Firms in Sialkot employ management practices that are statistically and significantly different 
from firms in Faisalabad because they focus more on safety stock and contingent 
transportation plan (see Table 2.13, column 5). On the other hand, firms in Faisalabad are 
statistically different from Sialkot firms (see Table 2.13, column 5) because they rely on 
government measure to counter terrorism; these firms have formalized a program designed to 
reduce the probability of terrorist attacks and to deal with the terrorist if an attack occurs (i.e. 
terrorism contingency plan).  
Firms in Faisalabad have statistically significant different management practices than 
firms in Lahore, as firms in Faisalabad rely on suppliers from multi-locations. They have rules 
of succession for every leading position, an escape and security plan at place, more material 
supplies from less terrorism-prone areas, and employees’ trainings in case of terrorism (see 
Table 2.13, column 9).  
 
2.5. Discussion 
The results of this study give insights that terrorism affects the business dimensions of 
firms export intensity, sizes, and locations; and firms adopt management practices to deal with 
terrorism.  
Firms’ export-intensity 
In general, terrorism has affected the business dimensions of exporting and non-exporting 
firms. The risk of exporting firms is higher due to complex and beyond control 
trustworthiness and reliability in the eye of foreign customers (Zeneli et al., 2018). For 
example, due to high frequency of terrorist attacks in Pakistan, foreign customers are reluctant 
to visit Pakistan. The uncertainty associated with terrorist attack affects firms through rising 
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insurance premium (Czinkota et al., 2005), disruption in international value chain (Czinkota et 
al., 2004), and loss in revenues (Oetzel & Oh, 2013). Non-exporting firms are suffering more 
due to longer delivery times of the material for production (Czinkota et al., 2005, 2010). 
Sialkot and Faisalabad have mostly export-oriented firms, however, not directly attacked by 
terrorists in recent years. Karachi is a city that has a representation of export and non-export 
firms. The analysis of firms located in Karachi helped in understanding the mechanisms 
through which firms are affected due to terrorism.  
Our empirical results (see Table 2.5) suggest that non-export firms are more concerned 
about terrorism and affected more due to terrorism in Karachi. Firms dealing with customers 
in the local market are suffering delays in supplies (Czinkota et al., 2005). A non-exporting 
firm “A” has shared: 
“Both (terrorism in and outside the city) will be affected, but Karachi is more 
sensitive to any uncertain activity. It has different dynamics for business 
operations to customers’ psychology in local and international market. Our labor 
will be at their home or safe place in case of terrorism in Karachi…” [Interview 
conducted on March 27, 2018]  
Non-exporting firms deal with customers in various geographic locations in Pakistan. 
They identify vulnerabilities in the internal value chain and prefer to move critical operations 
to less terrorism-prone regions (Frey, 2009).  
Terrorism has declined the demand from exporting firms from the foreign customers 
(Czinkota. 2002; Czinkota et al., 2010). Due to safety concerns, foreign customers get 
reluctant to visit Pakistan. The perception in the mind of foreign customers disturbs business 
ties (Czinkota, 2002). An export-oriented firm “B” has stated: 
“Its effect is almost the same because we are located in Faisalabad. Where the 
terrorists activity is, you can say,  1 percent of total, but factor is, we have to pay 
the cost when customers are not travelling. Before that customers most frequently 
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come to visit our factories different in Faisalabad area. But now, you can say it 
can be reduced like 99 percent customers are not willing to come to Pakistan… ” 
[Interview conducted on January 10, 2018]  
Exporting firms apply management practices to deal with the negative effect of terrorism 
on business operations to retain foreign customers. Exporting firms provide safety 
arrangements to foreign customers and rely on multi-location suppliers rather than a single 
location. They are prepared for rapid repair and replacement in case of terrorism, pay extra 
insurance and wages (Liou & Lin, 2008), and have adopted rules of succession of every 
leading position (Frey, 2009).  
Firms exposed to risk develop certain management practices for the continuation of the 
business activities. Firms based in uncertain environments benefit from internationalization 
because they have gone through an organizational learning process that equipped them with 
the tools to manage unpredictable market and regulatory changes (Cuervo-Cazurra et al., 
2019; Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 2008; Holburn & Zellner, 2010).  
Firms’ size 
The size of the firms determines the number of resources that are available to deploy in 
case of an emergency. In our sample, medium-sized firms are mostly engaged in export 
business. Similarly, foreign customers are sensitive to the issue of terrorism (Czinkota et al., 
2010). In our analysis, it is evident that medium-sized firms are more at terrorism-driven risk. 
These results suggest that medium-sized firms’ customers are reluctant to visit Pakistan 
because foreign customers have more options to avoid a terrorism-ridden city or country. 
Thus, medium-sized firms are more concerned about the effect and threats of terrorism. Firm 
“C” has stated: 
“Economy is hitting too much, because international customer, overseas 
customers are not coming due to attack. Because we are living so on daily basis, 
53 
 
we see and we live in same culture. But the people who are coming from outside, 
not same culture, they see these issue; they feel afraid…” [Interview conducted 
on January 10, 2018]  
Small firms are less concerned about terrorism. Firstly, there are limited resources to 
counter-terrorism and, secondly, small firms are mostly dealing in the local market that makes 
them less concerned about foreign customers because they have nothing to lose. Firm “D” has 
shared:  
“Terrorism is not a problem for local market. It does affect our foreign business 
partners. But it is also not that serious, we deal in imports from China, so they are 
only concerned with money they get from us. If we were exporters then it could 
have affect our businesses more dangerously. In local business we get 
familiarized with such uncertainties and find solutions accordingly. Outside 
Karachi terrorism doesn’t affect our business at all…” [Interview conducted on 
March 27, 2018]  
  
However, large firms have abundant resources that can be deployed to avoid 
inconvenience in business operations due to terrorism (Greenbaum, LaFree, & Dugan, 2007). 
A respondent from a large firm “E” summed up the impact of terrorism on business 
operations:  
“ I would say, in our case, it affects our customers more because our customers 
are more concerned with all the things are going bad in Pakistan, with the price 
will dramatically go up and shipment would not come on time…” [Interview 
conducted on January 9, 2018]  
Furthermore, large firms face the problem of foreign customers’ reluctance to visit them 
in Pakistan. Large firms manage the issue of foreign customers by meeting them at a trade fair 
or arranging a meeting in third place.  
The confidence and trust of customers is the most important factor for the export of 
supplies to a foreign destination (Zeneli et al., 2018). Firms in emerging markets might adapt 
in response to the threats and shocks to survive (Gao et al., 2017). A favorable reputation can 
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ensure adaptations which are seen as a signal of behavioral drift that dissuaded future 
transactions. Moreover, medium and large firms pay more attention to ensure safety 
arrangements for visiting customers.  
Small firms are less likely to survive external shocks due to “liability of smallness” 
(Aldrich, 1999). Small firms are not equipped with sufficient resources to offer extra facilities 
to their customers. They are mostly battling for their survival. The owner of a small firm “F” 
shared experience about doing business in a terrorism-ridden city: 
“Obviously, attack in Karachi gives a serious blow to my business. Other city 
attack is less severe for my business operations…” [Interview conducted on 
March 27, 2018]  
Terrorism damages medium-sized firms severely because their high percentage of revenue 
depends on foreign sales. They have to comply with the demand of importers. Sometimes 
they are bound to pay extra insurance for the supply of goods (Knight & Czinkota, 2008; 
McIntyre & Travis, 2006; Wernick, 2006). Terrorism interrupts the supply chain and 
alternative mode of supply (Czinkota et al., 2005, 2010) also adds the cost of doing business 
for medium-sized firms. Large firms manage interruptions in the supply chain through safety 
stocks (Czinkota et al., 2005; Knight & Czinkota, 2008; Sheffi, 2001, 2005; Suder, 2006).  
Furthermore, large firms usually operate in more than one location, so they rely on multi-
locations suppliers rather than a single location (Wernick, 2006; Suder, 2006). Firms also face 
a challenge of longer delivery time (Czinkota et al., 2005). Therefore, medium-sized firms’ 
devise a contingent transportation plan (Barnes & Oloruntoba, 2005; McIntyre & Travis, 
2006; Suder, 2006). In our results, terrorism has affected medium-sized firms' businesses 
more because uncertainty in the global supply chain leads to a decline in demand from foreign 
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customers (Czinkota et al., 2004; Czinkota, Knight, Liesch, & Steen, 2005, 2010; McIntyre & 
Travis, 2006; Suder & Czinkota, 2005).    
Firms’ location 
Environmental scanning is a key step in the planning process for firms to identify 
vulnerabilities in firms’ value chain (Zeneli, Czinkota, & Knight, 2018). The level of 
uncertainty in a terrorist-ridden city can be different for firms from a non-terrorist incident 
city. Similarly, the effect of terrorism on the business dimensions of those respective cities is 
different. This implies that the management practices of firms to counter the threat will also 
vary accordingly. The results of our analysis also explain that the effect of terrorism is more 
severe on the firms located in Karachi in comparison to firms based in Sialkot. The last two-
decade terrorism data show only 1 terrorist attack in Sialkot whereas Karachi suffered 
constantly due to terrorist attacks.   
The uncertain business climate has affected the visit of foreign customers to suppliers in 
Pakistan. Firms located in Faisalabad have suffered from foreign customers’ reluctance to 
visit their factory. Additionally, a firm “G” from Faisalabad explained: 
“Faisalabad is the most peaceful city of Pakistan. We had no terrorism in past 
two decades. We are mostly dealing with local suppliers and market. Our 
customer base is also within region. We are least bothered by the terrorism in 
other cities. It sometimes affects our supplies from foreign market. But it is not 
that problematic. If there is terrorism in our city, then the consequences would 
have been more serious. ” [Interview conducted on March 27, 2018]  
 
Terrorism-driven fear has forced firms to spend money on the insurance of goods 
(Czinkota, Knight, & Liesch, 2004). Karachi is the backbone of Pakistan business activities; 
firms operating in Karachi are paying more insurance for sustainable business operations. A 
Karachi based firm “H” stated:   
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“Karachi is the economic hub of Pakistan. Terrorism in Karachi is not only a 
problem to our economy, but it has a direct effect on our business as well. We 
have been affected and disturbed by terrorism in Karachi and Pakistan. We face 
supply chain and cost problem due to terrorism. This is a big concern for our 
business. We have to pay more to our employees. We have now alternative 
supply chain strategy to make our business less risky in case of terrorism in our 
city. We are providing special offers and facilities to our customers to retain 
them. We are very open with our customers to make things more transparent for 
our survival…” [Interview conducted on March 28, 2018]  
Terrorism has also increased the supply chain cost of firms. In peaceful conditions, firms 
can use conventional supply chain processes using road-cargo or rail-cargo. Due to terrorism, 
firms in a peaceful city reduce dependency on other problematic cities12 and devise innovative 
global supply chain, for example, firms in Sialkot established an airport with the support of 
private sector firms. Thus, business community in Sialkot has initiated the air-cargo services 
to ensure the supply of goods to foreign customers. A Sialkot based firm “I” explained: 
“Sialkot business community is very proactive…own airport for the convenience 
of the foreign customer…” [Interview conducted on April 12, 2018]  
In a terrorism-ridden city, firms face disruptions in day-to-day business activities. For 
example, transportation of goods is disturbed amid terrorism for several days (Wernick, 2006; 
Suder, 2006). In order to maintain the goodwill and trust in the eye of foreign customers (Gao 
et al., 2017; Zeneli et al., 2018), firms opt for speedy supply options that are relatively costlier 
for the firms. Air-cargo increases the supply chain costs for the firms (Czinkota, Knight, 
Liesch, & Steen, 2010). A firm “J” based in Karachi mentioned:  
“and suppose you have a shipment to go out, it will not leave that day, if it 
doesn’t leave that day, your shipment can be add… which means 30, 40 lakh ka 
jhatka air freight aik ganty mai lg gaya (translation: 30 to 40 lacs loss in one 
hour due to air freight immediately)…” [Interview conducted on January 12, 
2018]  
                                                          
12 The more internationally diversified the supply chain, and the longer, the more variables are at play that raise 
the uncertainty and risk level, primarily though reducing the amount of control and visibility and increasing the 
number of partner... [Suder, 2006, p. 135] 
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Terrorist incidents in the city are not only causing shutdowns and strikes that delay the 
timely delivery of goods but also threaten the performance of the firms (Czinkota, Knight, 
Liesch, & Steen, 2005, 2010). International customers are more sensitive to the peace 
conditions of a country from where they have a business partner or supplier. Even a small 
incident of a terrorist attack is socially amplified by the media (Kasperson et al., 1988). A 
Sialkot based firm “K” mentioned:  
“Terroristic attacks in Karachi or any other city of Pakistan, no difference in the 
mind of foreign buyers. They feel it same because media create a big hype to 
such incidents…” [Interview conducted on April 14, 2018]  
In comparison to other cities in Pakistan, Sialkot firms incorporate terrorism effects on 
employees in their business strategy (Czinkota et al., 2005) by taking care of their employees 
and paying extra costs to their labor to avoid any interruptions in production (Frey, 2009; 
Suder, 2006). This allows firms in Sialkot to retain skilled workers for their business 
operations. Firm “L” has shared: 
“Same city terrorism has a serious effect because availability of labor is 
important…movement of labor… production activity shall be disturbed… 
delivery on time… sour customer relations shall threaten business to fail…” 
[Interview conducted on April 14, 2018] 
Management practices to safeguard business operations allow firms to gain a good 
reputation in the eye of customers. This notion was succinctly summed up by a firm “M” 
based in Sialkot: 
“Terrorism has changed our business environment. If there is terrorism in our 
country, the perception of our country would go negative in international market. 
They will be reluctant to do business with us. Our foreign customers have already 




The reputation of a firm is an intangible asset that helps firms to survive the effect of 
terrorism (Gao et al., 2017). Firms adopt different business strategies to attract and retain 
customers. Timely delivery of supplies and safety arrangement for the customers help in 
restoring confidence (Czinkota et al., 2005; Zeneli et al., 2018). In Pakistan, the Sialkot 
business community has taken innovative steps to facilitate foreign customers. They have 
ensured the presence of foreign customers at their doorsteps through the initiative of a private 
airport. This service has enabled foreign customers to safely visit customers in Sialkot even if 
there are terrorist incidents in other cities of Pakistan. As quoted earlier by a firm “I” based in 
Sialkot, business community in Sialkot is very proactive and it has established an airport for 
safe arrival of their foreign customers at their doorstep directly.  
More recently, Sialkot has also founded an airline as well for more frequent flights from 
its customers’ countries. Firms in Sialkot are prepared to help their employees financially, 
medically and psychologically. Also, these firms have increased safety stock to fulfill their 
commitments to the customers without any delays. Gao et al. (2017) proposed a reputation-
based view of long-run survival that, emerging market firms might benefit from a reputation 
not only for producing quality products but also for withstanding environmental shocks.  
The risk of supply chain interruptions is mitigated by relying on several suppliers rather 
than sticking to one supplier (Wernick, 2006; Suder, 2006). Firms avoid supply chain issues 
by looking for contingent transportation arrangements and multi-suppliers (McIntyre & 
Travis, 2006; Suder, 2006). A firm “N” situated in Karachi shared experience of alternative 
supply chain strategy:  
“Terrorism is negative for our business activities and economy. We have special 
plan to cope the issue of terrorism. Although it is disturbed our supply chain 
process, but we use alternative supply chain options to make our business 
foolproof. Economy of Pakistan will take long time to recover from the negative 
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shadow of terrorism. It is not easy to turn things around overnight. It is easy to 
destroy business environment, but it is a big task to recover from economic 
disaster.” [Interview conducted on March 28, 2018]  
Also, firms evade human capital crisis through multiple practices such as adopting rules of 
succession for every leading position, anti-terrorism training of employees, and financial, 
physical, and psychological help of employees in case of terrorism (Frey, 2009). This allows 
firms business continuity even in severe business conditions. Decentralized firms are able to 
operate the business because in the case of terrorism firms can work in a safer location (Frey, 
2009; Sheffi, 2001, 2005; Suder, 2006). Empirical findings of this chapter explain that 
terrorism intensity is variable among different cities. Similarly, business operations of firms 
are affected differently, thus, firms employ different business strategies to safeguard business 
dimensions against terrorism.  
 
2.6. Conclusions 
This research aimed to gather and report the first comprehensive survey and interview 
data of Pakistani firms dealing with the challenge of terrorism. This research provided 
evidence on firms’ size and level of interest to prepare against terrorism. This study also gave 
an overview of how the variation of terrorism in various geographic regions influences firms’ 
business strategies to protect business operations. Additionally, it explains that the preferences 
and expectations of firms focused on local or /and foreign markets are different. Management 
practices of the firms are a self-defense mechanism against terrorism. The pattern of 
management practices applied to protect the core of the business varies from firm to firm 
depending upon the size, export intensity and geographic location of the firms. Management 
practices of firms against terrorism enable firms to develop a safety cushion for the business 
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dimensions under uncertain business environment. Firms operating in difficult situations can 
learn from the experience of firms developing a resilience core in the context of terrorism. 
This chapter calls for future research that there should be a mixed-method study to dig 
deeper and understand the underlying reasons that weaken the listed firms in the context of 
terrorism. The results of Chapter 2 show that the impact of terrorism varies from firm to firm, 
as management practices of the firms define resilience against terrorism differently based on 
their exposure to threat, available resources and intent to respond. In the next chapters of this 
dissertation, the relationship of terrorism with publicly traded firms is investigated using a 
longitudinal data to explore the intensity of terrorist incidents in different cities of Pakistan 
and the impact of city-level terrorism on the listed firms export performance (Chapter 3), and 




3. TERROR IN THE CITY: EFFECTS OF TERROISM ON FIRMS 
EXPORTS 
3.1. Introduction 
Terrorism is a worldwide phenomenon, with major acts since the early 1970s and a 
significant proliferation of terrorist attacks since the beginning of the 21st century (Institute 
for Economics and Peace, 2018). While the direct effects of terrorism are evidenced by 
numerous victims and their suffering, it also has indirect economic effects that might be 
intended or unintended by terrorist perpetrators (Sandler & Enders, 2008). Empirical studies 
provide empirical evidence of the macroeconomic effects of terrorist attacks, like terror-
induced negative growth effects (Enders & Sandler, 1996; Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003; 
Tavares, 2004; Chen & Siems, 2004). 
Macroeconomic research suggests that international trade could be a channel through 
which terrorism affects economic growth. An increase in the number and intensity of terrorist 
attacks can adversely affect international trade. Investigating bilateral trade flows between 
more than 200 countries, Nitsch and Schumacher (2004) find that bilateral trade decreases by 
about four percent if the number of terrorist incidents doubles. The results reported by Mirza 
and Verdier (2014) point to negative effects of terrorism on US imports, which are mainly the 
result of counterterrorism security measures. Examining the time dimension of the effects of 
terrorist attacks, Egger and Gassebner (2015) find that terrorism displays effects on 
international trade in the medium run (1.5 years after an incident), whereas the short-run 
impact seems to be negligible. Employing a sectoral disaggregated approach, 
Bandyopadhyay, Sandler, and Younas (2018) report that while terrorism reduces trade in 
manufactured goods, it has almost no influence on the trade of primary products.  
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While existing research on the link between terrorism and international trade provides 
valuable insights, our knowledge about the microeconomic link between terrorist attacks and 
firms’ exporting is still limited. In order to improve the identification of the relationship 
between terrorism and exports, this study aims to close this research gap by investigating the 
link between exports and terrorism at a highly disaggregated level, namely at the firm-level 
and city-level. Our disaggregated approach complements this research in two ways. First, this 
papers answers calls to consider the spatial dimension of terrorism and corresponding 
dynamics over time (LaFree, 2010). In particular, our disaggregated approach allows us to 
empirically investigate whether firm exports are affected by terrorist attacks in cities where 
firms are located and whether terrorist attacks in other cities affect exports via interregional 
spillovers. Terrorist attacks are not uniformly distributed within a country, they can vary 
immensely across regions and over time (Öcal & Yildirim, 2010). Thus, macroeconomic 
studies, based on aggregate terrorism data at the country level, tend to mask the regional 
variation in the level of terrorist attacks, which limits our understanding of how firm exports 
are affected by terrorism. 
Second, going beyond the macroeconomic relationship between terrorism and 
international trade, this is – to the best of the authors’ knowledge – the first study using firm-
level panel data to empirically examine the effects that terrorism has on firm exports. Our 
empirical strategy allows us to control for a substantial part of unobserved heterogeneity that 
may affect the results of empirical studies based on country-level data. We apply a panel data 
estimation with firm-specific and year-specific fixed effects to eliminate variation due to 
unobserved time-invariant factors (stable firm and city characteristics) as well as unobserved 
year-specific factors (systematic factors that affect all firms and cities in a given year) that 
may confound the relationship between the firm export ratio and terrorism. Hence, our results 
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are less affected by problems of aggregation and omitted variables that would otherwise result 
in biased parameter estimates. 
Our empirical analysis focuses on Pakistan, which, since 2002, is consistently ranked as 
one of the top five countries impacted by terrorism on the Global Terrorism Index (Institute 
for Economics and Peace, 2018). Since the economic effects of terrorist attacks are nonlinear 
and substantially bigger for terrorism-ridden economies (Mirza and Verdier, 2008), we argue 
that exports activities of firms located in those economies are likely to be severely affected by 
terrorism. Instead of conducting a cross-country analysis, therefore we employ a single 
country approach, which also implies that all firms in our sample tend to face the same 
institutional environment, e.g. trade regulations and legal environment. At the same time, we 
account for regional differences in the location of firms and terrorist incidents.  
Our empirical analysis is based on a unique panel dataset containing the financial 
information of the State Bank of Pakistan for301 firms listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange 
(PSX) from 1999 through 2014. Accounting for the regional dimension of terrorism, we 
assembled detailed terrorism data from the South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP) for various 
regions (cities) of Pakistan over fifteen years. Based on the number of terrorist incidents, the 
number of fatalities, and the number of injuries we constructed a City Terrorism Index (CTI) 
for each city in the style of the Global Terrorism Index (Institute for Economics and Peace, 
2018). Moreover, we also account for the impact of terrorism outside the city where a firm is 
located by constructing a distance-weighted indicator for terrorism outside a city assuming 
that firm exports tend to be more strongly disrupted by terrorist attacks that occurs 
geographically close by than by terrorism in more distant regions. Our empirical panel 
estimations show that there is negative and statistically significant relationship between a 
firm’s export ratio and the level of terrorism in the cities where the firms are located. The 
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effects are most pronounced in the medium term, decaying slowly over time. Although we 
also find support for some interregional spillover effects of terrorism on exporting, firms 
export ratios are most affected by terrorist incidents that take place in the same city.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the following section, we discuss the 
relationship between terrorist attacks, firm exports, and related regional dimensions. Section 3 
describes our sample and the measurement of variables. The variation of the level of terrorist 
attacks in Pakistani cities is illustrated in Section 4. The econometric specification and 
estimation results are presented in Section 5. Section 6 contains the discussion of our results 
and conclusions. 
 
3.2. Terrorism, Firm Exports, and Interregional Spillovers 
Terrorism can be defined as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a 
non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, 
or intimidation” (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2018, p.6).13 Single terrorist attacks are 
fairly random and unpredictable, thereby creating, apart from physical destruction and human 
harm, a broader atmosphere of fear. Terrorism not only hurts private citizens and governments 
but also the business activities of firms – even if this is not necessarily the main intention of 
terrorists. On the one hand, terrorism may directly impair local business activities by 
destroying public infrastructure, thereby disrupting organizational and production processes. 
On the other, it may detract firms’ international business activities through a decrease in 
customer demand, a reduction in foreign direct investment (FDI), as well as additional cost of 
doing international business due to delays and disturbances in international supply chains, 
                                                          
13 According to “The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research,” there are more than 250 academic, 
governmental, and intergovernmental definitions of terrorism (Schmid, 2011, see Chapter 2 on “The definition of 
terrorism”). Most definitions emphasize key elements like violence, fear, threats, and the disruption of public or 
private order.   
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including changes in governmental regulations and policies (Czinkota, Knight, Liesch, & 
Steen, 2010; Suder, 2004). In the annual Global CEO survey by PwC in 2006, terrorism and 
geopolitical disturbance were already judged to be a key risk for business growth by half of 
all interviewed CEOs. By 2015, geopolitical disturbance, mainly driven by regional conflicts 
and terrorist attacks, was the second most important concern for MNEs with 74% of 
interviewed CEOs mentioning it (PwC, 2007, 2016). Specifically, CEOs from the Middle East 
and Asia Pacific often regard the risk of terrorism and geopolitical disturbance to be the major 
business obstacle. Although terrorism is far from a new phenomenon, studies of its 
consequences were rare prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks in the US (Czinkota et al., 
2010).  
In this study, we focus on the impact of terrorism on firm export. Overall, firms’ 
internationalization activities may be inhibited by terrorism in at least five ways. First, 
terrorism can be conceptualized as an increase in trading costs, like a hidden tax or tariff on 
trade where transportation costs associated with bilateral trade increase in sync with greater 
terrorism in trading countries (Egger & Gassebner, 2015; Lenain et al., 2002; Nitsch & 
Schumacher, 2004; Mirza & Verdier, 2008; Walkenhorst & Dihel, 2006). Second, terrorism 
increases uncertainty, creating an atmosphere of anxiety and distrust for business partners. 
Consequently, firms might be unwilling to engage in business contacts with agents operating 
in unsafe and risky business environments. Business plans become more unreliable, if not 
obsolete, while travel to terrorism prone countries becomes more dangerous and expensive 
(e.g., higher insurance premiums). Terrorism may deter foreign business contacts as 
foreigners are not only less familiar with local risk, they more readily opt for alternative 
business opportunities and locations than local firms (cf. Greenbaum, Dugan & LaFree, 2007; 
Becker & Rubinstein, 2004). There is additional pressure on firms to convince their business 
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partners and customers about their capabilities to absorb terrorism shocks. Although there 
may be alternative solutions to communicate with foreign market customers, the lack of face-
to-face interaction can diminish the probability of future business deals. Third, exporting to 
another country may be associated with fixed costs (Helpman et al., 2008) that are affected by 
terrorism. Specifically, the goods and supply chain might be affected by delays and temporary 
disruptions due to longer inspections and stricter safety regulations (Walkenhorst & Dihel, 
2006), which increases the costs of exporting (Lenain et al., 2002). Fourth, trade is indirectly 
affected through counter-terrorism measures put in place by the government to reduce the 
likelihood of future terrorist attacks, also raising the cost of doing business. Fifth, Melitz 
(2003) shows that more productive firms enter the export market, while less productive firms 
continue to produce only for the domestic market. It can be argued that firm productivity is 
adversely affected by terrorism, thereby influencing firm exports (Bandyopadhyay et al., 
2018). A firms’ trade related costs and productivity levels may not just be affected by the 
level of terrorism in the country where a firm is located but also by the levels of terrorism in 
the destination countries to which a firm exports or wants to export. In this study, we focus on 
the former, analyzing how terrorism at home influences domestic firms’ exports. 
There are numerous papers, often using gravity models, investigating the impact of 
terrorism on trade at the macroeconomic level. One of the first studies is Nitsch and 
Schumacher (2004), which examines trade flow between more than 200 countries between 
1960 and 1993. They find that a doubling of terrorist attacks decreases bilateral trade by 4%. 
Using panel data from 177 countries covering 1968 to 1999, Blomberg and Hess (2006) find 
that bilateral trade falls by 5-6% if a pair of countries experiences at least one terrorist event 
within a year. They report this to be equivalent to a tariff of 0.65-1.46%. Comparing these 
figures with the worldwide applied average tariff rate of 4.65% in 1999 and 2.88% in 2015 
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(World Bank, 2017) suggests that countries with large amounts of terrorism experience a 
substantial reduction in trade flows. Moreover, trade studies separating imports from exports 
provide some evidence that terrorism affects imports more than exports, especially in the US 
and OECD (Egger & Gassebner, 2015; Bandyopadhyay et al., 2018). Egger and Gassebner 
(2015) employ monthly data on bilateral trade and terrorist attacks for 30 OECD countries 
between 1970 and 2008 in order to examine the short-run effects of terrorism on international 
trade. Their results suggest that the short-run impact of international terror on trade is almost 
negligible and that, if at all, terrorism negatively affects international trade only in the 
medium run (more than one and a half years after an incident). While Bandyopadhyay et al. 
(2018) also report small effects of terrorism on trade for OECD countries between 1995 and 
2012, they also show that terrorism has a much larger effect on trade in developing countries, 
especially in manufacturing sectors. They find that a doubling of terrorism cuts exports in 
manufactured goods by 5.9%. 
Overall, industrialized countries seem much less affected by terrorism (and its 
consequences) than developing countries (Bandyopadhyay & Younas, 2011; Sandler & 
Enders, 2008; Çetin, Keser, & Ay, 2019). Sandler and Enders (2008) argue that industrialized 
countries have more diverse and larger economic sectors, thus allowing them to faster and 
more efficiently reallocate resources to other sectors of the economy following terrorist 
events. In contrast, many developing countries still depend on a small number of sectors for 
their economic growth. Therefore, a major terrorist attack is a severe threat for their economic 
growth. Moreover, in industrialized countries, the institutions engaging in stabilizing fiscal 
and monetary policies are better equipped to do so, while developing countries often lack 
institutions that can efficiently absorb and ameliorate the economic shocks of terrorism.   
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In sum, the macroeconomic studies evaluating the relationship between terrorism and 
bilateral trade either find negative or statistically insignificant effects; the effects diminish 
over time such that terrorism affects trade mostly in the short to medium run (Nitsch & 
Schumacher, 2004; Mirza & Verdier, 2008; Egger & Gassebner, 2015). An explanation for 
inconclusive results is given by Egger and Gassebner (2015; p.60) who conclude, “the 
average terror event is relatively small and, for countries and country-pairs, infrequent. 
Certainly, that does not mean that terror does not matter. It says, though, that trade might be 
the wrong domain to look for big effects.” The negative effects of terrorism on trade might be 
more severe at the micro-level as compared to the macro-level where effects might be blurred 
due to the aggregation. 
We argue that this conclusion is particularly justified when focusing, for instance, on 
OECD countries where terrorism does not play a major role for the economy and when 
focusing on the analysis of macroeconomic relationships. Various developing countries suffer 
from frequent and severe terrorist attacks that, in turn, inhibit trade inclusion. Hence, the 
negative effects of terrorism on trade tend to be more pronounced for terrorism-prone 
countries. However, even within a terrorism-prone country, not all regions and cities are 
equally affected. Firms located in cities and regions with a few terrorist attacks might be less 
affected by terrorism than firms located in terrorist hotspots. In fact, there is tremendous 
spatial dispersion of terrorism, which might affect firms’ business operations and exporting to 
varying degrees. Nitsch and Schumacher (2004, p. 424 ff.) argue, “In fact, it is possible that 
terrorism has almost no measurable effect on trade since the overwhelming majority of 
terrorist actions are operations with only local implications”. While such differences cannot 
be considered at the country-level, at the firm level, it can be examined whether terrorism in 
the region where a firm is located affects its trade activities. The closer, geographically, a 
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terrorism incident is to a firm’s location, the more likely operations are impaired. Thus, a 
firm-level analysis can provide better insights on the underlying dynamics of trade. In 
particular, it can be expected that terrorist attacks within a geographical proximity, e.g. the 
city where a firm is located, affect firm exports negatively.  
However, it is not just near-by terrorism that may affect firm performance, like firm 
exports, but also terrorism further away. There are several studies analyzing neighborhood 
and spillover effects of terrorism on trade and economic growth. De Sousa et al. (2009) 
examine how US imports between 1993 and 2002 are affected by terrorism in countries 
exporting to the US as well as in countries neighboring the exporting countries. They show 
that both terrorist incidents in the exporting and neighboring countries reduce US imports. 
While a terrorist attack in an exporting country directly decreases imports by around 1%, it 
still decreases US imports indirectly by 0.5% when the terrorist attack takes place in a country 
that is a neighbor of the exporting country. In a subsequent work, De Sousa et al. (2010) 
broaden their neighborhood definition to account for cultural proximity between trading 
partners. They confirm their previous results for spillovers and find that US imports decrease 
more strongly, the closer a third country, in terms of distance and culture, is to an exporting 
country. Similarly, Murdoch and Sandler (2004) examine the spatial and inter-temporal 
relationship between civil wars on economic growth at home and in neighboring countries 
between 1961 and 1995 for 84 countries. They find that a civil war at home reduces economic 
growth by 85% in the short-run and 31% in the long-run. In addition, a civil war in a 
neighboring country lowers growth by 24% (30%) of the host-country effect in the short-run 
(long-run). Thus, the economic consequences of a civil war at home might be equivalent to 
three or four civil wars in countries at close proximity. These studies point to cross-country 
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spillover effects of terrorism and, therefore, it might be expected that interregional spillover 
effects exist between regions of a country.   
Indeed, there is empirical evidence that terrorism has regional effects within countries. 
Considering the uneven regional dispersion of terrorist attacks in Turkey between 1987 and 
2001, Öcal and Yildirim (2010) use geographically weighted regressions and demonstrate that 
regional effects of terrorism on economic growth are more pronounced in provinces with a 
higher concentration of terrorist incidents. Terrorist attacks might even lead to regional and 
city-level spillovers in specific industries like tourism. Drakos and Kutan (2003) show 
significant cross-country spillover effects of terrorism on the own and competitors’ market 
shares in the tourism industry in Greece, Israel, and Turkey between 1991 and 2000. For Italy, 
Greenbaum and Hultquist (2006) analyze the implications of terrorist attacks on the tourism 
industry at a more disaggregated level, namely the city level. Terrorism within a city 
decreases tourist activities, but only within the current and first year after the incident, 
supporting previous findings that the terrorist impact on economic activities quickly decays 
over time (Yechiam et al. 2005, Greenbaum et al., 2007). Moreover, while the city effect in 
Greenbaum and Hultquist (2006) is negative, the regional/provincial effect can be positive, 
which might suggest cross-regional substitution effects as tourists, especially from foreign 
destinations, are more likely and quicker to change their behavior by choosing safer locations 
(cf. Neumayer, 2004).Against this background, a relevant question is whether terrorism at the 
local level and its interregional spillovers only affect tourism, or whether firm exports are also 
affected. 
These studies suggest there is macroeconomic evidence for negative effects of terrorism 
on trade due to terrorist activities in trading partners’ countries and due to cross-country 
spillovers of terrorism. However, evidence for the local effects of terrorism on export 
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activities is missing. More generally, spatial variations of terrorism within a country, and its 
economic consequences, are rarely analyzed. Therefore, Greenbaum and Hultquist (2006, p. 
128) claim that, “Future research should use the disaggregated nature of city-level data further 
to more carefully examine the spatial relationships among cities and to better understand the 
implications of a terrorist attack on the regional economy.” Empirical analyses at the city-
level are meaningful because medium to large cities are the preferred targets for terrorist 
attacks because the number of people harmed and fear induced are maximized. Similarly, 
firms choose to locate in these same cities due to agglomeration economies and labor pooling 
(Harrigan & Martin, 2002). Hence, firms are directly and indirectly impaired by terrorism in 
cities and, in this study, we examine whether the export performance of firms is affected by 
terrorism in cities where firms are located and by the interregional spillovers of terrorism. 
In order to shed light on the link between terrorism and firm exports, we employ firm-
level data and city-level indicators for terrorism at the city-level and potential interregional 
spillovers of terrorism. Moreover, the panel structure of our data also allows us to examine the 
time dimension of the effects of terrorism on exports. Specifically, we expect that terrorist 
attacks in a city where a firm is located will negatively affect firm export ratios. We do not 
have, however, clear expectations with regard to the time pattern of the effects of terrorist 
attacks of firm export ratio since the results of existing research are inconsistent.  
 
3.3. Data 
3.3.1. Data Sources and Sample 
Our empirical analysis is based on two data sources. Firm information is obtained from 
the “Balance Sheet Analysis” of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), comprising data of firms 
listed on the Pakistan Stock Exchange (formerly Karachi Stock Exchange). The State Bank of 
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Pakistan dataset covers all non-financial sector firms from all industry sectors and is 
considered to be the most reliable data source for listed firms in Pakistan. The dataset 
provides information about firms’ export sales and other financial variables. The balance 
sheet analysis is released annually and we compiled firm-level information for an unbalanced 
panel of up to 482 non-financial firms listed on the Pakistani Stock Exchange (PSX) between 
1999 and 2014.14  
Data on terrorism in Pakistan between 1999 and 2014 are collected from the South Asian 
Terrorism Portal (SATP), which is maintained by the Institute of Conflict Management in 
India. The SATP comprises very detailed information about terrorist activities in South Asian 
countries, providing one of the most comprehensive and reliable data sources about terrorist 
attacks in Pakistan. Event information stems mostly from print and electronic media reports 
about terrorist incidents. SATP contains information about suicide attacks and bomb blasts, 
accounting for about 60% of all terrorist activities (cf. Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2019). More 
detailed information on each event is provided in text form. Since the SATP database contains 
detailed information about the location of terrorist attacks, we are able to assign terrorist 
attacks to 105 cities in Pakistan. Moreover, we also extracted all relevant information 
regarding the number of incidents, the number of deceased, and the number of injuries, all of 
which are used to construct a terrorism index for each city and year (see next section). The 
SATP data for Pakistan is used in research on the determinants for terrorism (Ismail & 
Amjad, 2014), the link between economic growth and terrorism (Shahbaz et al., 2013), as well 
as the impact of terrorism on FDI flows (Haider & Anwar, 2014). 
  
                                                          
14 The final sample is based on five data reports by the SBP, namely report 1 (1999-2005), report 2 (2003-2008), 
report 3 (2006-2011), report 4 (2007-2012), and report 5 (2009-2014). Given that the format and structure of the 
SBP reports has changed over time, we harmonized and crosschecked the financial data by referring to firms’ 
websites and annual reports.  
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3.3.2. Measurement of variables 
One of the most common indicators for firm’s export performance is the export intensity, 
our dependent variable, which is measured by the ratio of export sales to total sales (e.g., 
Roper & Love, 2002). 
Our key independent variables are a City Terrorism Index (CTI) and an Interregional  
Terrorism Index (IRTI), which measure the severity of terrorism on the city and regional 
level. In fact, most papers assessing the impact of terrorism on trade often measure terrorism 
as binary variable taking the value of 1 if at least one terror attack was recorded between two 
trading partners and 0 otherwise (Nitsch & Schumacher, 2004; Blomberg & Hess, 2006). 
Alternatively, some authors count the number of terror attacks (Nitsch & Schumacher, 2004). 
These approaches, however, do not allow for accounting for the severity of terrorism as 
expressed, for example, by the number of incidents, casualties, and injured. Our paper offers a 
methodological advantage with respect to the measurement of terrorism. Hence, to better 
account for the severity of those incidents, we also consider the number of fatalities and the 
number of injuries. Even though all three indicators could be included separately in our 
regression analysis, the interpretation of the estimation results might be problematic as the 
three indicators are strongly correlated. For instance, the correlation between the number of 
injuries and the number of fatalities is 0.91. Hence, instead of including the three measures 
separately, we follow the approach employed by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), 
which computes the Global Terrorism Index (GTI). This index is an indicator for the level of 
terrorism at the country-level. We adapted the computation of the GTI (see Institute for 
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Economics and Peace, 2018, p. 83) to compute a City Terrorism Index (CTI) for each city j in 
each year t:15 
    (3.1) 
Our theoretical considerations let us expect that firm export performance may also be 
affected by terrorist attacks outside the city where it is located; e.g. by terrorism in 
neighboring regions or in more distant regions. In order to examine such interregional effects 
of terrorist attacks, we constructed an Interregional Terrorism Index (IRTI) that measures the 
level of terrorist attacks in other regions. We identify 105 locations in Pakistan and measure 
the respective level of terrorist incidents. We argue that the impact of terrorism diminishes 
with increasing distance. In order to create weights reflecting the diminishing impact of 
terrorism, we measured the pair-wise distances between cities where firms are located and all 
other (104) locations using the great circle distance (geographic city centers).16 We apply the 
Haversine formula, which is commonly used to calculate the distance between two points on 
the Earth's surface based on the longitude and latitude coordinates. The (pair-wise) weights 
(αjl) are the inverse of the corresponding kilometer aerial distances (D) between a city j and a 
location l: αjl= 1/Djl. The Interregional Terrorism Index (IRTI) for a city j in year t, for 
number of cities N is given by:  
    (3.2) 
                                                          
15 According to IEP, the weighting was determined in consultation with the GPI Expert Panel. Note that our 
measure of CTI does not account for the total property damage from terrorist incidents in a given year. We do 
not incorporate such damages because the SATP database does not allow for constructing a reliable indicator.  
16 In the literature on international business, the great-circle distance between geographic centers of countries is 
used to measure the geographic distance (Berry, Guillén, & Zhou, 2010; Boeh & Beamish, 2012; Dai, Eden, & 
Beamish, 2013; Zaheer, Schomaker, & Nachum, 2012). 
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The measure capturing the level terrorism in the city where a firm is located as well as the 
interregional spillovers of terrorism is the Total Terrorism Index TTI, which is computed as 
the sum of the CTI and the IRTI for each cityj and for each year t. 
    (3.3) 
At the firm level, we also include several control variables. Specifically, firm size is 
identified as a relevant determinant of export performance (Chetty & Hamilton, 1993; Sousa 
et al., 2008). In our panel data analysis, the average size of a firm is already taken into 
account by firm-specific fixed effects. However, in order to control for change in firm size 
over time, we include two additional variables that are used in the literature as indicators for 
firm size, namely total sales and total assets of a firm (both in logs). Financial risks may 
affect firms’ abilities to engage in export activities (Egger & Kesina, 2013; Greenaway et al., 
2007). In order to control for financial risks, we include a firm’s financial leverage as an 
indicator for financial risk, measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. These 
control variables are lagged by one year to reduce potential endogeneity problems.  
Descriptive statistics and the correlation matrix for the data used in our regression 
analyses are provided in Tables 3.1 and 3.2, respectively. As can be seen in Table 3.2, the two 
control variables, total assets and sales, are highly correlated. Moreover, the pair-wise 
correlation between export ratio and IRTI is negative and statistically significant, whereas the 
correlations between export ratio and the other two terrorism indices, namely TTI and CTI, are 
statistically insignificant. Note, however, that these correlations are based on the total 
variation in our panel data (variation between and within firms), whereas our regression 
analyses are based solely on the within variation. Moreover, in our empirical analyses, we 




Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Export ratio 19.325 28.591 0 100 
TTI 287.625 316.478 2.106 2227.432 
CTI 275.330 316.025 0 2164.5 
IRTI 12.296 12.945 1.706 94.072 
LS (ln Total sales) 14.584 1.682 5.624 19.334 
LA (ln Total assets) 14.526 1.550 8.536 19.410 
FL (ln Financial leverage) 0.6739 0.4529 0.0139 9.1334 
Note: The number of firms is 301 and the number of observations is 2450. All explanatory variables are lagged 
by one year. 
 
 
Table 3.2: Correlation Matrix 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Export Ratio 1       
2.  TTI 0.0271 1      
3.  CTI 0.0303 0.9992* 1     
4. IRTI -0.0803* 0.0640* 0.0250 1    
5.  LS (ln Total Sales) 0.1046* 0.1038* 0.1029* 0.0268 1   
6.  LA (ln Total Assets) 0.1004* 0.0820* 0.0802* 0.0508* 0.8973* 1  
7.  FL (ln Financial 
Leverage) 
-0.0226 0.0142 0.0149 -0.0174 -0.2000* -0.1739* 1 
Note: The number of firms is 301 and the number of observations is 2450. All explanatory variables are lagged 





3.3.3. Variation of terrorism in Pakistan across cities and time 
While 93 countries recorded one or more casualties from terrorist attacks in 2014, 79 
percent of the people killed in terrorist attacks were in only six countries (rank 1 to 6): Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Nigeria, Pakistan, Syria, and India (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015). 
Pakistan ranks 4th out of 162 countries on the Global Terrorism Index, with a score of 9.07 out 
of 10 for 2014 (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2015). Moreover, Pakistan has suffered 
from terrorism over an extended period, featuring 13 times in the list of top ten countries most 
affected by terrorism between 2000 and 2014. However, the intensity of terrorist attacks 
varies remarkably between cities (regions) in Pakistan and over time, as depicted in Figure 1 
for the City Terrorism Index (CTI) in five provincial capital cities. On one hand, there are 
cities where the intensity of terrorism is high e.g., Peshawar, Karachi, and Quetta. On the 
other hand, there are cities where the intensity of terrorism is low e.g., Faisalabad. While 
terrorism has generally increased since 2006, it is noteworthy that not all cities are affected in 
the same manner. The CTI peaks differ not only in their intensity (e.g., 1112 for Karachi and 
2165 for Peshawar) but also across time (e.g., for Karachi in 2013 and for Peshawar in 2009). 
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Source: South Asian Terrorism Portal (2018)
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Figure 3.2 depicts the terrorism intensity for all target cities between 2000 and 2007. Each 
pie chart represents one city and includes the CTI intensity for up to four two-year periods. 
Pie charts with a single shaded pattern imply that terrorist attacks only occurred within one 
specific two-year time period. Pie charts with multiple patterns imply that terrorism occurred 
in more than just two years. The larger the relative CTI value within a time period, the larger 
is the shaded area within each pie. For 2000-2001, only very few cities are affected by 
terrorist attacks. Subsequently, more and more cities are targeted, especially in the north-west 
frontier provinces of Baluchistan and Khyber PakhtunKhwa (KPK), which share a common 
border with Afghanistan.  
Analogously, Figure 3.3 shows the terrorism intensity for cities affected by terrorism 
between 2008 and 2015. There is a rapid expansion of terrorism across the entire country, 
with a shift of terrorist activities from Baluchistan and KPK to new cities in the eastern 
provinces of Punjab and Sind. Overall, the descriptive findings show that terrorist incidents 
and intensities can vary remarkably between cities (regions) and across time, supporting the 
notion that terrorist incidents in Pakistan are rather unpredictable and random. Consequently, 
cross-county and country studies, which look at the country as a whole, mask any sub-
national variation, thereby not accounting for the heterogeneity in terrorism across cities and 
time. Hence, in our empirical analysis, we focus on the geographical and inter-temporal 
dispersion of terrorism in Pakistan. 
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Figure 3.2: City Terrorism Index (CTI) in Pakistani cities for the 2000 to 2007 period 
 
Notes: Each circle represents the CTI intensity for a given city or region in the case of FATA, Gilgit-Baltistan, and Azad Kashmir. Patterns within the pie show the accumulated 




Figure 3.3: City Terrorism Index (CTI) in Pakistani cities for the 2008 to 2015 period 
 
Notes: Each circle represents the CTI intensity for a given city or region in the case of FATA, Gilgit-Baltistan, and Azad Kashmir. Patterns within the pie show the accumulated 
value of CTI for two years (e.g., 2008-2009). Dot in the circle represent the geographic location of the labeled city (provincial capital) in the map of Pakistan. 
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3.4. Econometric specification and results  
3.4.1. Econometric specification  
Our panel data allow us to control for unobserved heterogeneity in different ways. We 
account for firm-specific fixed effects, controlling for all unobserved variables that do not 
change over time. Such unobserved variables could be, for instance, a firm’s management 
quality or the institutional environment of the region (city) where the firm is located. 
Moreover, we control for unobserved time-specific fixed effects such that we control for all 
variables that affect all firms in a respective year in the same way, e.g. business cycle effects. 
Our estimation model is given by,  
 (3.4) 
where ERijt is the export ratio of firm i (percentage of export sales in total sales) located in 
city j in year t, is a firm-specific fixed effect,  is a time-specific fixed effect, and  is an 
error term. The independent variables of interest are the lagged values of the Total Terrorism 
Index (TTI) where the maximum lag is 5 (T=5). Moreover, we include three control variables, 
namely the logarithm of financial leverage (FL), the logarithm of sales (LS), and the logarithm 
of total assets (LA). Furthermore, all explanatory variables are lagged one year for two 
reasons: First, terrorist attacks occurring at the end of a year, for instance, cannot affect export 
ratios in preceding months (also known as time aggregation bias) and by using lagged values 
we can rule out such cases (Egger & Gassebner, 2015). Second, lagged values reduce 
potential endogeneity problems. Finally, we take into account that the error terms of firms that 
are located in the same city may not be independent and, therefore, we make use of cluster-




3.4.2. Regression results 
The estimation results for the panel of 301 listed firms are reported in Table 3.3. All 
estimations include firm-specific fixed effects, time-specific fixed effects, and control 
variables. Cluster- robust standard errors that are adjusted for intra-cluster correlation within 
cities are reported in parentheses. Since the firms in our sample are located in only 21 
different cities and “few” clusters may lead to a downward-biased estimate of the cluster-
robust variance matrix (Cameron and Miller, 2015), we provide the confidence intervals of 
coefficients, as generated by the wild cluster bootstrap method proposed by Cameron et al. 
(2008). These confidence intervals are reported in brackets.17 
Columns (1), (2), and (3) report the results of regressions where lagged values of the Total 
Terrorism Index (TTI), City Terrorism Index (CTI), and Interregional Terrorism Index (IRTI) 
are separately included as explanatory variables. Moreover, firm-specific control variables are 
included in all three regressions. The estimated coefficient of the logarithm of sales is positive 
and statistically significant at a five or ten percent level, thus indicating that higher sales in the 
preceding year lead to a higher export ratio in the current year. The estimated coefficient of 
the leverage ratio is negative and statistically significant at the one percent level indicating 
that financial risks tend to reduce firms’ export performance. The estimated coefficients of the 
annual growth rate of sales and the logarithm of total assets of a company are statistically 
insignificant.  
In column (1), the sign of the estimated coefficients of the lagged values of TTI is always 
negative and statistically significant at the five or one percent significance level for lag 2 to 
lag 5, while it is not statistically different from zero at conventional levels for lag 1. The 95 
                                                          
17In order to compute the confidence intervals, we employed “cgmwildboot.ado” for Stata and fixed the number 
of replications to 4,000 for all regressions. The confidence interval reports the 5th and 95th percentiles of the 
coefficients from the bootstrap iterations and is based on the empirical distribution of coefficients.  
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percent confidence interval for each of these coefficients, as generated by wild cluster 
bootstrap method, confirms this finding. Hence, our estimation results suggest that terrorist 
attacks that occurred inside and outside a city during the past five years have a negative 
impact on firm export ratios. Next, we include the CTI and IRTI separately into our 
regressions in order to check whether firms’ export ratios are mainly affected by terrorist 
attacks within the city where a firm is located or by terrorist attacks in other regions of 
Pakistan. Column (2) reports the results of a regression where only the lagged values of CTI 
are included. The pattern coefficient estimates are very similar to those for the TTI variable. 
This result implies that terrorism in a city negatively affects the export performance of firms 
in the same city.  
In contrast, column (3) shows that the estimated coefficients of the lagged values of IRTI 
are negative, but only statistically significant at the five percent level for lag four. The 
estimated coefficients of the other lagged values of IRTI are statistically insignificant at 
conventional levels of significance. This suggests that the negative effects of terrorism on 
firms’ export ratios might be more severe if terrorist attacks take place in the same city. 
Hence, our results are in line with Nitsch and Schumacher (2004), who argue that terrorism 
has mostly a local impact. 
Moreover, columns (1) and (2) show that the estimated coefficients of the first lag are 
very small and statistically insignificant, whereas the sizes of the estimated coefficients are 
similar for lags 2 to 5, suggesting that the marginal effect of terrorism on firm export ratio 
seems to be quite stable over a period of four years. Instead of including all lagged values of 
TTI separately, we assume that the marginal effects of four years are identical and compute 
the sum of TTI (STTI) for a four-year period:  with T=5. In a similar 
way we also compute unweighted sums for CTI (SCTI) and IRTI (SRITI). 
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Table 3.3: The Relationship between Export Ratio and Terrorism  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variables TTI CTI IRTI 
LAG 1 -0.000384 (0.001487) -0.000266 (0.001042) -0.0350484 (0.02488) 
 
[-0.002267, 0.007563] [-0.0021741, 0.0016395] [-0.080843, 0.012699] 
LAG 2 -0.00216** (0.001000) -0.002069* (0.001025) -0.037034 (0.028666) 
 
[-0.003955, -0.000317] [-0.003889, -0.000171] [-0.088902, 0.016711] 
LAG 3 -0.00239*** (0.000457) -0.002382*** (0.000478) 0.015589 (0.035821) 
 
[-0.0032518,-0.001516] [-0.003300, -0.001477] [-0.044095, 0.075154] 
LAG 4 -0.00273*** (0.000935) -0.002643** (0.000979) -0.058556** (0.022971) 
 
[-0.004461, -0.000965] [-0.004451, -0.000811] [-0.102088, -0.015361] 
LAG 5 -0.00251*** (0.000897) -0.00236** (0.000861) -0.034522* (0.016837) 
 
[-0.004163, -0.000871] [-0.0039144, -0.000804] [-0.064473, 0.003856] 
Sales (LS) 3.221** (0.935593) 3.201*** (0.939409) 3.210*** (0.928214) 
 
[1.451655, 4.946726] [1.429953, 4.947002] [1.48438, 4.91671] 
Leverage (FL) -3.700*** (1.162125) -3.683*** (1.15418) -3.968*** (1.33597) 
 
[-5.812023, -1.572509] [-5.782655, -1.570508] [-6.38667, -1.563549] 
Total Assets (LA) 0.550 (1.880484) 0.554 (1.879525) 0.497 (1.868194) 
 
[-3.758028, 2.677444] [-3.760867, 2.670566] [3.665236, 2.682253] 
R-squared (within) 0.0666 0.0662 0.0652 
Notes: Regressions are based on a sample of 301 firms and 2450 observations. The dependent variable is firm export ratio and all firm-specific explanatory variables are lagged 
one year. Cluster robust standard errors that are clustered at the city level are reported in parentheses and corresponding significance levels are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 




Table 3.4: The Relationship between Export Ratio and Terrorism 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
STTI -0.002399***(0.000541)    
 [-0.003394, -0.00138]    
SCTI  -0.002341*** (0.000568)  -0.002087***(0.000702) 
  [-0.003395, -0.001256]  [-0.003403, -0.000745] 
SIRTI   -0.031897**(0.014164) -0.026159*(0.012570) 
   [-0.057438, -0.006074] [-0.049194, -.002553] 
Control Variables YES YES YES YES 
Firm-specific fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
Year-specific fixed effects YES YES YES YES 
R-squared (within) 0.0665 0.0662 0.0645 0.0682 
Notes: Regressions are based on a sample of 301 firms and 2450 observations. The dependent variable is the export ratio. Cluster robust standard errors that are clustered at the 
city level are reported in parentheses and corresponding significance levels are: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.The 95% confidence interval reported in bracket was generated 
with wild cluster bootstrap method (Cameron er al, 2008). 
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Column (1) of Table 4 reports the result of a regression where STTI is included as an 
explanatory variable. The estimated coefficient is negative and statistically significant at the one 
percent level (p<0.01). Again, we also include SCTI and SRITI separately and the results of these 
regressions are reported in Columns (2) and (3). The estimated coefficients are negative and 
statistically significant at the one percent level for SCTI (p<0.01) and at the five percent level for 
SRITI (p<0.05). Finally, we include both SCTI and SRITI together in order to investigate whether 
the estimated effects are robust to jointly including both variables. As seen in Column (4), the 
sizes of both coefficients decrease and the estimated coefficient of SRITI is now only statistically 
significant at the five percent level. 
Thus far, we have mainly focused on the statistical significance of the estimated effects of 
terrorist activities on the firm export ratio. A statistically significant effect does not imply, 
however, that the effect size of the estimated effects is economically relevant. Therefore, we 
provide illustrative examples of how–according to our estimation results–a higher level of 
terrorism affects the export ratio of firms. According to the results presented in Column 4 of 
Table 3.4, an increase in SCTI by one unit leads to, on average, a decrease in the export ratio of 
0.002087percentage points. This implies that an increase in SCTI by one standard deviation 
would result in –ceteris paribus–a decrease in the export ratio of 1.3 percentage points. Given 
that the average export ratio in our sample is 19 percent, this means that it would decrease by 7 
percent. An increase from the minimum value of SCTI to the maximum value of SCTI in our 
sample would lead to a decrease in the export ratio of 8.4 percentage points. The value of 
estimated coefficient of SIRTI seems to be comparatively high (-0.026159). However, it must be 
considered that IRTI is calculated as the distance weighted sum of the CTIs of 104 regions 
(cities). Hence, the estimated coefficient of SIRTI must be multiplied by the respective distance-
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based weight (α); i.e. the effect of a marginal increase in the CTI of a city l on the export 
intensity of a firm located in city j is: dEIij/dCTIl= -0.026159*αjl. Consequently, the individual 
effect of a marginal increase in terrorism in another city might be very small if the distance 
between the two cities is large but the joint effect of an increase of terrorism in all other cities 
might be remarkable. For instance, an increase from the minimum value of SIRTI to the 
maximum value of SIRTI in our sample would result in –ceteris paribus–a decrease in export 
intensity by 7.1 percentage points. 
Our results indicate that terrorist attacks in close geographical proximity negatively affect the 
export ratio. This confirms the findings of previous studies showing that terrorism in a region 
affects firms’ business activities and that the effects of terrorism are more pronounced in regions 
with a higher concentration of terrorist incidents (Greenbaum et al., 2007; Öcal & Yildirim 
2010). We also provide some empirical evidence for interregional spillovers of terrorism similar 
to those reported in studies about the tourism sector (Drakos & Kutan, 2003; Enders et al. 1992; 
Greenbaum & Hultquist, 2006). Our results suggest that the interregional spillover effects of 
terrorism on firm export ratio are negative, implying that even the export performance of firms 
located in less terrorism-ridden cities is negatively affected by terrorist activities in other regions.   
As pointed out in Section 2, there is no clear-cut empirical evidence with regard to the time 
dimension of the effects of terrorist attacks. While empirical studies examining the effects of 
terrorism on tourist activities suggest that these effects occur in the short-run (Drakos & Kutan, 
2003; Greenbaum & Hultquist, 2006; Greenbaum et al., 2007), the effects on trade seem to occur 
with a time lag. Egger and Gassebner (2015) find that international trade is affected by terrorism 
approximately 1.5 years later, whereas they did not find evidence for a short-run impact. Our 
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results also suggest that effects on firm exports occur with a lag of about two years. In our 
empirical analysis, we use measures of terrorism that are lagged at least one year, implicitly 
assuming that a firm’s export ratio in a given year is not influenced by terrorist attacks in the 
same year. While this procedure may avoid potential endogeneity problems, it also neglects 
short-run effects of terrorism. In order to check the robustness of our results, we also re-run our 
regressions with non-lagged measures of terrorism. Although not reported here, the estimated 
coefficients of current terrorism indices are statistically insignificant, thus providing further 
evidence that terrorist attacks do not affect firm export ratios in the short-run. Moreover, our 
results suggest that the effects of terrorism on firm export ratio do not quickly decay over time. 
We find that terrorist activities influence firm exports, even after five years. We also include 
longer lags, but results are hardly affected. However, including longer lags leads to a decrease in 
the number of observations and a change in the observation period; therefore, we present the 
results for up to five lags.  
We believe that our two-way fixed-effects model allows us to eliminate a substantial part of 
variation that may contain time-invariant and year-specific confounding factors that would lead 
to biased parameter estimates. Note that including firm-specific fixed effects eliminates the 
between-firm variation and our parameter estimates are, therefore, based on the within-firm 
variation over time. Including year-specific fixed effects ensures that our parameter estimates are 
based on the city-specific variation in the level of terrorism. Hence, we control for all common 
year-specific factors that may affect firm export ratios as well as terrorist activities. Although 
year-specific fixed effects are statistically significant, we also conducted regressions without 
year-specific fixed effects, finding that the estimated coefficient of the terrorism variables tend to 
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become statistically insignificant, suggesting that it is important to focus on the city-specific 
variation in the level of terrorism.18 
While we believe that our empirical approach improves the identification of the relationship 
between terrorism and exports, some caution must be exercised when interpreting the results of 
our regressions in a causal way. We cannot account for any change in an unobserved city-
specific variable that is correlated with changes in terrorist activities in a city and, at the same 
time, with the change in export ratios of firms located in that city. However, as can be seen in 
Figure 1, our measure of terrorism at the city-level (CTI) does not follow a clear or systematic 
pattern: CTI may strongly increase in one year followed by sharp decline in the next year. Thus, 
an unobserved city-specific variable would have to follow the pattern of CTI to pose a real 
problem for our parameter estimations. Furthermore, each terrorist attack is fairly random and 
unpredictable, implying that terrorist attacks can be considered as exogenous shocks from firms’ 
perspective.  
 
3.5. Discussion and conclusion  
Trade and market liberalization policies are allowing firms in emerging economies to more 
easily discover and exploit foreign market opportunities. Expansion in foreign markets through 
exporting is an important first step in the internationalization process (Aulakh, Rotate & Teegen, 
2000; Johanson & Vahlne, 1977). While the export performance of emerging market firms may 
be influenced by various firm-specific and environmental factors (Dominguez & Sequeira, 1993; 
Singh, 2009), terrorism may have become a major obstacle for firms seeking to internationalize. 
                                                           
18Terrorism and firm export ratios show a positive time trend; thus, without controlling for common time-specific 
effects, a positive common time trend may confound the effect of terrorism on firm export ratio. 
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In the aftermath of 9/11, the number of terrorist attacks has dramatically increased, especially in 
emerging economies (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2018) yet we know little about how 
terrorism affects the export performance of firms.  
Most existing studies focus on the macroeconomic analysis of terrorism and international 
trade (e.g., Egger & Gassebner, 2015, Gassebner, Keck, & Teh, 2005, Nitsch & Schumacher, 
2004), pointing to negative relationship between terrorism and trade. Going beyond aggregate 
country-level analyses, we investigate the underlying microeconomic relationship between 
terrorism and export intensity using firm-level data, also accounting for location-specific and 
time-specific characteristics of firms and terrorist incidents. In doing so, we improve the 
identification of the relationship between terrorism and firm export behavior. Concentrating on 
Pakistan, one of the most terrorism-plagued countries worldwide, we create a unique dataset by 
merging information of up to 301 firms listed at the Pakistan Stock Exchange with terrorist 
incidents in 105 cities/regions in Pakistan between 1999 and 2014. Overall, we can confirm that 
terrorism negatively affects firm export performance. Interestingly, the effect is rather stable in 
the years following a terrorist attack, indicating that business operations might be impaired by 
terrorism longer than expected. Moreover, we find strong support for a city level terrorism effect, 
such that firm exports are affected by terrorist attacks that take place in the same city. We also 
provide empirical evidence of some within-country interregional spillover effects of terrorism on 
export ratios.  
While we believe that our set-up of analyzing the relationship between terrorism and firm 
exports considers the spatial as well as inter-temporal dimension, our study is not without 
limitations. It is a single country study, thus hampering the ability to draw a conclusion for other 
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terrorism-plagued countries. Just comparing Pakistan, Yemen, and Israel, all suffering severely 
from terrorist incidents, it is clear they differ tremendously in their political, economic, and 
social situations. Nevertheless, Pakistan might be an exemplary country from the Middle East, 
where most countries are affected by the War on Terror following the 9/11 attacks in 2001 and 
the corresponding surge in terrorism across the region. Another limitation might stem for the fact 
that we use the firm headquarters as its location. While most manufacturing firms in Pakistan 
have their main production site at their headquarters, we cannot rule out that firms have more 
than one location in Pakistan. Admittedly, this is not fully reflected in the regressions. However, 
this would imply that our estimates for TTI are underestimated because terrorist attacks in 
locations other than the headquarters and where a firm might actually be located, enter the 
regression via the distance weighted measure IRTS. In other words, our findings on the effect of 
terrorism on firm exports should be even more significant considering all business locations.  
Building on these findings, we shortly sketch out two avenues for future research. First, 
exporting is often only the first step in the internationalization of firms, meaning that FDI and 
imports might also be affected by terrorism, albeit in a different manner (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 
2008; Bandyopadhyay, Sandler & Younas, 2014; Czinkota et al., 2004; 2010, Enders & Sandler, 
1996). For example, more foreign direct investments by emerging market firms might reduce the 
risk of terrorism for business operations and firm performance because of factory locations in 
less terrorism-prone countries and cities. A larger network of locations reduces the risk that a 
terrorist attack fully disrupts business operations. Similarly, we only investigate firm exports, 
even though imports can also be affected, such that the entire supply chain might be strongly 
disrupted by terrorism (Bandyopadhyay & Sandler, 2014). Given that, on the macroeconomic 
level, the effect of terrorism is even larger for imports than for exports (Bandyopadhyay et al., 
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2018), our estimation results might only constitute a lower bound and conservative measure for 
the effects of terrorism on the trade activities of firms. 
Second, although we find that exports are negatively affected by terrorism, we still know 
little about the underlying mechanisms; i.e. the ways that terrorism affects firm operations. While 
the number of killed or injured employees might be low, especially if firms are not direct targets 
of terrorist attacks, the effects in terms of lower labor morale by employees, more labor turnover, 
resulting in higher labor cost and higher security measures, might be quite extensive. Likewise, 
even if physical damages are limited, as enterprise buildings are not destroyed, the supply chain 
might nonetheless be interrupted, suffering from delays and unpredictable processes due to e.g. 
longer delivery times and clearance procedures. Moreover, the overall loss of trust from 
customers might hamper business relations and additional orders. In particular, foreign 
customers, who are less familiar with the geographical distances and firm locations, might 
refrain from doing business with firms that operate in terrorism-plagued countries, even if a firm 
is situated in a comparatively safe region of the country. Finally, additional insights on the effect 
of terrorism on firm performance might be obtained by analyzing the counterterrorism strategies 
and plans of firms. So far, the effect of counterterrorism security measures on trade and social 
welfare is lacking in clarity (Barker, 2003; Gaibulloev & Sandler, 2019; Mirza & Verdier, 2014). 
Firms might have put in place formalized programs and contingency plans designed to reduce the 
probability of terrorist attacks and to deal with the terrorist attacks when they occur. In addition, 
firms could increase safety stocks of inventory and arrange for alternative transportation modes 
in case of disruptions. Hence, future research might investigate the mechanisms through which 
firm operations are impaired and evaluate firms’ counterterrorism measures in order to better 
understand how terrorism affects firm’s exporting performance. 
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4. TERRORISM, COMPETITIVE POSITIONING, AND LIABILITY OF 
LOCATION: EXIT OF PUBLICLY-TRADED PAKISTNI FIRMS 
 
4.1. Introduction 
CEO identification of an array of geopolitical disturbances as a key risk (PwC, 2016) has 
been preceded by academic research on firm conduct in the context of conflict zones (Dai, Eden 
& Beamish, 2013), war (Dai, Eden & Beamish, 2017), terrorism (Czinkota et al., 2010; Frey, 
2009; Greenbaum, Dugan & LaFree, 2007) and disasters (Oh & Oetzel, 2011). Although 
terrorism research is not new, academic studies of its more proximate geographic influences and 
firm-level consequences were rare prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks (Czinkota, Knight, 
Liesch, & Steen, 2010). With the exception of a country-level study of changes in numbers of 
firms and employment associated with terrorism in Italy prior to 9/11 (Greenbaum, Dugan & 
LaFree, 2007), most studies focus on changes in the country-composition of MNE portfolios in 
relation to country-level geopolitical disturbances. For example, Dai, Eden, & Beamish (2013, 
2017) considered the impact of country-level geopolitical disturbance and MNE portfolio 
composition on MNE subsidiary survival as a function of subsidiary presence in conflict zones or 
war in relation to the geographic concentration and dispersions of other home-country firms. 
They found that the likelihood of subsidiary survival decreased as the exposure to geographically 
defined threats increased and the MNE had options in other less risky country positions.  
The question of whether, within a particular country, well-established independent firms exit 
and the manner in which they exit as a function of within-country city-proximity to terrorism and 
their competitive positioning (geography, industry, size within industry, export) is under-
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addressed. Two aspects of this void inform why a more fine-grained, country-specific study of 
well-established firms is of value.  First, broader consideration of the variety of persistence and 
exit types in relation to the effects of terrorism on resource availability is warranted. Oh and 
Oetzel (2017) show that not all subsidiaries exit; some MNE subsidiaries persist if they had 
country-specific experience with continued resource access. They argue that these business units, 
which we refer to as firms, can sustain legitimacy if they meet contractual and regulatory 
requirements associated with resource access. These are the firms who might be predisposed to 
acquire other firms and foster graceful exits. Second, theoretical consideration of location as a 
connection between within-country variation in terrorism and the competitive positioning of the 
firm could offer more precise insight to how terrorism functions as a locational liability for 
established firms. This linkage between location and exit complements study of the relationship 
between location and business founding (Lomi, 1995). It also permits more refined consideration 
of how terrorism operates as a liability.  If terrorism functions like a natural hazard, it would 
affect firms uniformly across industries due to proximity to geographic occurrences of terrorism. 
If it operates as a technological discontinuity, it would affect firms disproportionately as a 
function of their dependence upon the technology (Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Here, remote 
occurrences of terrorism could still affect firms based upon their business practices as technology 
specific to industries and/or methods of competing within an industry can be geographically 
clustered or geographically dispersed (Porter, 2000; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). In sum, in 
contrast to Oh and Oetzel (2011), our focus is on the effects of the terrorism events on the 
conduct of the firm itself as a function of its competitive positioning (geographic location, 
industry choice, size within industry, export) rather than assumptions about a country’s 
institutional capacity to address terrorism as a type of disaster.       
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This study focuses on the relationship between terrorism and the types of exit of firms from a 
particular resource market, the Stock Exchange in Pakistan. In the recent years, Pakistan has 
been especially vulnerable to terrorist attacks. In a study by the Institute for Peace and 
Economics (2015), Pakistan ranked 4th out of 162 countries on the Global Terrorism Index and 
was featured 13 times in the list of Top Ten Countries most affected by terrorism between 2000 
and 2014. Prior study provides evidences that for fragile country like Pakistan (Tingbani, Okafor, 
Tauringana & Zalata, 2019), the extent of terrorism is related to higher insolvency risk19. The 
explanation offered is that fragile countries have weak institutions. If creditors retrieve any 
money, it will take longer and the amount will be less than owed. Yet, for investors and trading 
partners, Pakistan represents a tolerable risk because of its global presence in certain industries, 
especially when doing business with publicly traded firms who must provide audited annual 
financial reports as a condition of listing. There is evidence that the Karachi stock market is 
prescient and resilient in the face of terrorism; a stock market effect only occurred in the day 
preceding and day of the Karachi-located attack (Aslam & Kang, 2015). Furthermore, even with 
terrorism, Pakistan has: (1) country advantages in particular industries, most notably textiles 
(Knight & Czinkota, 2008), (2) a reasonably well-established efficient stock exchange that has 
operated since 1946 (Ali & Sharif, 2019), and, (3) formal mechanisms to address insolvency 
(Hasanain & Shah, 2012). The struggles and financial difficulties of traded firms are more 
transparent and priced. Despite some institutional challenges, a functioning market for changes 
in share ownership and the availability of private sources of financial capital, suggests that, 
beyond bankruptcy, other more voluntary stock-market exits like being acquired or going private 
may also occur in the context of terrorism.   
                                                           
19 Insolvency risk is a terminology for the ability to retrieve monies owed in the event of firm bankruptcy. 
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Prior studies set the stage for further study of the relationship between the terrorism context 
and various types of exit. We know that the intensity of terrorist attacks varies remarkably 
between cities in Pakistan (Global Terrorism Database, 2017). We know that the short-lived 
Pakistan stock market reactions are a function of the proximity of attacks to the stock market 
locations and types of attacks (Aslam & Kang, 2015). However, we do not know if firms’ 
proximity and severity of attacks are related to the exit of firms. This leads to our first research 
question: What is the relationship between the location and severity of terrorism and the exit of 
publicly traded firms in Pakistan? Additionally, while the cross-country comparative study 
(Tingbani et al., 2019) documents a general influence of terrorism on insolvency, expert 
informant perceptions were based upon a standard case of a hotel business, with property owned 
and ownership structure specified. Although the lodging and tourism industry can be a 
bellwether for terrorism’s economic effects especially when terrorism is a repeated occurrence 
(Pizam & Fleischer, 2002), this study goes further to examine how terrorism affects a wider 
variety of firms based upon their competitive positioning (geography, industry, size and 
markets). A recent study of publicly traded Pakistani firms during the period of heightened 
terrorism focuses on stages of illiquidity but does not directly address variation in terrorism or 
competitive positioning (Farooq, Qamar & Haque, 2018). We do not know if within this 
population particular types of publicly traded firms are more affected than others. We 
specifically study how terrorism and competitive positioning, which we refer to as “location”, 
are related to exit by bankruptcy. Our second research question is: What is the relationship 
between publicly-traded firms’ characteristics, location, and bankruptcy?  
Our theoretical and empirical approach applies a more detailed analysis of city-level 
terrorism impact on the exit of firms from the stock market in Pakistan. We are more precise than 
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the insolvency study of Tingbani and colleagues (2019) and Greenbaum and colleagues (2007) 
because we isolate actual bankruptcy cases, incorporate city-level measures of the location and 
severity of terrorism, and consider geographically-tied aspects of competitive positioning. Our 
terrorism measures include local and spillover effects and their severity as a sequence of events 
in time, allowing us to consider the relative influence of more or less geographically and time 
proximate terrorism. This study offers multiple contributions to organizational theory and 
population ecology. As such, our combination of theoretical consideration of liabilities of 
location, measurement refinement and thorough analysis offers a comprehensive perspective on 
terrorism risk that can benefit scholars, practitioners and policy-makers alike.   
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we develop a model of exit as a function of location as 
a liability. We apply resource dependence and legitimacy logics commonly used in liabilities of 
age and size reasoning to locational aspects evident in the literature on competitive positioning 
and economic clusters. Next, we explain our method including descriptive information about the 
Pakistan context, data, and details about our unique fine-grained measures of terrorism; city-level 
measures that allow us to discern between the effects of more direct and combined direct and 
spillover effect of terrorist attacks. We then present the results of our predictive and exploratory 
analyses. The discussion that follows suggests that even though firms who previously overcame 
some aspects of liabilities of young age and small size (Aldrich & Auster, 1986) to become 
publicly listed, in the context of terrorism, can be in “the right place at the wrong time”. For 
example, a publicly-traded, safe-city firm, geographically distant from terrorism events, 
encounters challenge in its supply chain process of getting access to raw materials from suppliers 
located in a terrorism-ridden city. We conclude with a summary of our contributions, limitations 
of our study, and suggestions for future research. 
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4.2. Theory and hypothesis 
In general, explanations of firm outcomes in a population of firms include both the influence 
of uncertain environments, especially those with unpredictable changes in demand or disruption 
of dominant design (Anderson & Tushman, 2001; Suarez & Utterback, 1995), and the influence 
of firm attributes, specifically, age and size (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Brüderl & Schüssler, 1990; 
Stinchcombe, 1965). In particular, studies of exit first address their definition of exit and 
accordingly, determine whether to include or exclude an assortment of voluntary and less than 
voluntary transitions (Kalnins, Swaminathan & Mitchell, 2006). In a study that incorporates both 
types of transition, Ruef and Scott (1998) empirically find that both the managerial and technical 
forms of legitimacy provide notable improvements in organizational survival chances but that the 
strength of each effect varies over time depending on the nature of institutional environment. 
They also explain how external and internal attributes give rise to challenges in accessing and 
deploying resources including concerns about firm legitimacy (Ruef & Scott, 1998).   
In the case of firm attributes associated with involuntary exit, denoted as liabilities of age and 
size, both young-small firms and older-large firms experience exit risk (Aldrich & Auster, 1986). 
Young-small firms lack financial and reputational resources and organizational processes. Older-
larger firms may have squandered resources and become trapped by excessive bureaucracy or 
leadership voids (Farooq, Qamar & Haque, 2018; Hambrick & D’Aveni, 1988). Non-exiting 
firms appear to have the right mix of resources and appropriately inertial processes (D’Aveni, 
1989; McKelvey & Aldrich, 1983). Access to resources and well-honed processes can reduce the 





Our model of firm exit (Figure 4.1) develops the concept of liabilities of the location to 
explain the relationship between a substantive influence, terrorism, the interplay of the 
geography of terrorism with firm competitive positioning characteristics that include geographic 
location and types of firm exit.  In developing the concept of liabilities of location, we connect 
the strategy concept of competitive positioning to our more expansive definition of location, a 
definition that anchors industry and buyer market choices to geographic choice. In general, 
terrorism gives rise to a liability of location due to geographic proximity that in turn would give 
rise to exit. But, the extent to which a firm experiences a liability of location also depends upon 
the way terrorism, geography, and the firm’s competitive positioning are connected. This 
locational connectedness informs our understanding of why exit is warranted and whether more 
or less voluntary exits occur. We further explain these relationships below.  
Exit. The nomenclature and mechanisms of exit pathways are often context-specific and 
represent a range of involuntary to voluntary moves; e.g., excommunication, defrocking, and 
apostasy.  In the stock market, exits, which are different types of separation from access to the 
public capital market, are broadly referred to as delisting. Distinctions are made between three 
types of exit: bankruptcy20, the least voluntary exit, exit via acquisition or merger with another 
firm, and exit via complete share buyback (commonly referred to as “taking the firm private”, 
                                                           
20 In Pakistan, bankruptcy or “court-driven liquidation” is usually done when firms violate the regulations of 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) and Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) by non-payment of 
fee and non-submission of documents. Previous studies have mentioned it as a serious and hostile exit strategy. 
Court driven liquidation is an “external selection” exit mechanism since it involves juridical procedures that are 
mostly initiated or stimulated by external parties (Balcaen et al., 2011). The court-driven exit is the most 
unfavorable exit option for most shareholders. However, sometimes it is inevitable for firms to go bankrupt due to 




the most voluntary type of exit (Macey, O’Hara & Pompilio, 2008). More detail about the exit 
types are explained below.  
i. Court-driven liquidation (Bankruptcy) 
Firms exit via “court-driven liquidation” when they violate the regulations of SECP and PSX 
by non-payment of fee and non-submission of documents. This typically occurs as the 
culmination of failed attempts to address adversity, generate resources, and satisfy creditor 
obligations (Schary, 1991). The court-driven exit is especially unfavorable for shareholders as 
their shares no longer have value. While creditors may be able to retrieve some monies owed, 
their longer-run interest and the interests of others in doing business with what remains of the 
firm is likely more limited. “Court-driven liquidation” is a publicly visible, hostile exit strategy 
initiated by external parties (Balcaen et al., 2011) that creates reputational damage. 
ii. Mergers and acquisitions 
Merger and acquisition is another exit type. The tangible and intangible resources of firms 
attract interest from other firms who purchase the firm from its existing shareholders. In contrast 
to court-driven exit, being acquired by or joined with another established firm is a signal of some 
future viability of the exiting firm’s resources, albeit with revised ownership and control 
(Balcaen et al., 2012).  Changes in the share price of established firms make these deals more or 
less attractive. As a firm experiences difficult circumstances but it retains important resources, 
share price reduction makes it a more attractive target. An acquisition offers returns to former 
shareholders and creditors alike; departing shareholders receive cash or shares in the merged 
firm while creditors usually retain their standing in payment priority. Cefis and Marsili (2011) 
noted that mergers and acquisitions commonly occur via mergers with or sales to an established 
102 
 
competitor. Cefis and Marsili (2007) found that innovation plays an important role in enhancing 
the goodwill of the firm and helps in attracting a potential buyer from the market for the merger 
and acquisition process. For the acquiring firm, the assumption for shareholders, suppliers, 
employees and customers is that the addition of resources and opportunity to consolidate and 
rationalize competitive interests enhances viability. Firm exit from the stock market as result of 
merger or acquisition is less symbolic of failure, for both the departing firm and the remaining 
firm.  
iii. Buyback of shares 
In the case of this study, buyback of shares refers to an exit type where existing owners21 or a 
private equity firm deliberately buys all publicly available shares and withdraws the firm from 
public capital markets. It is commonly referred to as “taking the company private”. In 
comparison to partial share buybacks or share repurchase offers where particular shareholders 
may seek to advantage themselves and disadvantage others (Brockman & Chung, 2001; Cudd et 
al., 1996; Mitchell & Dharmawan, 2007), taking the company private increases the firm’s 
reliance on private financial capital markets while reducing its obligations to publicly disclose its 
financial reports. It is thought that being private provides owners with a longer decision-making  
                                                           
21 This is distinct from partial buybacks where ownership interests are increased but the firm remains publicly traded 
or from situations where shares are bought back, the firm is considered closely-held and thinly traded.  It is also 
distinct from a hostile takeover (Aggarwal, 2006) where former non-owners or purchase shares of a firm to establish 
ownership and control. 
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horizon and greater latitude in considering different market approaches that may not be well-
regarded by public shareholders (Bonaime & Ryngaert, 2013).    
Nonetheless, on average, firms who have successfully navigated the requirements to become 
publicly traded and who have invested in the systems to support the auditing and dissemination 
of financial reports are likely to engage in behaviors that best offer them independence of 
decision-making and more predictable access to financial resources. Thus, they are unlikely to 
exit from the stock market, even in the context of terrorism. 
Terrorism. Terrorism is an especially important external influence because of its 
unpredictable nature. Defined as “the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a 
non-state actor to attain a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or 
intimidation” (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2018, p.6)22 the overall objective is to be 
disruptive. Terroristic events can be initiated by a wide variety of parties with a wide variety of 
weapons. While a general risk of terrorism can be anticipated from historical occurrences, 
specific targets and mechanisms are hard to predict. In comparison to natural hazards like 
earthquakes, the exit of a firm due to the destruction of property from a “direct terrorist hit” is a 
small probability event and the destruction of multiple properties due to multiple “direct hits” has 
an even smaller probability. 
Terrorism creates an atmosphere of fear, destruction of public infrastructure and the flight or 
redirection of investment capital to less troubled areas (Abadie & Gardeazabal, 2003). Firms can 
experience distress due to variety of factors such as: decreases in customer demand, increased 
                                                           
22 According to “The Routledge Handbook of Terrorism Research,” there are more than 250 academic, 
governmental, and intergovernmental definitions of terrorism (Schmid, 2011, see Chapter 2 on “The definition of 
terrorism”). Most definitions emphasize key elements like violence, fear, threats, and the disruption of public or 
private order.   
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delays in supply chains, loss of investor confidence, and changes to government regulations and 
policies (Czinkota et al., 2010; Oetzel & Oh, 2014). The more severe and geographically 
proximate terrorism is, the greater the reticence of suppliers, employees and buyers to transact 
with the firm resulting in negative pressure on revenues and expenses (Oetzel & Oh, 2014). It 
follows that: 
Hypothesis 1: There will be a positive relationship between the severity and geographic 
proximity of terrorism and exit.  
Not all firms within a country will experience terrorism in the same way because where 
specific events occur and the severity of those events differs. As a result, some firms may 
recognize that conducting business will become more difficult as other cities experience 
terrorism, but that does not make it impossible for them to do business. They may go private by 
using a share buyback thus enabling managers to address the uncertainty and invest in a more 
defensive posture that might not be well-received in the stock exchange (Myers, 1984).  
Hypothesis 2a: Less severe and less geographically proximate terrorism will be 
positively related to exit through share buyback. 
Other firms may find themselves involved in the market for corporate control as they explore 
potential mergers and/or respond to friendly and unfriendly takeover inquiries.  Adverse 
circumstances, like proximate and severe terrorism, can give rise to a match between anticipated 
financial distress and opportunity-seeking behaviors (Jones & Hensher; 2007a, 2007b; Leroy et 
al., 2010, 2015). Would-be acquirers may be especially predisposed if the adverse situation 
makes for an attractively priced acquisition. Managers of the target firm can capture and return 
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the current value of the firm to their shareholders while new owners are left to address the more 
hostile environment (Aggarwal, 2006).  
Hypothesis 2b: More severe and more geographically proximate terrorism will be 
positively related to exit through acquisition. 
As terrorism becomes more prevalent and more severe, the availability of capital to support 
either type of stock market transaction (share buyback or merger & acquisition) is likely more 
limited. Private equity and FDI sources may be constrained (Bandyopadhay & Younas, 2014). 
When there are multiple occurrences of terrorist attacks (Pizam & Fleischer, 2002) that are 
geographically proximate to the firm and these attacks result in large numbers of death or injury, 
it is more likely that resource limitations and their associated legitimacy concerns lead to and 
compound the negative financial effects. It follows that: 
Hypothesis 2c: More severe and more geographically proximate terrorism will be 
positively related to exit through bankruptcy. 
Competitive Position as a Locational Liability. The mix of resources and processes used 
by a firm in the pursuit of performance is often referred to as a competitive position (Porter, 
1980). Geography and the other competitive positioning elements are often co-determined and 
alignment of these elements is viewed as requisite to success (Hambrick & Fredrickson, 2005; 
Porter, 1980, 1985). To explicitly draw attention to this connection, we go beyond the common 
use of location as a reference to geography and refer to competitive positioning as “location”. 
We argue that (1) the combination of firm attributes constitutes a type of firm, (2) certain types 
of firms may be disproportionately affected by terrorism because there may be a relationship 
between geographic location, industry, size within an industry, and buyer markets, and, (3) 
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terrorism, by virtue of geographic location and severity, can result in “location”, in this broader 
sense, being a liability that is associated with a higher chance of going bankrupt. 
To become publicly traded, a form of legitimacy, it is assumed that the firm evidences good 
“location” choices, has secured resource endowments and established relationships to support the 
enduring provision of resources. In the case of a stock exchange, where firms compete for 
investment and investors have portfolio diversification as an objective, official registration 
documents explain the investment opportunity by reporting annual performance and competitive 
positioning. The “location” elements emphasized include geographic location, industry, size of 
the firm within the industry, and buyer markets (export/domestic). 
The shift of a location from advantage to liability can result from a number of influences.  
Terrorism has the potential to disproportionately negatively affect firm types above and beyond 
geographic location. The choice of industry is one aspect. The literature on economic clusters 
(Porter, 2000) and national competitive advantage (Porter, 1990) argue that firms will co-locate 
in a particular geographic location to generate a critical mass of demand for inputs, attract 
suppliers, and support requests for public investment in infrastructure. Thus, when terrorism 
affects a geographic location, firms who found it beneficial to co-locate with other firms in the 
same industry, now bear greater risk of loss because the clustering makes the industry itself 
affected by terrorism. While not all same-industry firms in the same location may be affected, 
the loss of a critical mass of firms can negatively affect the remaining firms. The greater the 
severity and proximity of terrorism, the greater the likelihood that firms will go bankrupt.  
Additionally, the choice of buyer market (export/domestic) and geography may be co-
determined as the firm geographic location is made proximate to transportation infrastructure to 
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support the flow of goods and services. These operational and reputational effects may be 
especially pronounced for firms who rely upon international markets (Mirza & Verdier, 2008; 
Suder, 2004) as terrorism may not only create a reticence of buyers to travel to do business in 
Pakistan but also foster counter-terrorism efforts that add complexity for buyers (Mirza & 
Verdier, 2014). Thus, the greater the severity and proximity of terrorism, the greater the 
likelihood that revenues will shrink, expenses will rise and financial distress will drive firms into 
bankruptcy (Oetzel & Oh, 2014). 
Finally, a choice between geography, industry and firm size may be co-determined as some 
firms may choose a more focused position within an industry (Porter, 1980).   
Although some focused-firms who are uniquely specialized in the world economy may 
successfully navigate adverse circumstances, these firms are more typically resource-
constrained. Their lack of slack limits their ability to weather terrorism’s effects and places them 
at greater risk of bankruptcy.  In sum, whether or not geographic targets are selected by terrorists 
because of the potential for a disproportionate economic effect, it remains that attacks may have 
this effect (Tushman & Anderson,1986) because good geographically-anchored competitive 
positioning choices become sources of exposure and risk in the context of terrorism. 
Hypothesis 3:  There will be a positive relationship between the severity and geographic 
location of terrorism and the exit of particular types of firms. 
4.3. Methods 
Our approach included survival analysis of a panel dataset complemented by an exploration 
of firm bankruptcy events to determine if competitive positioning elements, alone and in 
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combination are related to bankruptcy given a small number of bankruptcy observations.  Our 
objective was to ascertain whether locational liabilities matter and whether these liabilities arose 
from more proximate geographic influences, broader geographic influences that take into 
consideration spillover effects, and/or a firm’s competitive position. Because geography is an 
important component of competitive position through which other competitive position 
components are attached we use the term “location”. 
4.3.1. Data 
This study combined city-level Pakistan terrorism data and data on listed firms at the 
Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX, formerly Karachi Stock Exchange) to create a panel dataset for 
the period 1999 through 2015. Terrorism data was obtained from both the Global Terrorism 
Database (GTD) and the South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP). Firm data was obtained from the 
“Balance Sheet Analysis” of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), Securities Exchange Commission 
of Pakistan (SECP), and firms listing status from the PSX. Our sample includes 499 listed firms 
that had a least one year of financial data. Firms were located in 27 different cities (Table 4.1).  
4.3.2. Variables 
Exit. Exit was measured as the type of delisting from PSX: share buyback, merger and 
bankruptcy. We used the annual SECP list of delisted firms. A total of 110 delisting events23 
were observed (Table 4.2).  For cities that contained the largest number of publicly traded firms, 
the highest frequency of bankruptcy occurred in Karachi while the greatest proportion occurred 
                                                           
23 The momentum of terrorist activities spread all over Pakistan after 2007 Swat operations. This military operation 




in Lahore. Notably, some cities which had a limited number of publicly traded firms experienced 
the bankruptcy of large proportions of those firms (Table 4.3). 
Table 4.1: Firms by City and Industry 
City 124 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
Bahawalpur 0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  1 
Chakwal 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 
Faisalabad 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 12 
Gujranwala 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Haripur 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Hub 1 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 3 
Hyderabad 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 
Islamabad 1 0 4 1 7 4 0 1 2 3 0 3 
Karachi 25 7 8 30 9 7 15 19 13 16 9 81 
Kasur 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 
Kohat 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 3 
Lahore 13 0 1 17 9 7 4 8 10 4 1 65 
Lakki Marwat                       0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Mardan 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Mirpur 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Multan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 9 
Noshehra 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Okara 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Peshawar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 4 
Quetta 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 
Rawalpindi 2 3 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 3 
Sheikhupura 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 0 1 
Shikarpur 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Sialkot 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Swabi 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 
Thatta 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Wah Cantt 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Grand Total 47 10 15 55 25 18 22 32 31 32 11 201 
Source: Pakistan Stock Exchange (2018) 
                                                           
24 1 = Chemical and Pharmaceuticals; 2 = Coke and Refined  Petroleum Products; 3 = Electrical Machinery and Apparatus; 4 = 
Food; 5 = Fuel and Energy; 6 = Information, Communication and Transportation Services; 7 = Motor Vehicles, Trailers, and 
Auto parts; 8 = Other Manufacturing n.e.s.; 9 = Other Non-Metal Mineral Products; 10 = Other Services Activities;11= Paper, 




 Table 4.2: Exit of Publically Listed Firms, Pakistan Stock Exchange, 2002-2015 
Year Sample Buyback Merger Bankruptcy  Unknown Others 
2002 499 0 0 0 0 0 
2003 498 0 0 0 1 0 
2004 491 0 0 0 8 0 
2005 479 9 1 0 0 0 
2006 473 1 4 1 0 0 
2007 468 4 1 0 0 0 
2008 460 0 2 0 0 6 
2009 455 0 1 0 4 0 
2010 443 1 0 2 7 1 
2011 439 1 0 3 0 0 
2012 406 5 0 28 0 0 
2013 399 4 1 2 0 0 
2014 394 3 1 0 0 0 
2015 389 2 2 1 0 0 
Total   30 14 40 19 7 
Source: Pakistan Stock Exchange (2018) 
Table 4.3: Geographically distribution of Bankruptcy (All Sectors)  
City 2005 2006 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Hub 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 
Hyderabad 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Islamabad 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 
Karachi 0 0 1 1 11 0 2 1 
Kasur 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Lahore 1 0 1 0 9 0 0 0 
Mirpur 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 
Quetta 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sheikhupura 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Swabi 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Thatta 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Other cities25  0  0  0  0  0  0  0  0 
Grand Total 2 1 2 3 27 2 2 1 
Source: Pakistan Stock Exchange (2018) 
                                                           
25 Other cities include all those cities where firms are located. For example Bahawalpur, Chakwal, Faisalabad, 
Gujranwala, Haripur, Kohat, Lakki Marwat, Mardan, Multan, Noshehra, Okara, Peshawar, Rawalpindi, Shikarpur, 




Terrorism.  We initially used the two best sources of terrorism data on Pakistan, the GTD 
and the SATP. GTD resides at the University of Maryland and is maintained by the National 
Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). GTD data has 
been widely used in previous scientific articles26. In comparison to other worldwide event 
databases for terrorist attacks,27 comprehensive information is available for each terrorist event 
including date and location (city) of the incident, the number of death and injuries. SATP is 
maintained by the Institute of Conflict Management in India and provides one of the most 
comprehensive and reliable data sources about terrorist attacks in Pakistan. It includes detailed 
information obtained from print and electronic media reports about terrorist incidents including 
suicide attacks and bomb blasts. As existing literature has extensively used the SATP database to 
conduct terrorism-related studies specific to Pakistan28 and the recorded incidences across the 
two databases converge29, we chose to use data from the SATP database. The numbers of 
terrorist incidences in the SATP database are slightly fewer than GTD (125 cities versus 115 
cities) and provide a more conservative test of the relationship between terrorism and exit.   
The first author constructed city-level detailed terrorist incidents, killings, and injuries 
information from 115 different locations in Pakistan as reported by SATP and 125 locations as 
reported by GTD. All relevant information regarding the number of incidents, the number of 
killings, the number of injuries were extracted and used to construct two indices of terrorism, a 
                                                           
26 See, the relationship between terrorism and e.g. trade (Bandyopadhyay et al., 2018; Egger and Gassebner, 2015), 
economic costs (Bilgel and Karahasan, 2017) and economic growth (Choi, 2014; Enders et al., 2011; Meierrieks and 
Gries, 2013).  
 
27 Another frequently used event database on terrorism incidents is ITERATE (International Terrorism: Attributes of 
Terrorist Events). ITERATE, however, only includes transnational terrorist incidents and data are not available after 
2012.  
28  The link between economic growth and terrorism (Shahbaz et al., 2013), the determinants for terrorism (Ismail 
and Amjad, 2014), and the impact of terrorism on FDI flows (Haider and Anwar, 2014). 
29 The comparison of the GTD and SATP numbers is available from the first author. 
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City Terrorism Index (CTI) for each city and year and a Total Terrorism Index (TTI) for each 
city and year. The CTI is in the style of the Global Terrorism Index (Institute for Economics and 
Peace, 2018). TTI accounts for the impact of terrorism within the city as well as a distance-
weighted indicator for terrorism outside a city to represent the spillover effects of terrorism on 
neighboring cities.   
The pattern of terrorism incidence shows a marked increase in terrorism over the period of 
observation (see Figure 4.2). While terrorism has increased since 2006, it is noteworthy that not 
all cities are affected in the same manner. The CTI peaks differ not only in their intensity (e.g., 
1112 for Karachi and 2165 for Peshawar) but also across time (e.g., for Karachi in 2013 and for 
Peshawar in 2009). There are cities where the intensity of terrorism is high e.g., Peshawar, 
Karachi, and Quetta, and cities with low intensity of terrorism are low e.g., Faisalabad. 
Our indices combine the severity and proximity of terrorism. To address severity and 
proximity, we followed the approach employed by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), 
which computes the Global Terrorism Index (GTI). GTI is an indicator of the level of terrorism 
at the country-level. By measuring at a city level, we incorporate proximity. Thus, our adaptation 
of the computation of the GTI (see Institute for Economics and Peace, 2018, p. 83) to compute a 
City Terrorism Index (CTI) for each city j in each year t30 is as follows: 
  (4.1)
                                                           
30 According to IEP, the weighting was determined in consultation with the GPI Expert Panel. Note that our measure 
of CTI does not account for the total property damage from terrorist incidents in a given year. We do not incorporate 
such damages because the SATP database does not allow for constructing a reliable indicator.  
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Figure 4.2: SATP Terrorism in Selected Cities, 2001-2015 
 
 Source: South Asian Terrorism Portal (2018)
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Our theoretical model explains that the firm may also be affected by terrorist attacks outside 
the city where it is located; e.g. by terrorism in neighboring regions or in more distant regions. 
To examine such spillover or interregional effects of terrorist attacks, we first constructed an 
Interregional Terrorism Index (IRTI) that measures the level of terrorist attacks in other regions. 
We first identified 105 locations in Pakistan and measured the respective level of terrorist 
incidents. We assumed that the impact of terrorism diminished with increasing distance.  To 
create weights that reflected the diminishing impact of terrorism, we measured the pair-wise 
distances between cities where firms are located and all other (104) locations using the great 
circle distance (geographic city centers)31. We applied the Haversine formula, which is 
commonly used to calculate the distance between two points on the Earth's surface based on the 
longitude and latitude coordinates. The (pair-wise) weights (αjl) are the inverse of the 
corresponding kilometer aerial distances (D) between a city j and a location l: αjl= 1/Djl.  
The Interregional Terrorism Index (IRTI) for a city j in year t is given by:  
    (4.2) 
where N is the number of all locations. We then created TTI as a combination of the level of 
terrorism in the city where a firm is located as well as the interregional spillovers of terrorism 
computed as the sum of the CTI and the IRTI for each city j and for each year t. 
     (4.3) 
                                                           
31 In the literature on international business, the great-circle distance between geographic centers of countries is used 
to measure the geographic distance (Berry, Guillén, & Zhou, 2010; Boeh & Beamish, 2012; Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 
2013; Zaheer, Schomaker, & Nachum, 2012). 
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“Location”. We focused on four aspects of competitive positioning: geographic location, 
industry, size and exports. As previously mentioned, firm data was obtained from the “Balance 
Sheet Analysis” of the State Bank of Pakistan (SBP), Securities Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan (SECP), and firms listing status from the Pakistan Stock Exchange. Geographic 
location, measured as the city of headquarter location, is the linchpin between terrorism and 
other firm attributes. Identification of industry was obtained from the official industry reports of 
the State Bank of Pakistan which lists firm membership in an industry.  
Firm size was coded by matching firm revenues, obtained from firm filings with SECP to the 
Prudential Regulations of SBP. Small firms are those firms that have annual sales of up to 150 
Million Pakistani Rupees. Medium firms are those that have annual sales between more than 150 
Million and 800 Million Pakistani Rupees. Large firms have greater than 800 Million Pakistani 
Rupees annual sales. While these revenue breakpoints occur across all manufacturing industries, 
we assume that because of the unique resource requirements and the role of firm size in each 
industry, size within the industry is a more important characterization of size in firm type than 
size alone.  
Export was determined from a review of the income statement of each firm. If they reported 
export sales, we categorized the firm as participating in export. Otherwise, we categorized them 
as not participating in export. Firm-level financial data on sales is obtained for the period of 1999 
to 201532 and used to classify firms by firm size according to industry standards.   
                                                           
32 The final sample is based on eight data reports by the SBP, namely report 1 (1999-2005), report 2 (2003-2008), 
report 3 (2004-2009), report 4 (2006-2011), report 5 (2007-2012), report 6 (2008-2013), report 7 (2009-2014) and 
report 8 (2010-2015). Given that the format and structure of the SBP reports changed over time, we harmonized and 
crosschecked the financial data by referring to, e.g., firms’ websites and annual reports.  
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When firm “location” data is combined with the bankruptcy, it is clear that the textile 
industry experienced the greatest number of bankruptcies (Table 4.4).  
Table 4.4: Bankruptcy by City and Industry 
City  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Hub 0  0 0 0 0 2 
Hyderabad 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Islamabad 0 1 0 0 1 0 
Karachi 1 0 0 2 2 11 
Kasur 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Lahore 0 0 0 0 2 9 
Mirpur 0 0 0 0 0 2 
Quetta 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Sheikhupura 0 0 0 0 2 0 
Swabi 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Thatta 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Other cities 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Grand Total 1 1 1 2 8 27 
Source: Pakistan Stock Exchange (2018) 
1 = Chemical and Pharmaceuticals;  
2 = Electrical Machinery and Apparatus;  
3 = Food;  
4 = Information, Communication, and Transport Services;  
5 = Other Services Activities;  
6 = Textile  
 
Table 4.5 summarizes city, industry, size, export, and age across all bankruptcy cases of 
listed firms at Pakistan Stock Exchange.  
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Table 4.5: City, Industry, Size, Export and Age of Bankruptcy Firms 
City Industry Sales in Thousand Rupees Size33 Exports Birth Death Year 
Hub Textile 154900 Medium No 1979 2011 
Hub Textile 1400 Small No 1983 2012 
Hyderabad Textile 2684459 Large Yes 1960 2013 
Islamabad Electrical Machinery and Apparatus 800 Small No 1989 2012 
Islamabad Other Services Activities 274000 Medium No 1967 2013 
Karachi Chemicals and Pharmaceuticals 1200 Small No 1979 2012 
Karachi Information, Comm. and Transport Services 3150700 Large Yes 1991 2010 
Karachi Information, Comm. and Transport Services 0 Unknown Don't Know 1992 2012 
Karachi Other Services Activities 47500 Small No 1947 2012 
Karachi Other Services Activities 0 Unknown Don't Know 1976 2012 
Karachi Textile 8300 Small Yes 1949 2012 
Karachi Textile 0 Unknown Don't Know 1951 2012 
Karachi Textile 0 Unknown Don't Know 1954 2012 
Karachi Textile 0 Unknown Don't Know 1962 2012 
Karachi Textile 111226 Small Yes 1964 2014 
Karachi Textile 2678374 Large Yes 1966 2014 
Karachi Textile 1300 Small Yes 1986 2012 
Karachi Textile 174600 Medium No 1987 2011 
Karachi Textile 51400 Small No 1987 2012 
Karachi Textile 28200 Small Yes 1992 2012 
Karachi Textile 43100 Small No 1993 2015 
                                                           
 
 
33 According to prudential regulations of the State Bank of Pakistan, Small firms are those firms which have annual sales of up to 150 Million Pakistani Rupees, 
Medium firms are those that have annual sales more than 150 Million and until 800 Million Pakistani Rupees, and large firms have more than 800 Million 
Pakistani Rupees annual sales. 
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Kasur Food 119336 Small Yes 1986 2012 
Lahore Other Services Activities 104600 Small No 1974 2005 
Lahore Other Services Activities 21800 Medium No 1984 2012 
Lahore Textile 0 Unknown Don't Know 1951 2012 
Lahore Textile 106700 Medium No 1966 2010 
Lahore Textile 511200 Medium Yes 1985 2012 
Lahore Textile 349746 Medium Yes 1986 2012 
Lahore Textile 321600 Medium No 1987 2012 
Lahore Textile 216700 Medium No 1987 2012 
Lahore Textile 300600 Medium Yes 1987 2012 
Lahore Textile 579300 Medium Yes 1989 2012 
Lahore Textile 450200 Medium Yes 1991 2012 
Mirpur Textile 83800 Small Yes 1984 2012 
Mirpur Textile 330800 Medium No 2004 2012 
Quetta Textile 467600 Medium Yes 1991 2006 
Sheikhupura Other Services Activities 0 Unknown Don't Know 1967 2011 
Sheikhupura Other Services Activities 0 Unknown Don't Know 1968 2005 
Swabi Textile 6800 Small No 1989 2012 
Thatta Other Services Activities 1000 Small No 1985 2012 
 




4.4. Data Analysis  
To test our hypotheses, we use a combination of survival analysis and more exploratory 
analysis of the frequencies of bankruptcy incidence by aspects of competitive positioning alone 
and in combination with each other. Because we incorporated 5-year lags as explained below, we 
examined firms between 1999 and 2015 with firm exit beginning in 2004.   
We test for the relationship between the likelihood of exit and influences on exit. As a first 
step, we consider exit more generally as the combination of three delisting paths: share 
buybacks, being acquired, and bankruptcy. Then, we conduct separate analyses for each distinct 
exit pathway. We used four different hazard specifications and examined the relative explanatory 
power of the two different terrorist indices in each model. To address the potential lagged and 
cumulative effects of terrorism as well as locational differences in the administration of 
bankruptcy actions34 we used multi-year measures of terrorism.  
As a detailed reporting of our survival analyses would detract from the readability of the 
paper, more details about our approach can be found in the Appendix. Our analysis of the 
relationship between geographically-tied aspects of firm “location” and bankruptcy relies on 
simpler tests of disproportionate influences as the relatively small incidence of bankruptcy does 
not permit more robust analysis.   
 
                                                           
34 The OECD Report (2006) explains the bankruptcy process in Pakistan.  According to the report, the High Court 
administers the bankruptcy and liquidation process of the company according to its jurisdictional location. Pakistan 
has high courts in each of its provinces, namely: Baluchistan, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK), Sind and Punjab. 
Although, high courts in Pakistan are a competent and high standard institution, it has faced criticism of its 
independence in some cases. Political interference in the appointment process has raised concern over the continuing 
influence of the executive over the judiciary. The sheer number of cases before the courts and the cumbersome 





We find support for Hypothesis 1. There is a significant and positive relationship between the 
proximity and severity of terrorism and firm exit (Table 4.6). Across all model specifications, 
irrespective of terrorism measure used, the two-year prior terrorism level predicted exit (p<0.05).  
CTI has greater explanatory power than TTI.  
We find support for Hypothesis 2c but not Hypothesis 2a or 2b. There is a significant and 
positive relationship between the proximity and severity of terrorism and exit by a bankruptcy 
(Table 4.9). We observe using the terrorism variable with a two-year lag, a hazard ratio of .0014 
which suggests 0.14 percent more likely to exit via bankruptcy given a unit change in terrorism 
(p<0.01). Again, CTI has greater explanatory power than TTI. The relationships between 
proximity and severity of terrorism and exit by acquisition and share buyback are indeterminate 
(Tables 4.7 & 4.8).    
Our more exploratory analysis of the relationship between “location” of the firm and 
bankruptcy evidence partial support for Hypothesis 3 with respect to the relationship between 
industry, size within the industry, and absence from export markets. As shown previously in 
Table 4.1 and Table 4.3, textile firms constitute the greatest number of publicly-traded firms and 
firms exit by bankruptcy. Textile firms are disproportionately more likely to be engaged in 
export χ2 (2, N=499) = 55.36, p <.0001 (see Table 4.10a). Specifically, although textile firms are 
disproportionately medium in size χ2 (3, N=499) = 19.48, p <.0005 (see Table 4.10b), it is the 
small textile firms who are disproportionately absent from export and larger textile firms who are 
disproportionately present in export χ2 (2, N=195) = 184.49, p <.0001 (see Table 4.10c).    
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Table 4.6: Location and Severity of Terrorism and Exit from Stock Market  


















Terrorism         
Terrorism_Lag1 -0.000389 -0.000390 -0.000418 -0.000417 -0.000409 -0.000409 -0.000401 -0.000400 
 (0.000362) (0.000364) (0.000364) (0.000366) (0.000364) (0.000366) (0.000366) (0.000368) 
Terrorism_Lag2 0.000719** 0.000732** 0.000697** 0.000711** 0.000703** 0.000717** 0.000661** 0.000674** 
 (0.000285) (0.000286) (0.000286) (0.000287) (0.000286) (0.000287) (0.000293) (0.000294) 
Terrorism_Lag3 -0.000320 -0.000359 -0.000343 -0.000383 -0.000339 -0.000379 -0.000384 -0.000426 
 (0.000472) (0.000482) (0.000474) (0.000484) (0.000474) (0.000484) (0.000487) (0.000497) 
Terrorism_Lag4 -0.000225 -0.000241 -0.000258 -0.000275 -0.000253 -0.000269 -0.000272 -0.000293 
 (0.000436) (0.000442) (0.000439) (0.000445) (0.000439) (0.000445) (0.000443) (0.000450) 
Terrorism_Lag5 0.000446 0.000429 0.000387 0.000368 0.000400 0.000382 0.000332 0.000310 
 
(0.000353) (0.000360) (0.000358) (0.000364) (0.000357) (0.000364) (0.000364) 
 
(0.000370) 
Constant -3.960*** -3.949*** -5.252*** -5.252*** -4.224*** -4.217***   
 (0.157) (0.154) (0.689) (0.689) (0.221) (0.219)   
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 5,340 5,340 5,340 5,340 5,340 5,340 5,340 5,340 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
One-sided p-values are reported when the predicted sign is expected, two-sided p-value otherwise:  
* = significant at p < 0.10; ** = significant at p < 0.05; *** = significant at p < 0.01  
A number of observations: 5430, Dependent Variable = 1 if the firm is exited from the stock market, 0 otherwise. Hazard ratios positive (negative) is a signal to 
an increase (decrease) in the likelihood of exit from the stock market. For example, a hazard ratio of 0.0007 suggests that .07 percent is more likely to exit given 






Table 4.7: Location and Severity of Terrorism and Exit by Share Buyback 


















Terrorism         
Terrorism_Lag1 0.000637 0.000637 0.000563 0.000569 0.000608 0.000612 0.000543 0.000553 
 (0.000645) (0.000644) (0.000661) (0.000659) (0.000654) (0.000653) (0.000665) (0.000662) 
Terrorism_Lag2 -0.00141 -0.00138 -0.00155 -0.00152 -0.00148 -0.00145 -0.00154 -0.00152 
 (0.000986) (0.000982) (0.000995) (0.000989) (0.000990) (0.000984) (0.00100) (0.000999) 
Terrorism_Lag3 -0.000536 -0.000547 -0.000689 -0.000695 -0.000628 -0.000635 -0.000653 -0.000663 
 (0.000923) (0.000928) (0.000950) (0.000955) (0.000943) (0.000948) (0.000949) (0.000956) 
Terrorism_Lag4 -0.000610 -0.000626 -0.000766 -0.000779 -0.000698 -0.000707 -0.000602 -0.000629 
 (0.000862) (0.000873) (0.000881) (0.000890) (0.000876) (0.000885) (0.000916) (0.000930) 
Terrorism_Lag5 0.000823 0.000797 0.000660 0.000634 0.000736 0.000712 0.000687 0.000655 
 (0.000544) (0.000551) (0.000557) (0.000564) (0.000555) (0.000561) (0.000592) (0.000598) 
 
Constant 
-5.106*** -5.112*** -10.53*** -10.53*** -5.895*** -5.905***  
 
 (0.288) (0.281) (1.541) (1.539) (0.394) (0.391)   
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 5,758 5,758 5,758 5,758 5,758 5,758 5,758 5,758 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
One-sided p-values are reported when predicted sign is expected, two-sided p-value otherwise: * = significant at p < 0.10; ** = significant at p < 0.05; *** = 
significant at p < 0.01  
A number of observations: 5758, Dependent Variable = 1 if the firm is a buyback of shares delisted, 0 otherwise. Hazard ratios positive (negative) is a signal to 
an increase (decrease) in the likelihood of buying back of shares. For example, a hazard ratio of 0.0009 suggests that .09 percent is more likely to go delisted by 







Table 4.8: Location and Severity of Terrorism and Exit by M&A 


















Terrorism         
Terrorism_Lag1 -0.000364 -0.000322 -0.000302 -0.000263 -0.000301 -0.000263 -0.000416 -0.000373 
 (0.00108) (0.00107) (0.00107) (0.00106) (0.00107) (0.00106) (0.00109) (0.00108) 
Terrorism_Lag2 0.00143 0.00141 0.00149 0.00147 0.00149 0.00147 0.00137 0.00135 
 (0.00100) (0.000993) (0.00100) (0.000997) (0.00100) (0.000997) (0.00103) (0.00103) 
Terrorism_Lag3 -0.00384 -0.00374 -0.00382 -0.00374 -0.00379 -0.00374 -0.00422 -0.00412 
 (0.00267) (0.00266) (0.00267) (0.00267) (0.00267) (0.00267) (0.00269) (0.00268) 
Terrorism_Lag4 0.000870 0.000865 0.000913 0.000907 0.000914 0.000907 0.000711 0.000707 
 (0.000846) (0.000847) (0.000838) (0.000840) (0.000834) (0.000840) (0.000849) (0.000849) 
Terrorism_Lag5 0.000432 0.000393 0.000565 0.000525 0.000545 0.000525 0.000517 0.000471 
 (0.00102) (0.00104) (0.00101) (0.00103) (0.00101) (0.00103) (0.00107) (0.00109) 
Constant -5.968*** -5.987*** -4.123*** -4.134*** -5.422*** -4.134***   
 (0.429) (0.420) (1.209) (1.209) (0.602) (1.209)   
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 5,839 5,839 5,839 5,839 5,839 5,839 5,839 5,839 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
One-sided p-values are reported when predicted sign is expected, two-sided p-value otherwise: * = significant at p < 0.10; ** = significant at p < 0.05; *** = 
significant at p < 0.01 
The number of observations: 5839, Dependent Variable = 1 if the firm is merged & acquired, 0 otherwise. Hazard ratios positive (negative) is a signal to an 





Table 4.9: Location and Severity of Terrorism and Exit by Bankruptcy  


















Terrorism         
Terrorism_Lag1 -0.00110 -0.00109 -0.00113 -0.00113 -0.00111 -0.00110 -0.00116* -0.00115 
 (0.000704) (0.000711) (0.000709) (0.000717) (0.000706) (0.000713) (0.000700) (0.000705) 
Terrorism_Lag2 0.00150*** 0.00153*** 0.00148*** 0.00150*** 0.00150*** 0.00152*** 0.00144*** 0.00146*** 
 (0.000379) (0.000385) (0.000381) (0.000387) (0.000380) (0.000386) (0.000385) (0.000390) 
 Terrorism_Lag3 1.54e-05 -8.37e-05 1.21e-05 -9.00e-05 1.50e-05 -8.51e-05 -0.000138 -0.000237 
 (0.000747) (0.000784) (0.000749) (0.000786) (0.000748) (0.000785) (0.000779) (0.000812) 
Terrorism_Lag4 -0.000314 -0.000377 -0.000337 -0.000402 -0.000321 -0.000385 -0.000563 -0.000628 
 (0.000746) (0.000772) (0.000750) (0.000777) (0.000747) (0.000774) (0.000751) (0.000774) 
Terrorism_Lag5 0.00116** 0.00113** 0.00112** 0.00109** 0.00115** 0.00112** 0.000851* 0.000820 
 




Constant -5.388*** -5.347*** -6.486*** -6.471*** -5.469*** -5.435***   
 (0.282) (0.277) (1.151) (1.149) (0.391) (0.387)   
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Observations 5,783 5,783 5,783 5,783 5,783 5,783 5,783 5,783 
 
Standard errors in parentheses 
One-sided p-values are reported when the predicted sign is expected, two-sided p-value otherwise:  
* = significant at p < 0.10; ** = significant at p < 0.05; *** = significant at p < 0.01  
A number of observations: 5783, Dependent Variable = 1 if the firm is court driven liquidated, 0 otherwise. Hazard ratios positive (negative) is a signal to an 
increase (decrease) in the likelihood of court-driven liquidation. For example, a hazard ratio of 0.0015 suggests that .15 percent is more likely to go court driven 







Table 4.10a: Textiles Firms in Exports 
   Exports Observed (O) Expected (E) |O - E| (O - E)2/E 
Textile Industry Export 154 123.6613226 30.33867735 7.443195042 
 
No Export 41 71.6993988 30.6993988 13.14450473 
 
Unknown 6 5.236472946 0.763527054 0.111329433 
All other industries Export 153 178.4168337 25.41683367 23.73691703 
 
No Export 137 103.4468938 33.55310621 10.88298445 





Chi Square  55.3597173 
    
P-Value 2.22E-08 
    
      
Table 4.10b: Textiles Firms in Sizes 
  Sizes Observed (O) Expected (E) |O - E| (O - E)2/E 
Textile Industry Small 23 23.36272545 0.362725451 0.00563161 
 
Medium 50 32.62725451 17.37274549 9.250312061 
 
Large 122 138.5651303 16.56513026 1.980321745 
 
Unknown 6 6.44488978 0.44488978 0.030710675 
All other industries Small 35 33.4749499 1.5250501 0.069478157 
 
Medium 31 46.749499 15.749499 5.305869025 
 
Large 222 198.5410822 23.45891784 2.771823443 





Chi Square  19.48 




Table 4.10c: Textiles Firms by Size and Exports 
  Size and Exports Observed (O) Expected (E) |O - E| (O - E)2/E 
Export Small 3 18.16410256 15.16410256 12.65958534 
 
Medium 33 39.48717949 6.487179487 1.065750916 
 
Large 118 96.34871795 21.65128205 4.865430744 
No Export Small 20 4.835897436 15.16410256 47.55063763 
 
Medium 17 10.51282051 6.487179487 4.003064415 





Chi Square  184.4856474 
    
P-Value 8.69E-41 
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Table 4.10d: Textiles Firms Bankruptcy 
  Bankruptcy Observed (O) Expected (E) |O - E| (O - E)2/E 
Textile Not 174 184.8877756 10.88777555 0.641165464 
 
Yes 27 16.11222445 10.88777555 7.357373703 
All other Not 285 274.1122244 10.88777555 0.432463954 





Chi Square  13.39353 
    
P-Value 0.000252 
    
 
The incidence of textile firm bankruptcy is disproportionately greater than their presence in 
the sample χ2 (1, N=499) = 13.39, p <.0001 (see Table 4.10d). But, the incidence of the 
bankruptcy of textile firms in high terrorism cities (Lahore and Karachi) is not different from the 
non-occurrence of bankruptcy by textile firms in these cities χ2 (1, N=201) = .03, p = .86 (see 
Table 4.10e). The bankruptcy of textile firms appears to be better explained by other aspects of 
“location.” Textile firms who did not engage in export were disproportionately present in 
bankruptcy occurrences, accounting for 10 of the 23 bankrupt firms χ2 (1, N=195) = 7.92, p < 
.005 (see Table 4.10f). Textile firms who were small were also disproportionately present χ2 (2, 
N=195) =36.25, p = .0001 (see Table 4.10g).   
Table 4.10e: Textiles Firms Bankruptcy by High Terrorism Cities 
  
Bankruptcy by High Terrorism 
Cities 
Observed (O) Expected (E) |O - E| (O - E)2/E 
High TTI – Lahore 
and Karachi 
Bankrupt Textile Firms 20 19.6119403 0.388059701 0.007678502 
 
Non-Bankrupt Textile Firms 126 126.3880597 0.388059701 0.001191492 
Low TTI – rule out 
Lahore and Karachi 
Bankrupt Textile Firms 7 7.388059701 0.388059701 0.020382934 





Chi Square  0.032416 
    
P-Value 0.857118 




Table 4.10f: Textiles Firms Bankruptcy by Exports 
   Bankruptcy by Exports Observed (O) Expected (E) |O - E| (O - E)2/E 
Export Bankrupt Textile Firms 13 18.16410256 5.164102564 1.468168064 
 
Non-Bankrupt Textile Firms 141 135.8358974 5.164102564 0.196324799 
No Export Bankrupt Textile Firms 10 4.835897436 5.164102564 5.514582484 





Chi Square  7.91649 
    
P-Value 0.004899 
    
 
Table 4.10g: Textiles Firms Bankruptcy by Size 
  Bankruptcy by Size Observed (O) Expected (E) |O - E| (O - E)2/E 




14 20.28717949 -6.287179487 1.948453501 




38 44.1025641 -6.102564103 0.844424568 









Chi Square  36.2507 
    
P-Value 1.34E-08 
    
 
The relatively small incidence of textile bankruptcy relative to the combination of size and 
export did not permit the use of a Chi-Square Independence Test. As shown in Table 4.11, cases 
of small textile firm bankruptcy are relatively evenly split across export and non-export positions 












Size35 Exports CTI_1 CTI_2 CTI_3 CTI_4 CTI_5 
Hub 2012 Small No 13 38 15 32.5 149 
Swabi 2012 Small No 87 16 0 0 11 
Karachi 2012 Small No 340 373 184 36 727 
Karachi 2015 Small No 392 1111.5 305 340 373 
Mirpur 2012 Small Yes 0 0 0 0 0 
Karachi 2012 Small Yes 340 373 184 36 727 
Karachi 2012 Small Yes 340 373 184 36 727 
Karachi 2012 Small Yes 340 373 184 36 727 
Karachi 2014 Small Yes 1111.5 305 340 373 184 
Lahore 2012 N/A N/A 98 1144.5 475 404 11 
Karachi 2012 N/A N/A 340 373 184 36 727 
Karachi 2012 N/A N/A 340 373 184 36 727 
Karachi 2012 N/A N/A 340 373 184 36 727 
Mirpur 2012 Medium No 0 0 0 0 0 
Hub 2011 Medium No 38 15 32.5 149 59 
Lahore 2012 Medium No 98 1144.5 475 404 11 
Lahore 2012 Medium No 98 1144.5 475 404 11 
Karachi 2011 Medium No 373 184 36 727 247 
Lahore 2010 Medium No 475 404 11 14 47.5 
Quetta 2006 Medium Yes 50.5 102.5 220 2 78.5 
Lahore 2012 Medium Yes 98 1144.5 475 404 11 
Lahore 2012 Medium Yes 98 1144.5 475 404 11 
Lahore 2012 Medium Yes 98 1144.5 475 404 11 
Lahore 2012 Medium Yes 98 1144.5 475 404 11 
Lahore 2012 Medium Yes 98 1144.5 475 404 11 
Hyderabad 2013 Large Yes 13 3 2 1 0 
Karachi 2014 Large Yes 1111.5 305 340 373 184 
Source: Pakistan Stock Exchange (2018) 
 
 
                                                           
35 According to prudential regulations of the State Bank of Pakistan, Small firms are those firms which have annual 
sales of up to 150 Million Pakistani Rupees, Medium firms are those that have annual sales more than 150 Million 
and until 800 Million Pakistani Rupees, and large firms have more than 800 Million Pakistani Rupees annual sales. 
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4.6. Discussion and conclusions 
4.6.1. Theoretical contributions  
With this study, we offer multiple contributions to organizational theory. First, we go beyond 
studies that examine the macro-incidence of terrorism and its effects on economic attributes of a 
country (Greenbaum et al., 2007; Tingbani et al., 2019) to consider terrorism and the manner in 
which it affects specific types of firms within a population of firms. We incorporate firm-specific 
variables such as location, size, and exports involvement that Greenbaum et al. (2007) and 
Tingbani et al. (2019) did not use in their previous studies. We also address the potential issue of 
overgeneralization through a precise city-level terrorism and firm-specific empirical investigation 
that may arise in broader studies of the effects of terrorism. Although we recognize that small, 
private businesses experience significant distress, the large number of large, publicly-traded firms 
who have persisted and the relatively limited stock market effects previously documented (Aslam 
& Kang, 2015) suggests a more balanced consideration of terrorism is warranted. Future research 
of enduring firms and firms who get acquired by other firms or go private through share 
buybacks would contribute to this more balanced perspective. 
Second, we recognize that terrorism creates a difficult environment but rather than focus on 
the financial effects and their relationship to only one form of firm exit, bankruptcy, we draw 
attention to the variety of available exit behaviors and the possibility that variety in context and 
firm attributes explain differences in exit outcomes. Obviously, a firm that is financially-
compromised will go bankrupt but we are more concerned with whether certain types of firms are 
more likely to be so financially-compromised that they are forced into bankruptcy. Studies that 
combine financial data with firm attribute data, including data on MNE and initiatives designed 
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to address or mitigate terrorism risk, could potentially provide more insight into how differences 
in competitive abilities compound or dampen the challenges of terrorism (Zeneli, Czinkota & 
Knight, 2018).   
Third, we begin to develop the concept “liabilities of location” as an extension of the general 
notion of “liabilities” found in population ecology (McKelvey & Aldrich, 1983; Stinchcombe, 
1965).  We focus on firms who had successfully overcome liabilities of young age and small size 
to become publicly traded and consider how other aspects of variation, namely competitive 
positioning, are related to exit.  To apply the geographic occurrence of terrorism, we take liberty 
to characterize competitive position more broadly as “location” because of the co-determination 
of geographic choice, industry choice, and export choice. As such, we are coupling the literature 
on competitive positioning and economic clusters found in the strategy literature (Porter, 1980, 
1985, 1990) with population ecology arguments that explain how changes in resource availability 
negatively affect firms.  In particular, the argument is that due to a firm’s competitive positioning 
its geographical attachment to and reliance on particular types of resources increase its 
vulnerability to the deleterious effects of terrorism. In sum, we begin with a set of firms who 
could reasonably be considered to have advantages and be in the right place because they are 
publicly traded, but end up being in the wrong place by virtue of their “location.” Our results 
provide evidence of the importance of considering the choice of industry, firm size and buyer 
market (export/no export) and combining these “location” influences.   
Fourth, we speak to limits on the enduring nature of a position within an environment.  We 
show that disruptions from terrorism that are associated with bankruptcy occur with a broad 
stroke, as suggested by previous studies of terrorism (Tingbani et al. 2019). We do show that 
132 
 
terrorism, at least in Pakistan, was disruptive for publicly-traded companies in general and for 
publicly-traded textile firms more specifically. The narrower strikes, in particular on the textile 
industry, are clearly evident. But even with our fine-grained measures of terrorism, we did not 
evidence that geographically-situated environmental jolts of terrorism were associated with the 
bankruptcy of particular types of firms. Modeling terrorism as cumulative effects or modeling 
contagion effects across stages in value-added processes between industries offer avenues for 
additional inquiry.   
Finally, while we argued that publicly traded companies have already overcome liabilities of 
small size and young age, there is the possibility that other aspects of liabilities of size and age 
(Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Stinchombe, 1965) may apply. Small firms still appear to have the 
liability of small size but without considering their age, we have yet to discern whether it is a 
liability of age or size that explains their bankruptcy. Additionally, while Porter (1980) addresses 
the risk of being “stuck in the middle,” the occurrence of bankruptcy for medium-sized firms is 
proportionate to their overall presence. Case studies of firms that have not gone bankrupt would 
allow us to apply more clearly population ecology logics to both survival and exit alike. 
   
4.6.2. Empirical contributions 
We also offer multiple empirical contributions. First, we use a more precise measure of 
terrorism. Our city-level measures include proximate and more geographically expansive effects 
that account for the severity of terrorism represented as a combination of the number of incidents, 
casualties and injuries. We used a weighted distance to firm location city with the terrorism 
incident city. The closer a firm is to an incident city, the stronger impact a firm receives. We 
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build upon previous papers that assessed the impact of terrorism on trade and measured terrorism 
as binary variable e.g., 1 for incident and 0 otherwise (Nitsch & Schumacher, 2004; Blomberg & 
Hess, 2006). Some authors counted the number of terror attacks (Nitsch & Schumacher, 2004). In 
capturing city proximity and severity, we obtain a more direct effect of terrorism on each firm. 
Second, we use firm characteristics such as size, export sales and location as explanatory 
rather than control variables. Previous studies either used macroeconomic variable to explain 
bankruptcy of the firms due to terrorism (Tingbani et al., 2019) or no firm specific variable other 
than the outcome of exit (Greenbaum et al., 2007). Our study provides a better test of whether 
terrorism affects all firms in the same way or whether there are firm-unique effects. This 
disaggregates the impact of terrorism within a country on specific firms. In previous studies, 
scholars did not incorporate firm-specific variables. They emphasized macro-level variables to 
establish the link of terrorism with insolvency (Tingbani et al., 2019). Macro-variables are 
appropriate in cross-country comparisons. In particular, when country differences in insolvency 
are the focus, variables that capture differences in bankruptcy institutions are important (Tingbani 
et al., 2019). In studies of firm-level bankruptcy, where available, firm-specific variables that 
allow the prediction of bankruptcy are appropriate (Altman, 1968; Lau, 1987; Ohlson, 1980; 
Shumway, 2001; Zmijewski, 1984).     
Third, our use of publicly listed firms provides us with more reliable data. Firm-level data 
was validated with DataStream, Orbis and Thomson Reuters. There was no significant difference 
in the data sources. Data was also matched with audited annual reports of the listed firms 
published by the SBP. While we have confidence in the reliability of our firm-specific data, we 
did not include financial measures or other indicators of value-added processes within the firm. 
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Additional research using these variables would enhance our ability to isolate and better predict 
firm-specific influences on exit and survival alike.  
Finally, we also took into consideration the importance of analytic methods and our 
theoretical model. As a nonparametric method, Cox regression is robust to non-normal 
distribution. The other three methods we used, which rely upon parametric distributions, share 
the assumption of proportional hazards with the Cox regression model. Our analysis of 
disproportionate occurrences was more exploratory and relied upon Chi-square analysis. Both 
analytic steps were reasonable given the data and model. Enhancement of the model to account 
for the tempo and cumulative effects of terrorism would require the selection of methods 
appropriate to that model. As we have evidence of non-uniform lagged terrorism effects, it is 
possible that there are distinct pathways of exit. Case studies of firms could offer more qualitative 
insights. 
4.6.3. Practical contributions  
Our study offers two especially important contributions for managers and policymakers, 
respectively. First, we show that terrorism in prior years can result in a delayed experience of 
bankruptcy, even as much as 5 years following severe levels of terrorism. It may take a couple of 
years to show a strong impact on business contracts and market share. While terrorism creates 
difficult situations for firms and as a result drives firms out of the market, it may create 
opportunities. Some firms may acquire others or fill voids left by departing firms. Additionally, 
during terrorist attacks in a particular city, it is not an easy decision for an existing firm to move 
its location (Barney, 1991). As firms are potentially affected by terrorist attacks in other 
locations, it may be more prudent to avoid the disruption of relocation.    
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For policymakers, we provide insight into the potential consequences of terrorism for country 
advantages in global markets. It is important to pay attention to terrorism-prone regions and take 
precautionary measures to stabilize economic activity. To obtain a better systematic 
understanding, there is still a need for a primary study to learn more from the experience of firms 
operating in terrorism-ridden cities. Qualitative research would permit a more complete study of 




5. OVERALL SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
5.1. Overview 
This dissertation was driven by a motivation to conduct research on how terrorism, perhaps 
the dominant influence on Pakistan’s economy since 2001, affects the business activities of firms 
and offer insight into how firms’ leaders are working toward continuing to make their business 
environment safer and accessible to local and foreign customers alike. Two overarching questions 
drove a more specific study on different aspects of business conduct: What is the impact of 
terrorism on the business activities of firms in Pakistan? What could firms and policy makers 
learn from the experience of firms in Pakistan with the context of terrorism?  Multi-level analysis 
of city-level terrorism's effects on the Pakistan economy through its effects on export, and on exit 
from the stock market was undertaken. Each of the main Chapters provides a thorough grounding 
in the extant literature, method, findings, and implications for future research, policy and 
practice.  
Chapter 5 provides a summary of each Chapter to offer a more complete, integrated 
perspective of terrorism’s effects, and concludes with implications for future scholarship, policy-
making, and business leadership. It begins with an overview of the broad purpose of the 
dissertation and extends with an overarching picture of terrorism and firms in Pakistan. It 
identifies the frequency of terrorism in different cities to observe variation along with a synopsis 
of available firms in various cities, as well as the incidence of terrorism and its effects (Chapter 
1). The main studies of this dissertation include: the relationship between terrorism and firms’ 
business operations with a special focus on management practices of the textile industry (Chapter 
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2); the effect of terrorism on the exports behaviors of the firms (Chapter 3); and terrorism, 
competitive positioning, and the exit of publicly traded firms in Pakistan (Chapter 4).  
 
5.2. Summary  
This dissertation examines the relationship between terrorism and three aspects of its firm-
level effects in the context of a broader business environment. Three different samples of firms, 
using primary data (Chapter 2) and secondary data (Chapters 3 and 4), were studied. Table 5.1 
presents a side-by-side summary of each chapter including key findings and implications for 
research, policy, and practitioners. A preliminary attempt to integrate these findings is offered in 
Table 5.1.   
Conceptually, there are three attributes common to the three chapters. First, all chapters focus 
on city-based measures of terrorism as cities are an important unit of economic analysis 
(Mudambi et al., 2018). Second, all chapters include firms that are industrially relevant and 
clustered proximately to important cities. This sample of firms allows us to capture the variation 
of terrorism in different geographic locations of Pakistan and its impact on businesses which are 
expected to be enduring contributors to Pakistan’s economy; i.e., publicly listed or privately-
owned firms in an iconic industry. Finally, participation in export or in export-effects is an 
important consideration in each chapter. This is consistent with the research on country-level 





Table 5.1: Summary of dissertation 
 Chapter 2  Chapter 3  Chapter 4 
Research 
Questions 
What is the impact of 
terrorism on business 
operations of textile firms in 
Pakistan and what 
management practices do they 
use to deal with terrorism? 
How does terrorism affect the 
export performance of the 
firms? 
What is the relationship 
between terrorism, competitive 
positioning, liability of 
location, and the exit of 
publicly-traded Pakistani 
firms? 
Findings Differences in the impact of 
terrorism and management 
practices are related to various 
combinations of firm attributes 
(size and location) and market 
focus. For example, export 
firms face challenges with both 
operations and customer 
relationships, while non-export 
firms find difficulty in their 
routine operations.  
City-level and some within-
country interregional spillover 
terrorism negatively affect 
export ratios.  
 
Terrorism, on both city, and 
total level, is positively related 
to firm exit from the stock 
market. Analyses show a 
significant positive relation of 
terrorism with court driven, and 
no relation with other types of 
exit i.e., buyback of shares or 
merger and acquisition. The 
sector-specific analysis points 
to a more stronger firm exit of 
textile sectors in comparison to 
other sectors.  
Research 
Implication 
Future studies should 
incorporate a holistic analysis 
of the effects of difficult 
contexts on firms’ operations 
and performance, including 
both pursuits of new products 
in the market (exploration), 
and improvement of existing 
products (exploitation).   
Future studies should combine 
our present study’s current 
quantitative approach with 
qualitative data to better 
understand export outcomes. 
Semi-structured interviews 
with managers about their 
export experiences could 
identify challenges/ 
opportunities in the context of 
export market.   
Future studies should include 
in-depth interviews and case 
studies to better understand the 
involuntary and voluntary 
nature of stock market firms’ 
exit, especially ownership 
structure factors associated 
with exit decisions.  
Policy 
Implication 
There is an opportunity to 
provide guidelines for a 
resilient business model to 
survive and grow in difficult 
situations.  
There is an opportunity to 
further develop and administer 
cross-country supply chain and 
security clearance 
infrastructure.  
There is an opportunity to 
improve the regulations and 




Business leaders and managers 
should customize their anti-
terrorism management 
practices to match their 
practices and characteristics. 
For example, a resilient anti-
terrorism strategy to develop 
robust buyer relationships and 
a reliable global value chain 
for business continuity.  
Business leaders and managers 
should monitor terrorism at the 
regional level and devise 
relevant individual and 
collaborative strategies to 
safeguard exports. For 
example, shared-regional 
strategies of firms to address 
decline in foreign sales.   
Business leaders and managers 
should continue to proactively 
develop succession plans and 
professional financial control 
systems that offer the best 
options for firms to avoid 
disgraceful exit from the stock 




The integrative model (see Figure 5.1) describes the interplay of (1) business continuity (exit 
as per Chapter 4), (2) competitive positioning in general (export as per Chapter 3), and (3) the 
support and protection of operations particular to competitive positioning within an industry of 
strategic importance to the country i.e., textile (Chapter 2). Irrespective of each Chapter’s focus 
on particular firm outcomes, the dissertation is bound by a particular external business 
environment contingency, terrorism, and its relationship to the internal decisions of the firms. 
While firms may be located in a country context that shares a threat of terrorism, internal aspects 
of the firm’s business environment, i.e., geographic location differences, firm variation in age, 
size and export efforts, are associated with systemization in the use of planning and deployment 
of resources.   
 



























A fine-grained analysis of the relationship between terrorism and different aspects of firms’ 
conduct (e.g., business operations, exports, and exit) could help identify how business leaders can 
anticipate the business-effects of terrorism and develop practices in the context of terrorism. This 
dissertation uses Pakistan as a test case for understanding terrorism effects on firms. Relevant and 
rigorous research questions are addressed to contribute to the field of international business and 
strategy. Specifically, this dissertation examines the impact of terrorism on business operations of 
firms and management practices of firms to deal with terrorism, terrorism and firms’ export 
performance, and terrorism-related exit strategies of firms. The findings of this dissertation set a 
stage for future studies that address the relationship between other organizational characteristics 
(family ownership, leadership style) and terrorism characteristics (target group, infrastructure 
loss). The relevance of this topic to academics, policymakers, and managers offers significant 
opportunity for continued investigation about exogenous shocks.    
Chapter 2 evidences that terrorism affects business operations and the relationship with 
foreign customers, and explains anti-terrorism management practices to retain foreign customers. 
While Chapter 2 focuses particularly on the textile sector, this sector is especially reliant on 
exports and is an integral part of economy of Pakistan. Chapter 3 includes firms in industries 
above and beyond textiles, and involved in exports. As a proportion of firms’ revenues erode, it is 
likely that terrorism may affect the export behavior of the firms. Thus, in broadening the range of 
considered industries, but focusing on changes in exports, Chapter 3 reinforces the relationship 
between characteristics of terrorism and export outcome. While Chapter 4 does not directly 
model the relationship between export effects and firms’ exit, the linkage is established how firm 
specific characteristics such as size, exports, and sector, influence the exit strategy of the firms. 
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 5.2.1. Chapter 2 
Chapter 2 focuses on the research question: “What are the impacts of terrorism on business 
operations of textile firms in Pakistan and what management practices do they use to deal with 
terrorism?” It explores these mechanisms through textiles sector firms that are affected by 
terrorism and what management practices are used to avoid the damage of terrorism.  Textile 
firms were selected for this study because well-regarded terrorism scholars pointed out that 
terrorist attacks can potentially affect the customers’ behavior to importing textile products from 
Pakistan (Czinkota, 2002; Knight & Czinkota, 2008).  
Chapter 2 builds upon the prior research that offered conceptual insight into the direct and 
indirect effects of terrorism. In the ongoing studies of terrorism, Czinkota, Knight, and Liesch 
(2004) and Czinkota et al. (2005, 2010) listed the numerous ways in which terrorism can affect 
business. These include longer delivery time, interruption in supply chain, increase in supply 
cost, loss of human life, and decline in demand. The literature (Knight & Czinkota, 2008; 
McIntyre & Travis, 2006; Sheffi, 2001, 2005; Suder, 2004, 2006; Wernick, 2006) recognizes that 
while terrorism can have a general effect, particular effects may be contingently related to 
characteristics of the firms, and how can firms cope with the issue of terrorism (Harvey, 1993; 
Wernick & von Glinow, 2012; Zeneli, Czinkota, & Knight, 2018) and its particular context 
(Suder & Czinkota, 2005).   
This chapter presents an empirical investigation that extends and expands upon prior 
conceptual studies to enhance the resilience of the firms (Czinkota et al., 2010; Frey, 2009). It 
explains the development of a questionnaire that included a combination of closed- and open-
ended questions designed to obtain managers’ perceptions of terrorism effects and firms' efforts 
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to address terrorism. Given the likely contingent nature of the relationship between perceptions of 
terrorism and actions taken to address terrorism, the questionnaire also included basic 
information about firm-specific variables, firms' experience with terrorism preparedness in the 
past, present, and future as well as the effect of terrorism on the business operations of the firms 
using 10 items to cover business dimensions: supply, supply chain, production, human resource, 
cost factor, and demand. This data was supplemented with data on the specific context of city-
level terrorist attacks in Pakistan to extract the perception and actions of firms about the 
proximity of the firm to terrorism. To obtain heterogeneity of experiences, the survey was 
administered to textile firm managers/owners at international trade fairs with both import- and 
export-oriented internationally engaged firms, heeding the call of Zeneli et al. (2018) to consider 
internationally engaged and large firms.  Thus, the data obtained permits empirical categorization 
of firms into sub-groups-small, medium and large firms-to elucidate the mechanisms through 
which firms are affected by terrorism, and firms’ strategic responses against terrorism. Previous 
studies of Czinkota et al. (2005; 2010) overlooked the logic of different size firms. The 
heterogeneity and high frequency of terrorist attacks among different cities within the context of 
Pakistan enable a more detailed response to open-ended questions such as 1) how does terrorism 
in the same city or any other city affect the business activities of the firms or 2) how does 
terrorism affect on business and economy in general, and 3) how can a firm fail due to terrorism. 
The findings presented in Chapter 2 offer an exploratory picture of the effect of terrorism on 
business operations and the relationship between firms’ management practices to deal with 
terrorism and characteristics of the firms (export intensity, firm size, and location). Local 
customers-focused firms suffered delays in supplies. Local firms’ management practices to deal 
with the terrorism identified vulnerabilities in the internal value chain. Critical operations were 
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moved to less terrorism-prone regions. Export-oriented firms faced a big challenge; foreign 
customers had negative perceptions of doing business in Pakistan due to terrorism and were 
reluctant to visit Pakistan. Exporting firms worked to ensure business operation continuity with a 
strong focus on foreign customers’ satisfaction through safety arrangements to foreign customers, 
reliance on multi-location suppliers rather than a single location, preparation for rapid repair and 
replacement in case of terrorism, payment of extra insurance and wages, and rules of succession 
for every leading position. 
Firms’ export-related behaviors due to terrorism vary according to their size. Small firms are 
mostly non-exporting and not equipped with sufficient resources to offer extra facilities to their 
customers. Medium firms are export oriented, so terrorism affects the firms through reluctance of 
customers to visit Pakistan, paying extra insurance, suffering interruption in the supply chain, and 
longer delivery times. Medium-sized firms ensure the safety arrangement of the foreign 
customers; they manage interruptions in the supply chain through safety stocks to avoid shocks 
and also devise a contingent transportation plan. Large firms also face the problem of foreign 
customers’ reluctance to visit them in Pakistan. Large firms manage the issue of foreign 
customers by arranging the safety parameters and relying on multi-locations suppliers rather than 
a single location.   
This chapter has important contributions through the broader aspects of terrorism at a city-
level. First, cities in addition to Lahore and Karachi are included in this study because they too 
are affected by terrorism. Second, this permits stronger consideration of the interdependency of 
firms that serve domestic and foreign markets. A city-level comparison between firms in Sialkot 
and Faisalabad is illustrative of how a safe or unsafe business environment for a firm is 
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determined considering the complexity in business operations and leverage in relationship with 
customers.  For example, disruption in business operations and reputation can create more 
inconvenience for foreign customers because they are not familiar with the culture, laws, and 
languages in a local setting.  
Foreign customers are more sensitive than domestic customers to terrorist incidents in 
Pakistan. Thus, the impact of terrorism is more severe for firms that are more dependent on the 
foreign market. Sialkot is strongly focused on foreign customers, a relatively small industrial city 
in comparison to other metropolitan cities like Lahore, Karachi, and Faisalabad, etc., in Pakistan. 
Firms in Sialkot attract key personnel by paying more to labor in comparison to firms in 
Faisalabad. Sialkot firms’ reliance on foreign customers shifts the management practices towards 
the foreign market which is significantly different from firms in Faisalabad. Firms in Sialkot give 
more importance to safety stock and contingent transportation plan. While comparing Sialkot 
firms with firms in Lahore, there is a decline in demand from foreign customers. Firms in Sialkot 
are not only devising safety mechanisms for business operations, but also the arrival of foreign 
customers. Sialkot firms are more active in comparison to firms in Lahore by providing financial, 
medical, and psychological help; rely on suppliers from multi-locations rather than a single 
location; contingency transportation plan; and more material supply from less terrorism-prone 
areas.  
Geographically, the inability of firms in Faisalabad to provide a safe travel arrangement for 
foreign customers adds more stress for firms in Faisalabad. Consequently, they face a decline in 
demand from abroad and from Pakistan in comparison to firms in Lahore. Firms in Faisalabad are 
statistically different from Lahore to cope with the issue of terrorism as they rely more on 
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suppliers from multi-locations and follow rules of succession for every leading position. They 
devise an escape and security plan at the place, arrange more material supplies from less 
terrorism-prone areas, and manage employees training in case of terrorism. Thus, management 
practices create a safety cushion between the effect of terrorism and the business operations of 
the firms. Sound business strategies allow firms to gain a good reputation and build confidence in 
the eye of customers and employees. The variation of terrorist incidents among cities and firms’ 
characteristics determines the reaction of firms against terrorism.  
Chapter 2 contributes to the literature by extending the studies of Czinkota et al. (2010) and 
Zeneli et al. (2018) by considering the empirical analysis of firm-specific impact of terrorism on 
the business operations and management practices to cope with the issue of terrorism as 
recommended by Frey (2009) and Harvey (1993). This unique study explores the mechanisms 
through which terrorism affects export intensity, firms of different sizes, and geographic location. 
It identifies the context of terrorism on business operations and management practices for various 
types of firms (Malik, 2019).     
Chapter 2 uses cross-section data from a survey and interviews to explain the relationship 
between terrorism and firms’ business operations. Future research may use panel data to observe 
the impact of terrorism on decision making concerning firms’ exports and survival over time. 
Also, this chapter suggests a mixed-method study to provide a deeper understanding of how the 
pursuit of new products in the market and improvement of existing products may occur even in 





5.2.2. Chapter 3 
Chapter 3 addresses the research question “How does terrorism affect the export performance 
of the firms?” This chapter is an effort to fill the research void regarding the firm-level export 
effects of terrorism across a variety of industries. An unsafe business environment may lead to 
low economic activity in a terrorism-prone country. Previous macroeconomic studies enlighten 
us about the negative effect of terrorism on international trade (Mirza & Verdier, 2014; Nitsch & 
Schumacher, 2004). Terrorism may cause damage to businesses, particularly manufacturing 
sector firms are more delicate to the external environment. Manufacturing sector firms have a 
more complex organizational process than service sector that involves supply, supply chain, 
production, employees, cost, and demand. For example, Bandyopadhay et al. (2018) point to a 
negative impact of terrorism on manufacturing goods, whereas there is no impact on the trade of 
primary goods.   
While existing literature indicates that at country- and cross-country-level terrorism affects 
trade, this chapter delves into a microeconomic analysis of city-level terrorism and firm-level 
export performance. The advantage of the disaggregated study is to respond to calls for the 
spatial dimension of terrorism and the corresponding dynamics of time (LaFree, 2010). Thus, 
Chapter 3 empirically investigates the city-level terrorism in the same location of the firms and as 
well as the weighted distance spillover effect of terrorism in the neighboring cities. Random 
nature of terrorist incidents within a country would allow conducting a single country analysis to 
offer implications for the managers in terrorism-ridden country because the geographical 
dispersion of terrorism events may result in a variation across cities over time (Öcal & Yildirim, 
2010). Microeconomic impact of terrorism on export performance of firms at a city level extends 
the literature that mostly discusses macroeconomic trade-related cross-country studies (Mirza & 
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Verdier, 2014; Nitsch & Schumacher, 2004). Thus, Chapter 3 digs deeper to explain terrorism 
and international trade link by constructing a unique firm-level panel data and city-level terrorism 
data to investigate the relationship between terrorism and exports. Firm-specific and years-
specific fixed-effects would control for the unobserved heterogeneity in a panel data estimation 
that is ignored in cross-country studies. Hence, our disaggregated empirical approach makes our 
analysis and results more robust and avoids omitted variable bias.  
Chapter 3 uses a unique dataset based on the firm-level financial information of 482 listed 
firms at the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSX) from 1999 to 2014. Similarly, city-level terrorism 
data is compiled from the South Asian Terrorism Portal (SATP) for 15 years. City Terrorism 
Index is constructed by using the number of terrorist incidents, the number of fatalities, and the 
number of injuries for each city, inspired from the Global Terrorism Index (Institute for 
Economics and Peace, 2018). A weighted-distance matrix is computed to capture the spillover 
interregional neighboring effects of terrorism on the exports. The assumption to include a 
weighted scheme is that the closer the city to a terrorist incident city, the bigger the impact on the 
exports of the firms and vice versa. Our estimated results point to a statistically negative impact 
of city-level terrorism on the export behavior of the firms. Moreover, the impact of terrorism in 
the same city is strong in the medium-term and diminishing over time. Also, terrorism in the 
neighboring city also has an interregional spillover effect on the export behavior of the firms. 
Chapter 3 calls for future research that may provide insights on the effect of terrorism on the 
business activities of firms and anti-terrorism management practices of well-established listed 
firms. Some firms might have developed a self-defense system to avoid the harm of terrorism. 
Further studies may help in understanding the mechanisms through which firms’ foreign business 
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activities are disrupted and help firms in devising a customized global strategy to protect export 
performance.  
 
5.2.3. Chapter 4 
Chapter 4 aims to investigate the question: “What is the relationship between terrorism, 
competitive positioning, liability of location, and the exit of publicly-traded Pakistani firms?” 
Previous research hints that terrorism threatens firms’ existence. Greenbaum et al. (2007) posited 
and showed a positive significant relationship between terrorism and firm death in the year 
following the terrorist attack. Some firms might manage to survive due to their capabilities and/or 
country conditions. Oh and Oetzel (2017) empirically explain that some firms were able to 
develop capabilities around managing in unstable markets; furthermore, firms gained a 
competitive advantage through innovative strategies. Also, firms’ strategic responses absorbed 
violent shocks and reduced devastating negative consequences (Oetzel & Getz, 2012). Tingbani 
et al. (2019) showed in a cross-country comparative study that the effect of terrorism on business 
failures differed among developed, developing, and fragile states. While previous studies 
provided evidence on terrorism and business failure (Greenbaum et al., 2007; Tingbani et al., 
2019), the city-level effect of terrorism on firms’ exit has yet to be investigated.  
Thus, Chapter 4 conducts an empirical study to explain the relationship between city-level 
terrorism and firms’ exit strategies. A more nuanced consideration of location that accounts for 
within-country variation in terrorism and its interplay with the competitive positioning of the firm 
sets the stage for an insightful study to capture how terrorism functions as a locational liability; 
i.e., like a natural hazard, affecting firms more generally, or as a technological discontinuity, 
having a disproportionate effect on particular types of firms (Dai, Eden, & Beamish, 2017). 
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Previous studies on exit literature define exit by determining whether to include or exclude an 
assortment of voluntary and less than voluntary transitions (Kalnins et al., 2006). Thus, the types 
of firms’ exit examined included bankruptcy, M&A, and buyback of shares. Classic 
organizational theory arguments are developed to support the relationship between firm 
attributes, terrorism, and exit. For example, previous literature on the uncertain business 
environments in combination with firm attributes such as age and size result in unpredictable 
changes in demand or disruption of dominant design (Aldrich & Auster, 1986; Anderson & 
Tushman, 2001; Stinchcombe, 1965; Suarez & Utterback, 1995). Also, the business environment 
and firms’ internal attributes give rise to challenges in accessing and deploying resources 
including reputational concerns about firm legitimacy (Ruef & Scott, 1998).   
Using the Cox regression model and Chi-square, this chapter examines the impact of 
terrorism on the 499 listed firms at the Pakistan Stock Exchange (Formerly Karachi Stock 
Exchange) for the period 1999-2015. Chapter 4 results point to a significant positive impact of 
city-level terrorism on firms’ exit from the stock market. In further results, terrorism has a 
significant positive relationship with court driven liquidation (Bankruptcy), whereas no 
significant relationship with the buyback of shares or mergers and acquisitions. To capture the 
individual characteristics of specific sectors, our empirical analysis points to a more stronger firm 
exit of textile sectors in comparison to other sectors due to city-level terrorism. 
Chapter 4 contributes to the literature by offering the first evidence on the relation of city-
level terrorist attacks and the exit decision of emerging market listed firms. Our analysis is more 
precise than the previous studies of Tingbani et al. (2019) and Greenbaum et al. (2007) as we 
isolate actual bankruptcy cases, incorporate city-level measures of the location and severity of 
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terrorism, and consider geographically-tied aspects of competitive positioning. Our terrorism 
measures include local and spillover effects and their severity as a sequence of events in time, 
allowing us to consider the relative influence of more or less geographically and timely 
proximate terrorism.  
Chapter 4 theoretically contributes by developing the concept “liabilities of location” as a 
way to appropriately align theory applicable to the study of a population of publicly-traded firms 
and to link classic population ecology arguments (McKelvey & Aldrich, 1983; Stinchcombe, 
1965) with classic competitive positioning (Hambrick & Fredrickson, 2005) and economic 
cluster arguments found in the strategy literature (Porter, 1980, 1985, 1990). Our results provide 
evidence of the importance of considering the choice of industry, firm size, and buyer market 
(export/no export) and combining terrorism “location” influences. Future studies on survived 
firms that have not gone bankrupt would allow us to apply more clearly population ecology 
logics to both survival and exit alike.  
 
5.3. Implications  
5.3.1. Limitations and implications for research 
This dissertation is amongst the first empirical studies to examine the relationships between 
terrorism and firms’ business choices. In particular, the city-level analysis of terrorism brings 
new insights into firm-specific effects on business operations. This dissertation extends the 
existing research by highlighting the strategic significance of firms’ management practices to 
safeguard the core of business operations against terrorism (Czinkota et al., 2005, 2010; Zeneli et 
al., 2018). Although, the number of management practices based on the literature is discussed in 
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the dissertation, it does not expand on which management practices or combinations of practices 
are good for depending on firms’ characteristics and competitive positioning. Some insights are 
provided into the management practices of different size of firms, various geographic location 
and export intensity. A deeper exploration of these management insights offers an opportunity for 
future research. The limitations of this dissertation draw attention for future research.  
Business managers have ranked terrorism as one of the biggest threats to businesses (PwC, 
2018). Unfortunately, it is a more severe problem for emerging economies where terrorism is 
coupled with other serious issues of the society e.g., unemployment, illiteracy, and poverty. 
However, terrorism is a complex issue and the informative value of surveys is still limited. To 
address the limitations of this dissertation, future research might go multiple directions to explain 
the mechanism through which terrorism puffs business activities of firms, such as drilling down 
to a more rigorous estimation based on size, ownership, age, market, and sector of firms. 
Likewise, there is an opportunity to develop a more precise location-specific terrorism 
measurement considering city-level effects within a country.     
Chapter 2 contributes to the literature by disentangling the effects of terrorism on 
international business for local and international firms, firms of different size, and firms in 
regions affected by terrorism to different degrees. It builds an argument that firms’ strategy 
against terrorism is dependent on the perception and experience of firms operating in a terrorism-
ridden region. The literature would benefit from further study of terrorism-specific firms' 
management practices to ensure the business continuity. As much of the research has focused on 
the defensive routines, it would be useful to study the entrepreneurial behavior of firms like the 
introduction of new products in the market or / and improvement of the existing products and 
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processes (O’Reilly & Tushman, 2004). Chapter 2 calls for a mixed method study that begins 
with interviews of leaders to learn more and probe their understanding of the processes that 
explain the relationship between terrorism and its impact on each department within a firm and 
the firms overall deterioration. This chapter also calls for future research on firms' sector-specific 
and city-specific mechanisms to examine the relationship of terrorism and the vertical and 
geographic interdependencies of their value chain processes and internalization activities. 
Additionally, our understanding about the relationship between terrorism and international 
business strategy can be enhanced by comparing buyer-supplier relationships of firms in the 
context of terrorism, i.e., foreign-foreign, foreign-local, local-foreign, and local-local 
relationships. 
Chapter 3 is contributing to the international business literature by conducting research on a 
city-level unit of analysis that gives a more refined relationship between terrorism and firms 
export performance (Mudambi et al., 2018). Future investigation using panel data would enable 
us to observe variation in terrorism pattern and its impact on firms’ export performance over 
time. Incorporating city data and supply chain structures would allow consideration of both space 
and time (Mingo et al., 2018). Future research might also focus on a more detailed analysis of 
how the publicly-traded firms’ export activities are hampered and what measures firms take to 
deal with the issue of terrorism. Qualitative data could be used as a complement to better 
understand how leaders are experiencing terrorism over time. Interviews with managers might 
help in understanding the logic of particular anti-terrorism strategies needed to survive in the 
global market.  
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Chapter 4 introduces a new theoretical construct, liability of location. This extension of 
liabilities of age and size (Aldrich & Auster, 1986) could provide a supplemental approach for 
examining business continuity. Future study can focus on how firms overcome liabilities of 
location through resilience strategies. In particular, in-depth interviews and case studies to better 
understand the voluntary nature of stock market firms’ exit (share buybacks, mergers & 
acquisitions) in relation to terrorism effects on future market opportunities would offer a more 
balanced strategic perspective on terrorism.  
In sum, this dissertation sets the stage for continued research on the relationship between 
terrorism and its effects on business. In particular, it draws attention to a combination of physical 
and psychological mechanisms that arise within and across businesses. Research should 
acknowledge that terrorism is a serious concern not only in Pakistan, but also a serious concern 
for partner firms in foreign destinations.  
 
5.3.2. Implications for Policy 
The implications of this dissertation can help policymakers to draw policy recommendations 
in the context of terrorism and business activities of the firms. This dissertation mainly focuses 
on the management practices of firms operating in a terrorism-stricken country e.g., Pakistan. 
These findings offer novel policy recommendations suggested by the firms interviewed to 
achieve individual and collective objectives of firms in particular and of the economy in general. 
Firm ‘O’ has pointed out the impact of government policies on the business:  
“Failure of the firms is due to inconsistent policies of the government and poor 
management strategies of the companies.” [Interview conducted on April 15, 2018] 
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Terrorism is an external environment challenge for the firms that may not be handled all 
alone. This work hints the logic of decision making under uncertainty through specific business 
practices that can determine the severity of the relationship between terrorism in the city and the 
sensitivity of the firms. Business-environment is to some extent beyond the control of a firm; the 
intervention of government can address the security-related issues and ensure a robust ecology of 
businesses. For example, a manager from Firm ‘P’ has mentioned:   
“Terrorism increases uncertainty for business and big economic decisions. We have 
faced situations when our customers changed their mind to visit us. It is very 
embarrassing for us when they tell us about security concerns. We can’t improve 
security situation alone. It is the responsibility of government to ensure peace in the 
region...” [Interview conducted on March 29, 2018] 
  The perception of foreign customers may be changed by taking regional security measures 
to ensure the safety of customers. This dissertation suggests that government can help firms to 
enhance the outreach of business linkages through smart diplomacy and simplified trade 
agreements. For example, the alignment of trade and foreign policy might facilitate firms to build 
credibility and trust for long term business ties. Multilateral and bilateral negotiations by 
allowing access to relevant information of business personnel through the establishment of 
institutional mechanisms may ease up the visa process in countries with strict visa policies. Ease 
of mobility may result in opening the avenues for new business connections.  
Furthermore, an open visa policy may help in two aspects: firstly, it may help in attracting 
foreign business delegates to explore business opportunities; secondly, it can boost the tourism 
industry that consequently builds a soft image of the country. Based on the answers of firms from 
the interview, Firm ‘Q’ corroborates the importance of visa policy:  
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“It is difficult to survive in international market. Our government is not sincere with 
business community. We are paying double price for our booth. Three business 
people could not get visas. They have no ability to fight for their businessmen. They 
have no research for these trade fairs.” [Interview conducted on April 15, 2018] 
Also, the government can provide incentives in the shape of excise and taxation rebates to 
firms that are consistently maintaining the internationalization process despite being exposed to 
the risk of terrorism. Concerned authorities may ensure the transparency and set regulations for 
export-oriented firms to expedite the scrutiny of delivered products. Similarly, for the business 
operations in a local environment, the infrastructure development of roads and ports to stock 
products of remotely located firms might somehow solve the challenge of supply chain 
disruptions. The lesser the dependency of a firm on other cities makes business process easier. 
For example, a single-source transportation facility, the lower the vulnerability of the internal 
value chain activities of firms under uncertainty. A public-private partnership and collaborative 
actions might help in establishing infrastructures such as dry-ports, road access, and innovative 
cargo service to gain customers’ confidence. Firms’ ability to supply uninterruptedly in the 
middle of terrorism to foreign destinations can change the business reputation in the eye of 
customers. Given the findings that terrorism is a big issue for the international business activities 
of the firms, policymakers are advised to pay attention to the complexities of the value chain 
process for small regions where lack of infrastructure creates more trouble for business 
operations of the firms.  
The findings of this dissertation point to a trend of decline in export sales due to terrorist 
attacks in the city (Chapter 3). It is therefore crucial for the policymakers to improve the ease of 
doing business, on-arrival visas to foreign investors, and foolproof security facilities. The 
perception of the customer decides the fate of a firm in a global business environment. A caring 
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approach of the policymakers can be depicted by offering practical solutions to firms to deal with 
the threat or effects of terrorism. The matter of terrorism can potentially tarnish the business 
connections of export-dependent firms.  
In a policy framework, terrorism-related policy shifts may change the complexities involved 
at each stage of business dimensions of a firm operating in a terrorism-plague country. Lack of 
planning to address terrorism risk might endanger the survival of the firms. To avoid such 
situations, there is a role of public-private partnerships that may help in drafting policy guidelines 
to achieve economic objectives. Foreign policy may reflect a business-friendly environment to 
attract investment from abroad. In a nutshell, a safe business environment and strong institutions 
in a country can ensure long-lasting business network with domestic and foreign customers. For 
example, firm ‘R’ has explained: 
“Terrorism is unhealthy for business activities and economy of Pakistan. It has 
reduced the demand of customers, and customers are afraid to visit our factory. We 
have to pay higher wages to our workers to keep our production in flow. We have to 
spend more on security. Likewise terrorism is not good for economy, because 
government has to readjust their priorities; they have to cut their development budget 
on security budget. That’s why we lack infrastructure and improvement in our 
system.” [Interview conducted on March 29, 2018] 
Ministries and Chamber of Commerce in Pakistan have shown interest in the findings of this 
dissertation. The independent chapters identify the different relationships between terrorism and 







5.3.3. Implications for Managers 
The implications for research can be extended into practical implications for managers. This 
dissertation opens up an important and relevant topic of seeking competitive advantage in the 
context of terrorism. Management practices that allow firms to continue to be a reliable 
commercial partner are especially important. Managers must be aware of the potential 
repercussion on the business operations and developing international markers amid terrorism. 
This dissertation informs management decisions in three aspects: firms’ unique characteristics, 
effects of terrorism on firms’ operation, exports and exit.   
Firms’ unique characteristics are a combination of size, location, and customers. This 
dissertation draws attention to the interplay between the internal environment of firms and 
external environment challenges. In a business environment, terrorism disrupts business 
operations (Chapter 2), shrinks export performance (Chapter 3), and fosters the exit of firms 
(Chapter 4). This dissertation provides awareness to managers about their decision to minimize 
disruption, sustain exports, and enhance the longevity of firms.  
Management practices explained in Chapter 2 give an overview of firms' conduct with 
specific firms’ characteristics. Management practices are like a magnetic field around the core of 
the firm that repels the negative waves that could disrupt the cohesion of business operations. 
Managers need to understand which management practices are essential to their business 
continuity and competitive positioning and focus on the resilience of those practices. Chapter 2 of 
this dissertation provides rich primary data that shows variation in the strategic responses to 
address the effects of terrorism on business operations.  
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The managerial implications of city-level effects are more evident in Chapter 3 and Chapter 
4. The dependence of firms on suppliers from terrorism-prone cities increases the uncertainty for 
their sales in foreign market. Similarly, the complexity of global value chain may create 
difficulties for firms even when they are located in less terrorism-affected cities. In the absence of 
customized management practices of firms, terrorism leads to a decline in export ratio. The 
dependence of a firm on export could result in exit of firms through bankruptcy. The effects or 
threats of terrorism appeared to depend on the perception and actions taken by managers to 
safeguard business activities.  
The aforementioned managerial implications are directly related to the analyses presented in 
Chapters 2, 3, and 4. Chapters 3 and 4 utilize secondary panel data that capture trends over time 
and space, while the interview responses in Chapter 2 corroborate the inferences drawn from 
analyses in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4. Additional managerial insights, derived from open-ended 
responses are offered below. 
Managers must understand the value of communication through innovative strategies to gain 
the confidence of foreign customers for retaining existing business orders and setting a stage for 
establishing new markets. Internationally engaged firms’ managers must fight at two frontiers. 
They first, must create business activities to ensure production of goods at the firm level. 
Secondly, they need to create a stable global value chain and go the extra mile to achieve 
competitive advantage through credible business connection with foreign customers.   
The implications for managers drawn from this dissertation are categorized into two groups 
based on the market focus of the firms. Local and foreign market-focused firms have different 
business environments to deal with. The exposure of terrorism risk and sensitivity of customer 
159 
 
relationships determine the gravity of the counter-terrorism strategy of the firms. Managers aim 
to survive firm under the uncertainty of terrorism and implementing business-related contextual 
practices to ensure business continuity. Business managers can devise innovative anti-terrorism 
practices that may enable businesses to achieve a competitive advantage in the local and foreign 
markets. Terrorist attacks create bad word-of-mouth; therefore, business practitioners must be 
aware of the fact that the adversity of terrorism can lead to business decay. 
Succinctly, the three major aspects of this dissertation are, namely firm-specific 
characteristics, location-specific terrorism effect on firms (operations, exports, and exit), and the 
significance of firms’ rigorous terrorism management practices. This dissertation provides 
empirical evidence of terrorism and firms’ behavior in a particular country context. Improving 
the business environment via thorough security and safety arrangements for local and foreign 
customers may change the perception. The counter-terrorism business strategy may help firms in 
restoring the image and gaining the confidence of customers. Unfortunately, terrorism is a 
dominating hurdle in the economic activities of firms in Pakistan. The economic goals of 
Pakistan are dependent on the business environment in the economic hotspots. A lack of 
customer trust may cause business failure for the firms. Thus, management practices may not 
only make possible the protection of firms but also put back the customer connection.  
 
5.4. Conclusion 
This dissertation is an effort to enhance the understanding of firms’ management practices to 
cope with the challenge of terrorism to sustain export performance and survival of the firms. 
Management practices can increase the immunity of firms to run day-to-day business operations 
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and stay competitive in the local and foreign markets. This dissertation provides 
recommendations to address other difficult situations that arise. For example, the current situation 
of COVID-19 has disrupted the business environment at a regional and global context; the 
resultant guidelines may assist with this disruption. 
Management practices explained in this dissertation can be tailored to other contexts and used 
to develop safety mechanisms against other difficult business situations. The complexity and 
variation of terrorist incidents in the context of firms’ business operations in Pakistan might 
recommend certain actions in response to other difficult situations across the globe to maintain 
the survival, sustainability, and growth in local and foreign markets. By addressing selected 
themes of terrorism and firms' perspective on resilience strategies, this dissertation motivates the 
continual scientific discussions with practical solutions in the fields of international business, 
strategy, and decision making under extreme uncertainty caused by exogenous shocks to generate 
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APPENDIX A  
Survey for Trade Fairs in Germany and Pakistan 
(Chapter 2) 
 
1. Survey for Heimtextil 2018 
Frankfurt, Germany, January 9-12, 2018 
 
2. Survey for Textile Asia 2018 
Karachi, Pakistan, March 27-29, 2018 
 
3. Survey for FIBO Global Fitness 
2018 
Cologne, Germany, April 12-15, 2018 
 
This survey collects information on your enterprise’s business organization, 
internationalization, and obstacles to business. 
The information obtained here will be held in the strictest confidentiality. Neither your name 
nor the name of your business will be used in any document based on this survey.  





Name of Enterprise: _________________________________________________ 
Main industry: ______________________________________________________ 
Main products: _____________________________________________________ 
Address: __________________________________________________________ 
 
Contact details of respondent (or business card) 
Name: _________________________________________ 
Job title: _______________________________________ 
Phone : ________________________________________ 
E-mail: ________________________________________ 
 
General information about the enterprise 
 
1. What is the founding year of your enterprise?  
 
2. Is your enterprise part of an enterprise group? 
Yes ☐  No ☐ 
If yes, is it a foreign enterprise group?  Yes ☐  No ☐  
If yes, in which country is the head office of your group located?________________ 
 
3. Does your enterprise have subsidiaries in Pakistan?   
Yes ☐  No ☐ 





If yes, in which cities and what is the number of subsidiaries per city? 





4. Does your enterprise have subsidiaries outside of Pakistan? 
Yes ☐  No ☐ 
If yes, in which countries and what is the number of subsidiaries per country? 





5. What was your enterprise’s average number of employees in 2015 and 2016? 
 
2015   2016 
                    
 
6. What was your enterprise’s total sales for 2015 and 2016 (in Pakistani Rupee)? 
2015   2016 
                    
 
7. What proportion of your enterprise’s total sales is attributable to exports? 
 2015 2016 





8. For how many years have you been exporting abroad? 
 
9. If your company exports and imports, what are your export and import markets? 
 Exporting to Importing from 
Europe Yes ☐ No ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ 
… Germany Yes ☐ No ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ 
North America (USA & Canada) Yes ☐ No ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ 
South America Yes ☐ No ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ 
Asia Yes ☐ No ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ 
… China Yes ☐ No ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ 
… Afghanistan Yes ☐ No ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ 
… United Arab Emirates Yes ☐ No ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ 
Africa Yes ☐ No ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ 
Australia & New Zealand Yes ☐ No ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ 
Others Yes ☐ No ☐ Yes ☐ No ☐ 
 
 
10. What is your most important export market? ___________________________ 
 
11. What is your most important import market? ___________________________ 
 
12. Who are your main customers in Germany? 











 1-5  years 6 - 10 years 11 - 15 years > 15 years 





Doing business:  
 
Obstacles and management practices  
13. To what degree are the following issues an obstacle to the current operations of your 
enterprise in Pakistan? 
Obstacle to the current 
operations of your 
enterprise in Pakistan 








Tax rates ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Tax administration ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Political instability ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Corruption ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Terrorism ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Crime, theft, disorder ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Customs and trade 
regulations ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Transport ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Electricity  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Telecommunications ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Inadequately educated 
workforce ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Courts  ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Business licensing and 
permits ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Labor regulations ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Practices of competitors 
in the informal sector ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 
Access to land ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ ☐ 







14. How much money has your enterprise approximately spent on security and anti-
terrorism measures in 2015 and 2016 (in Pakistani Rupee)? 
 
15. Effects of terrorism or threats of terrorism in Pakistan for your enterprise.  
Please rate the following statements on a scale from “1” to “7”. 
“1 – strongly agree” 
“2 – agree” 
“3 – agree somewhat” 
“4 – neither agree nor disagree” 
“5 – disagree somewhat” 
“6 – disagree” 
“7 – strongly disagree” 
  
Effects and threats of terrorism in Pakistan 
1. My enterprise was affected by terrorism in the past.  
2. 




I expect that my enterprise will be negatively affected by 
terrorism within the next 5 years. 
 
 
16. To what extent have the business operations of your enterprise ever been affected by 
terrorist activities in Pakistan? 
Please rate the following statements on a scale from “1 – strongly agree” to “7 – strongly 
disagree”. 
  
Effects of terrorism on your business operations in Pakistan 
1. Physical damages (e.g. enterprise buildings)  
 < 100000 Rs 100000 Rs – 
200000 Rs 
200000 Rs – 
500000 Rs 
500000 Rs –   
1000000 Rs 
> 1000000 Rs 
2015 ☐  ☐  ☐  ☐  ☐  





Effects of terrorism on your business operations in Pakistan 
2. Lower demand by customers from Pakistan  
3. Lower demand by customers from abroad  
4. 
Customers are reluctant to come to Pakistan to visit my 
enterprise 
 
5. Unpredictable supply chain shifts and interruptions   
6. Supply chain direct costs have gone up  
7. Longer delivery times  
8. Injured or killed employees  
9. Higher labour costs  
10. Higher insurance costs  
 
17. How does your enterprise deal with the effects or threats of terrorism? 
Please rate the following statements on a scale from “1 – strongly agree” to “7 – strongly 
disagree”. 
  
Management practices to deal with terrorism 
1. 
My enterprise has a formalized program designed to 
reduce the probability of terrorist attacks and to deal with 




My enterprise has decentralized business operations and 




My enterprise moves critical operations or branching out 
into less terrorism-prone areas. 
 
4. 
My enterprise identifies vulnerabilities across the firm’s 
internal value chain. 
 
5. 







Management practices to deal with terrorism 
6. My enterprise increased the number of security staff.  
7. 
My enterprise’s decision-making is decentralized rather 
than centralized.  
 
8. My enterprise has an escape and security plan in place.  
9. 
My enterprise is prepared for the rapid repair and 




My enterprise discusses the risk of terrorism and anti-
terrorism measures with customers.  
 
11. 
My enterprise offers to provide safe travel arrangements 
for visiting customers. 
 
12. My enterprise has increased safety stocks of inventory.  
13. 
My enterprise relies on alternative suppliers in different 
locations rather than on a single source supplier.  
14. 
My enterprise has increased the amount of material 
sourced from less terrorism-prone areas. 
 
15. 
My enterprise has broadened its shipping arrangements 




My enterprise provides training to employees how to 
behave in case of a terrorist event. 
 
17. 




My enterprise is prepared to provide financial, medical and 
psychological help in case of terrorist attacks.   
19. 




18. Does it make a difference for the business operations for your enterprise if terrorist attacks 
take place in the city where your enterprise is situated compared to terrorist attacks that take 
place in the same region or in other regions of Pakistan? If yes, could you please describe the 





19. How do you assess terrorism in Pakistan with regard to the business activities of your 
enterprise and with regard to the economy in general? 
  
20. How can enterprises fail due to terrorism? (Only for Textile Asia 2018 & FIBO 2018 
Surveys) 
 
21. In case we have further queries, could we contact you again in the future?   
Yes ☐   No ☐   
 
 







B. Econometric Specification (Chapter 4) 
The aim of using survival analysis is to capture the probability of happening of an event. 
We used four different survival approaches to test our hypotheses. Among the known 
parametric distributions, only the exponential, the Weibull and the Gompertz model share the 
assumption of proportional hazards with the Cox regression model (Bender et al., 2005). A 
distribution whose hazard function slopes upward is said to have positive duration 
dependence (Greene, 2008). For such distribution, the likelihood of failure at time t, 
conditional upon duration up to time t, is increasing in t. The opposite case is that of 
decreasing hazard or negative duration dependence. The question about whether a firm is 
more or less likely to exit at time t given that it has lasted until time t can be framed in terms 
of positive or negative duration dependence. The most common approach is to use the Cox 
regression model (Shumway, 2001).  
Cox’s (1972, 1975) model specifies that  
λ(ti) = exp (x'iβ)λ0(ti)           (B.1) 
The function λ0 is the “baseline” hazard, which is the individual heterogeneity. In 
principle, this hazard is a parameter for each observation that must be estimated. Cox’s partial 
likelihood estimator provides a method of estimating β without requiring an estimation of λ0. 
The hazard function36 h0(t), is defined as follows: 
h(t) = f (t) / S(t)                                      (B.2) 
                                                          




where f(t) is the probability density function and S(t) is the survivor function of the 
duration of firms to stay. The parametric form of any given model depends on the choice of 
h0(t). The hazard function of this distribution, conditional on the regressor, X, is 
 h (t; X) = exp( Xβ ) αtα – 1               (B.3) 
exp( Xβ ) =  exp( LAG1_Total Terrorism Index * β1 + LAG2_Total Terrorism Index * β2 + LAG3_Total Terrorism Index * β3 
+  LAG4_Total Terrorism Index * β4 + LAG5_Total Terrorism Index * β5 +  e)           (B.4) 
To illustrate the differences between the Cox model and the other three, we present the 
hazard functions and survival functions (see Table 4.12). This table shows two parameters, a 
location parameter (λ) and a scale parameter (p). All these are distributions for a nonnegative 
random variable. As shown in the table, their hazard functions display very different behavior.  
Table B.1: Hazard Functions and Survival Functions 
Distribution Hazard Function, λ (t) Survival Function, S (t) 
Exponential h0(t) =  S0(t) = 
 
Weibull h0(t) = 
 S0(t) =  
Gompertz h0(t) =  S0(t) = exp ( )) 
Source: Greene (2008); Bender et al. (2005) 
To test the hypotheses of this study, we estimated each model. The strength of survival 
analysis techniques includes the ability to handle censored observations. Censored 
observations arise when the duration of a study is limited. Some firms in the sample appear to 
never experience any additional financial distress events except bankruptcy. These firms 
represent censored observations and can arise for several reasons. Survival analysis methods 
consider these censored observations and thus avoid sampling bias (Shumway, 2001). Cox 
regression is also a nonparametric method and robust to non-normal distribution. 
